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PART I 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The topic of the thesis 
 
The topic of this thesis is the Lebanese government’s conduct regarding the Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon, and the conditions related to their civil rights situation. 
 
In 1948, more than 900,000 Palestinian refugees fled their homes as a consequence of 
Israel’s creation and the war that followed.4 They lost their Palestinian Mandate citizenship, 
and the majority of them continue to be stateless. Virtually none have returned to their 
homes, and by 2005 there were more than four million people who were waiting in host 
countries for a solution to their situation. The refugee problem has existed for nearly sixty 
years, and the choice of topic thus concerns the oldest and most dire unsolved issue of 
modern Middle Eastern history. The Palestinian refugees are in a situation that relates to 
most of the modern conflicts in the area, including the creation of the modern Middle 
Eastern states, counting Israel; the several wars in the region since 1948; and specifically 
the civil war that devastated Lebanon in the years of 1975-1989. The situation still appears 
most critical in this country, where more than fifty per cent of the Palestinian refugees still 
reside in refugee camps erected more than fifty years ago. 
 
The situation of the Palestinian refugees is of interest for several reasons: It has been 
neglected by the international community; it concerns most countries of the region; and a 
final solution is yet to be discovered. The main host countries are Jordan, Syria, and 
Lebanon, and this thesis focuses on Lebanon, because a striking difference between this 
and the other host countries is the situation of civil rights and integration policies. Jordan 
incorporated the Palestinians completely in 1948, as Jordanian citizens. In Syria they were 
treated on near equal terms as Syrian nationals from 1949;5 they were granted all rights 
                                                 
4
 UNRWA Number of registered refugees (1950-2005). Israel has rejected any returns except for small 
numbers for family reunification (Takkenberg 1998, 52). 
5
 Takkenberg 1998, 167f. 
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except citizenship, and were only excluded from political participation.6 Egypt, and most 
other host countries that received a smaller number of Palestinian refugees, shifted between 
policies of integration and neglect.7 Thus, some level of integration took place in each 
country at an early stage. In contrast, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were not granted 
civil rights, and the majority of them remain in refugee camps isolated from the Lebanese 
society. Many live outside the camps; in cities and in unofficial gatherings; but the camp 
based refugees are the focus of this thesis. Their situation in Lebanon appears as if frozen 
in time, with few changes during the years.8 This difference between Lebanon and the other 
host countries is the main reason for the choice of topic. 
 
The Lebanese government became the actor responsible for protecting the rights of the 
Palestinian refugees on Lebanese soil, as we shall see below. Thus it will be the focus of 
my study (both the executive branch and Parliament). Also, I am not discussing the state of 
the refugee situation alone, but the reasons for the situation as well. There are no official 
records accounting for reasons why the Lebanese government have not granted the 
Palestinians civil rights, and few researchers have examined it. Only theories and suggested 
explanations exist in the source material. During my fieldwork in 2006 I looked for 
opinions and explanations why the situation in Lebanon was different from the other host 
countries; in attitudes, statements, legislation, and most importantly in interviews. 
In general, the reasons for the situation were not restricted to the conditions in 
Lebanon. The international community neglected its responsibility since the birth of the 
refugee problem, and Israel did not heed its responsibility either. Neither, one could argue, 
did the Palestinian Authorities after 1993.9 These are all factors that are important for the 
refugee situation in Lebanon; but this thesis seeks to discuss the Lebanese factor and its 
causes, trying to clarify Lebanese reasoning in regards to the refugees on their soil. 
 
                                                 
6
 Such as the right to vote. (Edminster 1999, 7.) 
7
 The situation in Egypt used to be comparable to Syria until the Gulf war, when the Egyptian government 
changed their policy (Takkenberg 1998, 171). Many Arab countries received some refugees, but the above-
mentioned were by far the main countries of refuge to the 1948 Palestinian refugees. 
8
 The term ‘frozen case’, used in the title of this thesis, was derived from an interview with the Lebanese 
researcher Simon Haddad in 2006. See Appendix 5b for his quotation. 
9
 See Chapter 2. 
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Time period 
 
The time period of concern is the period when the Lebanese government was in official 
charge of the refugees, starting with their arrival in 1948 and ending in 2005. There was a 
break in the period from 1969 to 1989, when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
was in charge of the refugee camps. This period will not be examined in detail, and it forms 
a gap that allows a comparison between the situation of 1969 and that of 1989 in some 
chapters. The PLO officially lost control of the camps in 1987; but the government was not 
reinstated to de facto control until the Ta’if Accord; the peace agreement which ended the 
civil war in 1989. The first stage of the government’s responsibility, then, was from 1948 
until 1969, and the second stage began after the Ta’if Accord in 1989. The Lebanese 
government was still in charge of the refugees in 2005, the year before I conducted my 
fieldwork. I chose to end the time span of the thesis in 2005 because of changes which 
occurred in that year; specifically the withdrawal of the Syrian forces long present on 
Lebanese soil; the consequences of which still remain to be seen. 
 
Defining the problem of the thesis 
 
The question I ask is as follows: Why did the Lebanese government not grant civil rights to 
the Palestinian refugees in the country, and why was the civil rights situation different in 
Lebanon than in the other Arab host countries? 
In order to answer this, I first need to clarify what in fact was the civil rights 
situation of the Palestinian refugees, and what in fact was the Lebanese government’s role 
in that situation. Although most researchers and Lebanese sources claim that the 
government played a negative part in relation to the refugees’ rights, there is no real 
consensus. Whether or not the government was even related to the problem is an issue of 
disagreement, and the question of whether or not it could be held responsible meets with 
highly differing views. Also, the research question focuses on the government, but asks 
why the situation in Lebanon is different from other countries as well; and unofficial 
opinions and explanations are important. I therefore rely on available official sources, but 
also on the conditions of the Lebanese society, general circumstances, and Lebanese public 
opinions, in order to discover the reasons for the country’s specific conduct of the refugees. 
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My hypothesis is twofold: Firstly, that the Lebanese government consciously avoided 
integration of the Palestinians throughout the period when they were in charge; and that not 
granting them civil rights was a means for avoiding integration. The second hypothesis is 
that the two reasons most commonly used for the conduct were Lebanon’s confessional 
balance, which influenced the government’s power, and the role of the Palestinians in the 
Lebanese civil war of 1975-1989. One assumption is that the government employed 
coercive power, attitudes and discourses, laws, and official statements as tools in order to 
avoid integration. I also believe that there were other reasons influencing the situation, 
whether believed or real, and that different excuses exist as well. 
 
The chapters 
 
This chapter introduces Part I of the thesis, which is an introduction to the subject. This 
chapter presents the topic and focus, the state of the earlier research, and defines terms. It 
gives an overview of the theoretical framework: The meaning of civil rights in and apart 
from UN conventions, and the international protection of the Palestinian refugees. Lastly, a 
part about the method of source criticism is included. Chapter 2 presents the historical 
background which is essential to understanding the refugee problem and the Lebanese 
society’s history of confessionalism and war. Although the civil war years are not part of 
the focus of the thesis, it is important for the understanding of the following years. The 
chapter treats the period from the creation of modern Lebanon in 1920 until 2005. 
Chapter 3 introduces Part II of the thesis, which accounts for the empirical situation 
of the Palestinian refugees in order to determine the facts of what the civil rights situation 
was. The chapter accounts for the normative laws and regulations in force, focusing on the 
Lebanese legislation on work and freedom of movement. Chapter 4 looks at de facto 
policies in relation to selected civil rights, and shows the actual conditions of the 
Palestinian refugees caused by policies and practises. Chapter 5 looks at the conditions in 
relation to two UN civil right conventions presented below. 
Chapter 6 introduces Part III of the thesis, which discusses the reasons for the 
situation. Chapter 6 puts the former chapters in context by looking at prevalent Lebanese 
attitudes and general opinions, exemplified by written statements and interviews. Chapter 7 
presents Lebanese perceptions of what might explain the civil rights situation. It presents 
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all the explanations or justifications given to me by Lebanese sources, derived for the most 
part from interviews. Most of the interviewees are current or former officials, but I also 
include researchers and one journalist. Palestinians sources are referred to, but not in the 
same manner, since the chapter seeks to account for the Lebanese justifications. The 
chapter’s focus is not to define the actual reasons for the situation, but to account for what 
are the perceived reasons. In Chapter 8 I proceed to discuss the perceived explanations in 
light of prevalent discourses in Lebanon. Chapter 9 consists of summary and conclusions. 
 
When comparisons to other host countries are made, they mainly will be to Syria, 
Lebanon’s closest neighbour, where the situation is most similar. The situation in Jordan is 
also sometimes discussed. Other countries are less relevant, mostly because they are not 
covered by the same international organs.10 
 
State of the research 
 
There is a lot of literature and reports on Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon. Writings 
have been published more frequently during and after the 1990s; especially relating to the 
PLO’s role in the civil war and the Oslo Peace Process (see Chapter 2). Although few 
writers have focused on the role of the Lebanese government specifically, there are several 
topics close to mine that have been thoroughly examined. One of the most important is the 
refugees’ socio-economic conditions and humanitarian situation as a consequence of 
Lebanese laws and regulations. Much has been written on Lebanese history and politics 
relating to my topic as well. 
 
The anthropologists Rosemary Sayigh and Julie Peteet, among others, have studied the 
socio-economic situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.11 Most researchers involved 
in this subject have a social and humanitarian perspective. Sayigh focuses largely on the 
conditions of work, education, housing and health.12 Some Lebanese laws and specific civil 
                                                 
10
 The West Bank and Gaza were under the same UN protection as the above-mentioned host countries, but 
were under occupation for the whole period from 1948-2005 and met with quite a different set of problems. 
11
 Sayigh 1995, Sayigh 2001 and Peteet 1996, Peteet 1997, Edminster 1999. 
12
 Sayigh 1995. 
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rights have also been examined.13 The Palestinian lawyer Suheil al-Natour has published 
several articles and one book about Lebanon’s legal conduct regarding the refugees,14 and 
his work is important for Chapter 3. Others have examined laws on work, residence and 
travel in light of different international legislation or documents, particularly the 1951 
Refugee Convention.15 
Another relevant topic is the Lebanese attitudes toward the refugees. Simon Haddad 
and Hilal Khashan, researchers in the field of political science, have conducted studies on 
attitudes toward resettling the refugees and toward granting them civil rights.16  Some 
articles on different aspects of Lebanese policy toward the camps exist as well.17 These 
studies are discussed in Part II, but they do not treat official attitudes and statements, which 
I will focus on. 
The most relevant studies on Lebanese politics, history, confessionalism and 
clientalist systems are those of the Lebanese researcher and politician Farid el Khazen, and 
the writers Nizar Hamzeh and Paul Salem.18 I make use of the latter in Chapter 3 in 
particular. 
 
When accounting for the explanations given for the situation in Lebanon, researchers have 
basically focused on either the rejection of resettling the Palestinians in Lebanon because of 
Lebanon’s confessional balance; on the refugees’ right to return to their homeland; on 
Lebanon’s density and economy; or on the outbreak and consequences of the civil war. My 
thesis relates to these studies, but also includes explanations that have not been thoroughly 
discussed in earlier works. No extensive work has focused on specific civil rights and 
analyzed their state historically by help of Lebanese legislation and UN conventions. And 
although the lack of civil rights in light of Lebanon’s specific situation has been discussed, 
the role of the Lebanese government and the focus on the reasons for the lack of civil rights 
is a topic barely studied in previous research. 
 
                                                 
13
 Aasheim 2000, Said 1999, Said 2001, Salah 2003. 
14
 al-Natour 1993, al-Natour 1997, al-Natour 2003: “The Palestinians in Lebanon: New Restrictions on 
Property Ownership”, al-Natour 200: “Les réfugiés palestiniens”, al-Natour 2000, al-Natour 2005. 
15
 al-Najjar 2005, Said 2001, Akram 2002. 
16
 Haddad 2000: “The Palestinian predicament in Lebanon”, Haddad 2003, Khashan 1992, Khashan 1994. 
17
 Faris 1981, Sayigh 1995, Said 2001, Onisko 2003. 
18
 Salem 1998, Khazen 2003, Hamzeh 2001, Knudsen 2005. 
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Terms and theoretical framework 
 
Some terms specific to Lebanon require a brief definition. First, ‘tawtin’ is an Arabic word 
derived from watan, homeland. It is an expression which specifically refers to resettling the 
refugees in Lebanon, that is to say that they become Lebanese citizens instead of returning 
to Palestine. The term has come to be used for the Lebanese official rejection of tawtin; the 
rejection of a permanent settlement. For many, the term is extended to include integration, 
or even intermediate steps toward integration such as granting the refugees civil rights. I 
use this term instead of ‘resettling’ because it holds a discursive significance to the 
Lebanese. When the term ‘integration’ is used, it refers to granting the refugees civil rights 
as well as to incorporate them into society in a wider sense. 
The term ‘confessional’ and ‘confessionalism’ refer to the several religious 
confessions of Lebanon and are the common terms for Lebanon’s political system and 
demographic makeup. The term ‘sectarian’ is also used in some sources, but that term is 
generally deemed negative in Lebanon, and therefore ‘confessional’ is preferred. 
 
Civil rights 
 
The concept of civil rights requires a more detailed discussion. The civil rights were 
derived from the international human rights that were formulated by the UN at its creation 
in 1948, as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Human rights had 
naturally been a concept prior to this, but the UDHR formally put them into writing, and 
one of their categories became the civil rights. The terms of the UN are thus important for 
my topic, and in this section I will examine the terms and give an overview of the rights 
included in the civil right conventions. I will also look at the international protection of the 
Palestinian refugees, which is a unique case of neglect. Some work has been done 
regarding the problems of the UN’s agencies and international protection when it comes to 
Palestinian refugees (especially by former director of UNRWA Lex Takkenberg),19 and I 
rely on them to some extent. 
 
                                                 
19
 Akram 2001, Akram 2002, Takkenberg 1998, Said 2001, Aasheim 2000. 
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Human and civil rights 
The civil rights and human rights deal with the same rights but inspire different effects.20 
The UDHR established the principle that every human being is entitled to certain rights, 
independent from factors such as specific legal systems or nationality. The human rights 
describe what human beings need in order to live a worthy life and were established as a 
means of protection in principle from legal and political recurrent, socially produced threats. 
The human right is often perceived as a counter-measure against such threats, and is 
morally, not legally binding. The UDHR, then, is a set of principles which signatory states 
have agreed to follow, but none can be legally charged for ‘violating’ them. The human 
rights are divided into subgroups such as political rights, economic rights, and civil rights. 
In 1966, the Convention of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) were adopted in order to secure the 
implementation of civil rights. By contrast to the UDHR, the civil right conventions are 
legally binding to signatory states; that is to say that a state binds itself to adhere to the 
stipulations of the civil rights within its legal framework. The human rights, then, are not 
related to a state, but are universal principles; while the civil rights depend on a state to 
implement them. Along with the UDHR, these conventions are the main documents of the 
human rights and the content of the conventions are the basis for what the term civil rights 
means in this thesis. 
 
The ICCPR and the ICESCR, when ratified, are to be adapted to the signatory state’s legal 
framework and are internationally and legally binding. The first five articles in both 
conventions instruct the signatories to adhere to its content, and the following articles list 
the rights protected by the conventions. For instance, Article 2 of the ICCPR states the 
following: 
‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of 
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.’21 
 
It goes on to declare that: 
                                                 
20
 The sources for this paragraph is the UDHR, the ICCPR, the ICESCR and Lindholm 2006. 
21
 ICCPR: Article 2, paragraph 1. 
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‘…each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other 
measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.’ 
 
Likewise, article 2 of the ICESCR states: 
‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international 
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available sources, with 
a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.’22 
 
The conventions include persons other than citizens of the state.23 A state that has ratified 
the conventions binds itself legally to adhere to its content, and Lebanon ratified the two 
conventions in 1972. The legally binding aspect of the civil rights, then, was not operative 
until 1966; but the rights still existed as a category of human rights. Therefore I will use the 
term for the whole period of 1948-2005. Saying that Syria ‘granted the Palestinian refugees 
civil rights in 1949’ basically means that the state fulfilled parts of the rights that would 
become legally binding with the conventions. A state might break with or withhold civil 
rights before the conventions, but it was only after 1966 that one could claim that a state 
‘violated’ the civil right conventions. 
 
The rights recognized by the ICCPR include: 
• The right to life 
• The right to security of person 
• The right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose residence for anyone lawfully within the 
territory of a state 
• The right to equality before the law 
• The right to peaceful assembly 
• The right to freedom of associations 
• The right to protection from discrimination 
 
The rights recognized by the ICESCR include: 
• The right to work, and other work-related rights 
• The right to the forming of trade unions 
• The right to social security 
• The right to an adequate standard of living including adequate food, clothing and housing 
• The right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health 
• The right to education 
 
                                                 
22
 ICESCR: Article 2, paragraph 1. 
23
 Aasheim 2000, 57, 59. 
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I have selected four of these as a focus in this thesis: The right to health, to housing, to 
freedom of movement, and to work. Three are found in the ICESCR, while the right to 
freedom of movement is found in the ICCPR. These four are perhaps the most important 
for the refugees’ situation in Lebanon, and they also illustrate Lebanese attitudes 
specifically. There also existed written or oral sources relating to these rights for the whole 
period, making the focus possible in practise. 
 
The Palestinian refugees under international law 
 
The United Nations, the UDHR and the Palestinian refugee problem all coincide in time, as 
all three were ‘born’ in the late 1940s – the UN itself in 1945, and the others in 1948. The 
UN soon established organs to protect the rights of refugees in general, who rely on the 
international community and the country of refuge because they are hindered from 
receiving rights from their own governments. But the UN system did not apply to 
Palestinian refugees. 24  Defining a ‘Palestinian refugee’ has been a problem for the 
international community, both because of the political turmoil surrounding the Palestinians 
and Israel, and because most other refugees are unwilling, to return to their country for fear 
of persecution; while Palestinians are hindered from returning by another state entirely.25 
The general definition has come to mean those Palestinians, that is Arab citizens of 
Mandate Palestine, who fled the part of Mandate Palestine that in 1948 became Israel and 
were prevented from returning there; and their descendants.26 And these were made to rely 
on other, specific UN organs. 
 
UNRWA and UNCCP 
The UN’s first response to the Palestinian refugee tragedy was to adopt Resolution 194 on 
December 11, 1948. It declared that refugees ‘wishing to return to their homes and live at 
peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date; 
and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return’.27 
The right of a refugee to return to her home country was further defined as an individual 
                                                 
24
 Takkenberg 1998, 354. 
25
 Said 2001, 131. 
26
 Takkenberg 1998, 49. 
27
 The United Nations Department of Public Information 2002, 13. 
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right which could not be dismissed by a representative for the refugee communities.28 The 
first agency responsible for the Palestinian refugees was the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), and the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR) was 
established to cooperate with the ICRC and was the first UN agency affiliated with the 
refugees, focusing on medical assistance.29 Then, before the 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees was adopted to protect the rights of refugees in general, the UN 
established two agencies in order to assist the Palestinian refugees, taking over for the 
UNRPR. These were the UN Concilian Commission on Palestine (UNCCP), created in 
December 1948, and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East (UNRWA) in December 1949. UNRWA’s areas of operation was Gaza, the West 
Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. The Palestinian refugees in other countries were under 
the mandate of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), established around the 
same time. UNRWA’s mandate was restricted to material aid such as providing housing 
and health facilities for the refugees, and did not extend to protecting civil rights. By 
contrast, the UNCCP was created among other things to protect the rights of the refugees. 
But this function evaporated already in 1952.30 The UNCCP was reduced to an agency 
without any protective power, and worked mainly on documenting the past of the refugees 
who had fled Mandate Palestine. No other international organ was given the charge of 
protecting the rights of the Palestinian refugees. This development left the refugees without 
practical or formal international protection, as the only group of people in the world. As a 
result, UNRWA gradually changed from a short-term emergency operation to an 
organization with quasi-governmental responsibilities. Its funding came mainly from donor 
countries, with a smaller amount directly from the UN.31 Through the formal label of 
‘assistance’, the agency in fact secured a number of the refugees’ basic rights that might 
have been the responsibility of host countries, most importantly the rights to health and all 
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that entails, and education. UNRWA was also the largest contributor of economic support 
to the refugees. 
 
The UNHCR and the Refugee Convention 
Although UNRWA did not have a mandate for protection, the refugees within UNRWA’s 
area of operations were automatically excluded from receiving support by the UNHCR, 
which stated that its protection ‘shall not extend to a person [w]ho continues to receive 
from other organs or agencies of the United Nations protection or assistance.’32 For the 
same reason, Palestinians were excluded from the Refugee Convention: 
‘This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from other organs or agencies of the 
United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.’33 
 
Lebanon never ratified this convention in any case, but this policy formally rendered the 
Palestinians refugees unable to benefit from formal protection arrangements.34 In other 
words, the only agency related to the Palestinians was restricted to material aid and, as we 
shall see, suffered from limited means. 
 
The civil right conventions and the host governments 
Human rights are universal, but no state is held directly responsible for implementing them; 
thus no one was really responsible for ensuring the human rights of the Palestinian refugees. 
But the civil right conventions related to them by virtue of binding the host countries’ legal 
framework to its content. So although the UN created no instruments for implementing the 
civil rights of the Palestinian refugees, the states were still bound to the conventions. 
UNRWA, then, was responsible for relief for the Palestinians, but the protection of their 
rights became the responsibility of the host governments. And protection may be viewed as 
the most important aspect in relation to civil rights, for without protection, even when 
receiving relief services, there is no real security of rights.35And responding to this, civil 
rights apart from citizenship and political participation were extended to the refugees in 
most host countries. However, in Lebanon, the Palestinians were left in a vacuum of 
neglect. The Palestinian Human Rights Officer with the Norwegian People’s Aid stated that 
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the Lebanese state was guilty of violating rights they assumed responsibilities for through 
the ratifications.36 The jurist Wadie Said, among others, also concludes that Lebanon acted 
in violation of the civil right conventions.37 But the UN rarely addressed the situation for 
the refugees in Lebanon. One resolution from 1950 called upon the governments concerned 
to ‘undertake measures to ensure that refugees, whether repatriated or resettled, will be 
treated without any discrimination either in law or in fact.’38 Apart from this statement, few 
were made against the treatment of Palestinian refugees in UNRWA’s area of operations.39 
 
The rights in focus here differ on one important aspect. The rights to health and housing 
were included in UNRWA’s mandate of responsibility, but many of the agency’s activities 
interfered with matters of governmental policy and were therefore of concern to the host 
governments, ensuring a degree of cooperation and connection between the agency and the 
government.40 Sources claiming that there were sometimes problems ‘coordinating action 
and reconciling differences’ between UNRWA and the host governments show that the 
governments influenced the agency and the refugee communities.41 But although the rights 
to health and housing were affected by governmental decrees, their implementation was the 
responsibility of UNRWA as well as of the host country. The rights to freedom of 
movement and work, by contrast, did not come under UNRWA’s mandate and thus were 
solely the responsibilities of the host country. 
 
Method: Source criticism 
 
This thesis uses both written and oral sources discovered during fieldwork in Lebanon in 
the period from 16 January to 30 March, 2006. I spent most of the time in Beirut and in the 
largest and the smallest camp there; respectively Burj al-Barajneh and Mar Elias. 
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Written sources 
 
Written sources are most important for Part II. During my fieldwork I soon discovered that 
there were few sources from the period  of 1948-1969. Beside some reports on the general 
refugee situation in the Arab countries42 and the few Lebanese laws relating to Palestinians, 
written sources dealing with the situation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon almost 
exclusively come from the archives and annual reports of the ICRC and UNRWA.43 A 
consequence was that there was more to be found on issues like housing and health from 
the first period, since those areas fell under the responsibility of UNRWA and the ICRC, 
and UNRWA especially kept detailed records. On the rights to work and free movement 
there were no official sources, since governmental procedures having to do with the 
refugees usually were de facto situations, not legal ones, as we shall see in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Therefore I rely mainly on the UNRWA reports, the laws, and my interviews when relating 
to the first period, as well as literature by Sayigh and al-Natour especially. The sources 
were used in order to verify or falsify assumptions and statements, and to account for the 
actual situation. I compared official documents and oral statements with the reported or 
observed conditions, in order to verify or falsify their information. 
The most important written sources for the whole thesis are also different reports 
and legislation. Reports include international reports from UNRWA, the research institute 
Fafo, the Danish Refugee Council, and reports from international missions to Lebanon. 
Legislation include Lebanese legislation before, after and including the Ta’if Accord of 
1989 and the ICCPR and ICESCR. Other UN documents on Lebanon are also used.44 I also 
use reports from the Palestine Return Centre and from non-governmental organizations 
such as the Palestine Human Rights Organization, and newspaper articles. Such sources 
may contain political or other propaganda or motives. For instance, the name itself of the 
Palestine Return Centre is a strong implication that this centre works for the right of return 
of the refugees. When it comes to official statements relating to the refugees, I searched 
widely and archived every source I found. They were not plentiful, as few statements were 
indeed recorded. The ones used here, then, is from a small but broad selection.  
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The sources are generally held to be reliable, and are verified or falsified by each 
other and by oral statements. One example of a ‘reliable’ written source which was found 
incorrect, was UNRWA’s official numbers of Palestinians in Lebanon, which, according to 
other sources, were too high after their arrival in 1948 and also after the civil war. In such 
cases I give the different statements and discuss which is more probable. In the 1950s, 
UNRWA’s numbers were amended, so in this case it was quite clear that the numbers of 
1948 had been incorrect. 
 
Oral sources 
 
Two kinds of sources are treated as oral sources in this thesis. The first is statements 
recorded in written sources such as newspapers, reports, literature and UN collections of 
documents. When these statements are given as a part of a speech or other oral forms of 
written statements, I basically treat them as written sources. When the statements are of a 
more spontaneous nature, such as interviews in newspapers, they will be interpreted 
according to the contexts listed below. The other kind of oral sources is interviews with 
Lebanese and Palestinian sources that I conducted during my fieldwork. Some observations 
rely on these, since they give accounts of events that were not documented in writing and 
thus allow for exploration of less known periods, such as the period of 1958-64. 
 
My interviews 
The interviews were conducted in the time span of 8 February to 27 March, 2006. I 
interviewed both Lebanese and Palestinians. Among the Lebanese were academics and 
researchers (Farid el Khazen and Simon Haddad); former and current officials, among them 
two army officers wishing to remain anonymous and one member of parliament.45 One 
Lebanese journalist, Ziad Majed, was also interviewed. Among the Palestinians was a 
researcher and former politician (Salah Salah), an NGO worker (Haifa Jammal), and two 
jurists (Suheil al-Natour and Salah Dabbagh). 
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The selection was made because of relevance and attainability. Each interview 
followed a somewhat personally adapted set of questions, differing according to whether 
the subject was an academic or a politician, and according to what party he was affiliated 
with. The interviews took a different turn if the subject had written texts I used in my 
research.46 Some persons I met twice or several times, and a more personal and friendly 
setting influenced the second interview.47 There is an imbalance of gender representation – 
out of fourteen recorded interviews only one of them was with a woman. The reason for 
this was the fact that there was a gender imbalance within my focus – most politicians, 
lawyers and researchers related to my topic were men, and most of the women I found 
relevant were unattainable. 48  However, I had several meetings with female and male 
representatives of refugee camp communities, NGOs, and researchers, but I did not have 
the chance to record their interviews. Their influence and information still formed my 
perceptions of the situation. 
 
The topic of my interviews were made less controversial to governmental representatives 
than perhaps it would had been a year before, because of an official committee that was 
established in October 2005 which planned on dealing specifically with Palestinian issues 
(see page 89 and Postscript).49 This circumstance opened the subject for discussion, and I 
rarely met with people who were unwilling to comment on it, although I had assumed that 
the subject might be received as controversial. 
 
The nature of oral sources 
Although there is no unanimity regarding the validity of oral sources, the difference 
between written and oral sources is not as great as once presumed; when it was thought that 
written sources were ‘reliable’ and oral sources were not.50 Most written sources are in fact 
based on oral narratives; some of my reports, such as the one from Fafo and the report on 
non-ID refugees, are based on oral accounts and the statistics are constructed on them. Also, 
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some oral sources have a specific value through non-verbal acts like gesticulations, facial 
expressions, body movements, and so on.51 Such acts can give a meaningful insight for an 
interviewer. 
 
Interpreting oral sources 
One fundamental and apparent aspect of interpreting interviews is that people may adapt 
what they say to their identities, roles, and political affiliation.52 For instance, I interviewed 
Lebanese affiliated with different parties: The Progressive Socialist Party; the Free Patriotic 
Movement; the Kata’ib (or Phalange); and Hizbollah.53 I also interviewed Palestinians who 
were members of Fatah, the DFLP, and Hamas. Such affiliations will be taken into account 
when interpreting their statements, as well as what roles the interviewees have in society, 
such as Member of Parliament, head of a department, or journalist. Whether or not a 
statement may be coloured by some external purpose or ulterior motive, for instance 
propaganda towards the international community, must also be considered. And for 
Lebanon, a subject’s confessional affiliation is equally important as their political 
belonging, and this was asked of most subjects and will also be taken into account. 
The setting – the time a statement was made, the place it was said and to what 
audience (in this case to a female, Western student) must also be considered. For instance, 
at the time of my interviews the Syrian forces had withdrawn less than one year before, and 
this seemed to colour several statements. 
Another aspect is that the interview’s topic is by nature set by the interviewer, so 
the product is created by both the subject and by the interviewer. My interviews were 
guided by my bringing up an issue of either importance (for the Palestinians) or of conflict 
and sometimes shame (for the Lebanese). My questions, follow-up comments, expressions 
and so on were likely to influence the subject’s answers, and the other way around. Such 
influences people find difficult to evade or may not even notice.54 The interviewer may act 
in setting agendas, selecting topics in conversations, or ‘making assumptions about realities 
that hearers are obliged to at least temporarily accept in order to process the text or talk.’55 
Hearers may be ‘coerced’ into assuming certain roles; for instance, if I, as an interviewer, 
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refer to a politician as ‘you’ in relation to asking about the party politics, this implies that 
the politician speaks for the party. If I refer to the party as ‘they’, the interviewee may feel 
freer to answer for himself, not necessarily as a speaker for the party. This can be detected 
in his use of ‘I’ or ‘we’ in the response. However, although the interviewer initially holds 
the coercive power, so to speak, through setting the agenda of the interview, the subject 
might also change the pace and the topic in a ‘struggle for control’ of the interview.56 One 
theory is that the interviewer should give priority to what the interviewee wishes to tell.57 
This change of topic often occurred, and in most cases, I accepted their changes and asked 
template questions at a later time. 58  This relationship between the subject and the 
interviewer can be viewed as one of the ‘problems’ of interpreting oral sources, or simply 
as one of the aspects to remember when analysing the findings. I often summarized the 
interviewees’ statements in order to confirm that I understood their opinions. 
 
Another factor to keep in mind when interpreting oral sources, in this case my interviews, 
is the pace of the narrative. If a person dwells on one episode and hastily explains another, 
this may mean that she wishes to emphasize the meaning of the one episode she dwells on, 
or to draw the attention from the other.59 The amount of meaning the subject draws to an 
event can be detected this way. This did take place in some of my interviews.60 
As for credibility, facts recounted in an interview may be of a personal nature, 
mixed with imagination and memory. Memory is the main tool in extracting historical facts 
from interviews, and memories by definition relates to both the past – what one remembers, 
and the present – when one remembers it; something that must be taken into account when 
analysing oral sources.61 The factual or fictional content of the source may be viewed as 
other problems of oral sources, but can also be true for written sources. The best way to 
verify facts is to check them with other sources, oral or written. But one aspect of oral 
sources is different, and often makes the interview all the more interesting: If a fact is 
wrongly recounted, that does not mean that the subject was ‘lying’ – oral sources is as 
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much about how the source perceived the truth, as it is about the ‘truth’ itself.62 In this way, 
oral sources also speak of what people believed was happening at a certain time. For my 
thesis, this is an important point: My wish was to discover what the Lebanese believed to 
be reasons, as well as finding the actual reasons for the situation of the Palestinian refugees 
in Lebanon. 
In speaking of the past, interviewees may also adjust their statements to what their 
beliefs or standards are at the time of the interview, even though such standards may have 
been different at the time of the event. Acts considered legitimate at one point in time may 
be viewed as unacceptable at a different point – and therefore the subject may adjust the 
‘truth’ to fit what she perceives as ‘true’ at the time of the interview, or attempt, 
consciously or unconsciously, to ‘hide’ the facts. 63 In my cases, for instance, the view on 
violence or oppression may have changed between the time of the civil war and the time 
when the interviews took place. This perceived truth is what I have tried to detect in my 
interviews when I asked about the reasons for the conditions of the refugees. Of course, this 
is not a necessary truth about oral sources; as many are able to recount such ‘past selves’.64  
 
Thus, the oral sources I use should be understood and analysed in the light of contextual 
features such as the role of the participants themselves; their motives and purposes; the 
relation of the interviewer and the subject; the pace of the narrative; the nature of memory 
and fact; the wish for consistency; and the time in history. But before oral sources are used 
in an extensive manner, we shall look at the empirical situation and the historical 
background for the topic. 
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Chapter 2. Historical Background 
 
Lebanon’s creation and political system 
 
The nature of the Middle East changed at the end of the First World War. Under Ottoman 
rule, modern Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan were governed as one area, but Great 
Britain and France divided the region into mandates. The provinces of Syria and Palestine 
were redrawn as the modern states of Syria, Palestine, Lebanon and Transjordan, and in 
Lebanon and Palestine the creation of the mandate came to differentiate them from their 
neighbours. The most remarkable difference between Lebanon and the other mandates was 
a large population of Christians who had been in the area for centuries: The area of ‘Mount 
Lebanon’ in the province of Syria formed the basis of the new Lebanese state, and the 
inhabitants were mostly Christian Maronites and Druze (a Muslim confession). Modern 
Lebanon of 1920 included areas around the mountain and with them a large community of 
Sunni and Shi’a Muslims, but the area still consisted of 10,452 square kilometres only;65 
comparatively the size of the county of Rogaland in Norway (see Map 1). The separation 
from Syria was designed so that the Christians would become the majority of the 
inhabitants of the new state. The separation was welcomed by most Christians but resented 
by most Muslims.66 Lebanon had seventeen confessions altogether: The largest being Sunni, 
Shi’a and Druze (Muslims) and Maronite, Greek-Orthodox and Catholic-Orthodox 
(Christians).67 Mandate Lebanon thus became a resourceful state ruled by the French in 
cooperation with Christian Lebanese. 
 
Independence 
The Second World War brought about two changes of perhaps equal importance: The end 
of the mandates, and the creation of Israel in Mandate Palestine. Lebanon gained 
independence in 1943, and a political system that took the country’s various communities 
into consideration was created. With independence, the so-called ‘National Pact’ came into 
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existence. It was an unwritten agreement based on a census from 1932 that had measured 
the numeral size of the confessions, and had broadly found the country to be sixty per cent 
Christian and forty per cent Muslim. Whether or not the census was carried out correctly 
has been debated, but it was generally accepted.68 The political system adopted was called 
a confessional democracy – a quasi-democratic system based on power sharing between the 
confessional groups. 69  The National Pact followed this principle of power-sharing, or 
balance of power: Parliament seats and all high offices of government would be reserved 
for Christians or Muslims on a ratio of six to five, and the country’s leading positions of 
President, Prime Minister and speaker of Parliament would be divided on a confessional 
basis. The President would belong to the largest confession (Maronite), the Prime minister 
to the second largest (Sunni), and the speaker of Parliament to the third (Shi’i). As 
executive power lay with the President, the outcome was that the Maronites gained the 
dominant authority in Lebanese political life. Problems with the system became evident as 
the 1932 census was never updated although the Muslims, and especially the Shi’is, had a 
higher population growth than the Christians. 70  No new census measuring Lebanon’s 
population was held, and the imbalance of the power sharing which soon became evident 
was not redressed. 
 
The zu’ama 
A second factor of importance to the power sharing in Lebanon was the existence of a 
clientalistic system, founded in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century when the 
political organization of the area of Mount Lebanon was led by prominent families who 
functioned as patrons to the population, and offered, for instance, the use of land in 
exchange for loyalty.71 They were generally referred to as the zu’ama (sg. za’im), and most 
were Maronite or Druze. Allegiance to the zu’ama depended on personal loyalties, and the 
clientalistic networks were partly based on confessional allegiances. In addition, another 
class of zu’ama emerged in the beginning of the twentieth century. Although their loyalties 
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were based on the same traditional principles, they developed as a new power in modern 
Lebanon as landowners, urban merchants, bankers, and others who acquired power under 
the last days of the Ottoman rule or during the French mandate.72 This zu’ama included 
several Sunni families. All zu’ama tended to exercise their power through confessional 
bonds, but the newer class provided their ‘clients’ with services through their political 
positions instead of land. It was therefore essential for them to be elected for governmental 
positions; and a form of confessional clientalism was brought into the modern Lebanese 
governmental politics.73 In coalition with the French Mandate, the zu’ama, and particularly 
the Maronites, were introduced to the idea of ruling the country based on a Western system 
combined with a traditional Lebanese arrangement. In other words, in addition to the 
established political system of power sharing, the loyalties to the zu’ama; whether to land 
owners or urban merchants; had a large impact on Lebanese politics, and Lebanon’s 
modern political system was rooted in its confessional history. 
 
The political parties 
One consequence of this was that the political party system developed differently in 
modern Lebanon than in the other Arab countries. It was not required to belong to a party 
to be a Member of Parliament in Lebanon; but most were usually ‘affiliated’ to one. First, 
the parties’ platforms reflected the confessional, communal landscape they came from and 
the communities were commonly associated with one or several parties. 74  But such 
loyalties was not the only aspect of Lebanese political life. Several parties were also 
founded on ideological factors, and it was soon possible to divide the parties into rightist 
and leftist. The importance of ideology became more and more apparent in the 1950s and 
1960s. Although the rightist parties for the most part remained confessionally based, many 
also adhered to a Lebanese nationalist ideology. The Maronites came to be associated 
mainly with the Kata’ib or Phalange Party, which was based on a rightist nationalist 
ideology. The Druze were commonly attached to the leftist Progressive Socialist Party 
(PSP) although this was ideologically, not confessionally, based. Leftist ideologies ranged 
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from Marxism to Pan-Arabism.75 The Sunnis were generally identified with parties with an 
Arab nationalist orientation, and the Shi’is were not politically organized until the 1970s 
and 1980s. Thus the bulk of the Lebanese parties and political procedures were formed on a 
mixture of ideology and confessional affiliation, and both the ideological and confessional 
differences were significant for the parties’ roles in the civil war of 1975-1989. 
 
The Palestinian refugees 
 
The second modern state for which the creation of the mandate had severe consequences 
was that which might have been Palestine. The creation of Israel in 1948 led to war 
between the new state and its neighbouring countries, and a large number of Palestinians 
fled from the area.76  The refugees arriving in Lebanon were mainly from northern Galilee 
in today’s Israel, and they numbered around 100,000.77 They formed about ten per cent of 
the Lebanese population, and most of them were Sunni Muslims. 78  The mass of the 
refugees were gathered in seventeen refugee camps around the country (see maps 2 and 3), 
although in the first years many well-off or Christian Palestinians settled in other places.79 
It was unknown just how many refugees resided in Lebanon at what time, although the 
numbers up till 1970 were rather more accurate than the numbers after the Lebanese civil 
war. UNRWA estimated that there were around 400,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in 
2005,80  but there were many indicators that the actual number was lower because of 
emigration. Fafo’s estimate was closer to half this number. The numbers were contested in 
various sources.81 The number of camp residents in 1998 was estimated to be between 56 
and 89 per cent.82 
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The host countries 
Lebanon was only marginally involved in the 1948 war, but there was widespread 
sympathy for the Palestinian cause. The state cooperated with the Red Cross and with 
UNRWA. There was a general belief that the situation was temporary, and that the refugees 
would soon be repatriated.83 But the unsolved nature of the refugee problem made the Arab 
host countries tolerate an extended stay of the Palestinian refugees on their soil, and 
therefore granted them de facto asylum. The dominant focus of the Arab states was on the 
right of return; preservation of the Palestinian identity; and in most cases, on solidarity and 
social integration of the refugees.84 The Arab states agreed to reject the naturalization of the 
Palestinian refugees in order to emphasize their view that Israel was responsible for the 
situation, and that the UN bore secondary responsibility by legitimizing the Zionist claims 
to Palestine.85 The Palestinians also expressed their rejection of being resettled and losing 
their Palestinian identity; thus protecting their right to return and compensation. Although 
the Arab League adopted several resolutions, and also a document referred to as the 
Casablanca Protocol, which stipulated favourable treatment of the Palestinian refugees in 
every member state, the actual treatment of the refugees depended mostly on the policies of 
the various governments. It was adopted in 1966 and ratified with reservations by Lebanon, 
but was never fully implemented.86 
 
The 1958 uprising 
 
In 1958 there was a short civil war, or uprising, in Lebanon, based on confessional 
discontent. Basically, the western-oriented President Camille Chamoun responded to a 
growing pan-Arabism in the Middle East by strengthening its links with the West and 
trying to weaken the Muslim zu’ama and elite, causing a public uprising. The Lebanese 
Army took the side of the rebels and replaced the President with general Fouad Shehab. 
The war ended quickly, but had notable effects. Although the Palestinian refugees had been 
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absent in the conflict, Shehab strengthened the Army’s Intelligence Bureau and installed 
them directly in every refugee camp, which led to a tighter control.87 It also marked the 
first open confessional discontent with the political system. 
 
The PLO and the Lebanese Civil War 
 
In June 1967 a third war broke out between Israel and several Arab states, but Lebanon did 
not participate. This six-day war was a catastrophe for the Arab world. Israel occupied the 
West Bank from Jordan, which had governed it since the war in 1948; Gaza and the Sinai 
from Egypt; and the Golan Heights from Syria. Another wave of refugees entered Lebanon, 
although not by far as many as in 1948.88 
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had been established in 1964, its 
charter stressing the liberation of Palestine through armed struggle against Israel.89 From 
1967 on, it became politically active in Lebanon. The Lebanese parties that were already 
divided on ideological, political and confessional grounds, were now further divided on the 
issue of the PLO and its presence in the country. The broad partition was between Christian 
rightist and Muslim leftist parties, where the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) 
gathered several leftist parties in a coalition, dominated by the PSP, and allied with the 
PLO. The LNM identified with Arab causes and particularly the Palestinian cause, and 
focused on social questions and a more just political representation.90 Their history of 
adhering to socialism, communism, and specifically pan-Arabism caused them to support 
the PLO in its fight against Israel, and the PLO’s resources were helpful in their own 
internal conflict with the rightist forces. 
The main actors among rightist parties were the Phalange and the Lebanese Forces, 
the latter a newcomer onto the political stage. These held the nationalist view that Lebanon 
was different from other Arab countries and therefore were against pan-Arabism. They 
were not inclined to support the PLO, both because the organization attracted the regional 
issue of Israel and Palestine to Lebanese soil; and especially because the PLO was allied 
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with the LNM who wished for a change in the political system; a system the rightist forces 
wished to maintain. Tensions rose in the 1970s, years that were marked by the 
militarization of Lebanese politics. 
In 1969 the PLO and the Lebanese government signed the Cairo Agreement, which 
gave the PLO the responsibility for and control over the refugee camps and stipulated areas 
in the south from where they could fight Israel. It required them to cooperate with the 
Lebanese government, but the camps became isolated. Under the control of the PLO, many 
of the refugees’ civil rights were granted, and they were able to move freely in Lebanon for 
the first time since their arrival. The PLO was supported almost unanimously by the 
Palestinian refugees and the reaction to the Cairo Agreement was full-fledged political 
activism where the community previously had been inactive and controlled. The 
organization’s large resources improved the economic situation of the refugees. 
In 1970 the PLO moved its headquarters from Jordan to Lebanon, as the King of 
Jordan expelled the organization in a massacre remembered as Black September, and this 
caused perhaps thousands of new Palestinians to flock to Lebanon.91 The PLO created a 
large bureaucratic system inside the camps, and thus grew the infamous notion of the PLO 
as a state within the state, dividing the internal parties of Lebanon more yet.92 
 
The civil war’s main events 
 
There is no true consensus on why the civil war broke out, but the most credible 
explanation involves at least three factors: Lebanon’s tense confessional history and so-
called balance of power; rising tensions among the poor, especially the fast-growing Shi’a 
community; and the intensification of pressure and internal division caused by the PLO’s 
presence and warfare in the south. When war broke out in April 1975, political parties 
turned into militias and state institutions suffered collapses throughout the war.93 The PLO 
and the rightist forces clashed after the Phalange initiated its first siege of a camp in 1976, 
followed by similar attacks on other camps. The Palestinians thus became involved in 
Lebanese internal affairs to an extent regretted by most members in hindsight. Besides the 
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established parties in Lebanon, new figures emerged onto the political scene; such as the 
Sunni militia the Murabitun, the above-mentioned Lebanese Forces, and the Shi’a party 
Amal.94   They fought to achieve more political power, challenging both the Maronite 
hegemony and the traditional zu’ama systems. 
 
A regional issue 
The war soon became a regional issue, and in 1976, after numerous violent clashes, the 
Arab League created the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) to act as an intervention force in the 
country and to preserve its sovereignty.95 The ADF had some 30,000 troops and consisted 
almost entirely of Syrian forces, with some elements from other countries such as Saudi 
Arabia and Libya. In 1979 it became purely Syrian. The Syrian state still regarded Lebanon 
as part of the Syrian province and had an interest in its future; and this marked the onset of 
their practical control over parts of the country that lasted until 2005.96 Syria’s shifting 
allegiances often tipped the power balance of the conflicts. For instance, at an early stage of 
the war, Syria first supported the Lebanese left and the PLO until these almost gained 
control of Beirut; then Syria supported the right-wing side instead. 
 
Israel first invaded south Lebanon in 1978, after years of clashes and shelling across the 
border. The UN then created UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon) and 
established a UN-governed zone on the Israeli-Lebanese border, to ensure the withdrawal 
of the Israeli forces and to ensure national security.97 This goal was not achieved. Despite 
many attempts of peace treaties, fighting went on between Lebanese militias, at the same 
time as Israel and the PLO, with respective allies, fought on the border, which led to heavy 
Israeli bombardment of the south. 
In 1982, Israel invaded the country again, and this time they reached and besieged 
Beirut. This led to the formation of another Shi’a party, the religiously founded Hizbollah, 
supported by Iran and Syria. Its primary goal was to end the Israeli occupation, and its 
Islamic nature marked a difference from other Lebanese parties. Israel’s invasion also led 
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to the creation of an international deterrent force with troops from the USA, and ultimately 
to the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon and the subsequent massacres in the Sabra and 
Shatila refugee camps, which caused the death of thousands of refugees. Numbers up to 
3,000 were suggested.98 Responsibility for the massacres was placed on both the Phalange 
party, which carried out the massacres, and the Israeli forces, who let the Phalange enter 
the camps. 
 
The PLO was weakened: It had split internally, and was driven out of the northern city 
Tripoli by Syria when trying to return to Lebanon in 1983; ending their period of control in 
Lebanon. The Cairo Agreement was formally abrogated in 1987.99 Israel withdrew to the 
south in 1985, a year that also marked the last stage of the civil war: The War of the Camps. 
This was an attack initiated by the Shi’a party Amal: The first incident of premeditated 
Muslim violence towards the Palestinians. Amal was supported in the attacks by several 
smaller Shi’i and Christian fractions. Syria’s influence was felt again as they first supported 
the unprepared Palestinians, and then changed sides when the Palestinians were getting the 
upper hand.100 Hizbollah and the PSP also entered the conflict in 1987 to support the 
Palestinians. The fighting inside the camps spread to other parts of the country and lasted 
until 1989. The War of the Camps also caused terrible destructions.101 In 1989, the Ta’if 
Accord, a Syrian-brokered peace agreement, officially ended the war and dissolved the 
militias. The last fighting ended in 1991.102  The bombing of the south created many 
internally displaced people, and Lebanon faced a post-war economic crisis. 
 
Categories of refugees 
The Palestinian refugees were thus divided into three categories. The first, and by far the 
largest, consisted of Palestinians who came to Lebanon in 1948-49. Most of these were 
registered with UNRWA after its founding in late 1949, and by the Lebanese state after the 
predecessor to the Directorate of Refugee Affairs was established in 1950 (see Chapter 3). 
The influx in 1967 created the bulk of the second category of Palestinian refugees. These 
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were only registered by the Lebanese state, as UNRWA’s registers only included those 
who registered as refugees before 1949.103 Some also came from a group of some thousand 
refugees who fled from Gaza to Lebanon after a war between Israel and Egypt in 1956, but 
most of these were denied residence. This category will henceforth be referred to as non-
registered refugees. The third category of Palestinian refugees arrived during the time 
when the PLO controlled the camps in Lebanon. They were non-identified refugees (or 
non-IDs); Palestinians who were ‘not registered with any agency in Lebanon or 
international body and thus do not possess any valid documents acknowledging their legal 
existence’.104 Most of them arrived in the 1970s after the PLO moved its headquarters to 
Lebanon and only registered with the PLO. Their registration was rendered invalid after the 
ousting of the PLO from Lebanon. 105  Others did not register at all, as they found it 
unnecessary in the time of war. Together, this category of refugees numbered from 3-5,000 
in 2005.106 Non-registered and non-ID refugees were not eligible for UNRWA services, 
and registered refugee women married to non-ID husbands lost their support from 
UNRWA when giving birth, since their children would be considered non-ID refugees.107 
 
Post-war Lebanon: The Lebanese Perspective 
 
The Ta’if Accord 
The Ta’if Accord formed the basis of the reformed Lebanese Constitution. All parties 
agreed to compromise and all militias were abolished except Hizbollah, which was allowed 
to keep its weapons in order to fight the Israeli occupation. The political system remained 
intact, but the power-sharing relations in the government were amended to represent the 
Muslim communities more justly.108  The Ta’if Accord also stipulated that Palestinians 
were not to be settled in Lebanon, officially rejecting tawtin. In addition, in 1991, the 
Casablanca Protocol was weakened or invalidated by another Arab League resolution 
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claiming that it should be heeded ‘in accordance with the rules and laws in force in each 
state’.109 This, for Lebanon, basically abrogated the Protocol altogether. 
 
Most of the political parties had lost their popular support. They were weakened due to 
their roles as militias during the war; to Syria’s influence which had some parties banned; 
and to the compromises of the Ta’if Accord. The old alliances were broken, especially 
since the LNM had been severely weakened, and the new figures in Lebanon’s political life 
were somewhat swept up by traditional clientalism.110 The failure of the ideological parties 
ensured the zu’ama’s continued influence, and politics thus remained clientalistic and 
confessional.111 
 
Israel and Syria 
Israeli forces remained in the south until 2000, when they finally withdrew. After their 
primary goal was thus achieved, Hizbollah became engaged in governmental politics and 
had a large impact as one of the major parties of the largest estimated confessional group in 
Lebanon. Hizbollah was the only party in Lebanon who claimed they wanted a numerical 
democracy from 1992.112 
Syria’s impact on Lebanese political life was as important, if not more so, than 
Israel’s. The Lebanese Army was weaker than the Syrian, and the government had 
basically fractioned into militias and otherwise dissolved. The Syrian forces stayed on after 
the war, and according to the majority of interviews and literature, they hindered the free 
executive power of the government.113 The Syrian forces finally withdrew in April 2005, 
after increasing protests from Lebanon and the international community, when the Syrian 
government had been officially accused of participating in the assassination of Lebanon’s 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri who had spoken openly against the Syrian domination. Parties 
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that were banned were reopened, and the party the Free Patriotic Movement was founded in 
2005 in relation to the Syrian withdrawal. 
 
A challenge for Lebanon after the war was thus to regain its own sovereignty through 
ending the Israeli occupation of the south, as well as the Syrian domination.114  Most 
Lebanese had also started to consider the PLO as an intruder who had exploited its freedom 
and violated Lebanon’s sovereignty. The PLO’s role in the war caused rising ‘anti-
Palestinian’ feelings that did not end with the war.115 Some claimed that the PLO was what 
divided the Lebanese society into fractions and militias and caused discord and death to 
spread through the country.116  Others claimed that the PLO was the catalyst for such 
discords to arise and the blame belonged to several groups.117 Some, mostly Sunnis, also 
said the PLO was not at all to blame.118 But beyond war, occupation, or the expulsion of 
the PLO, the presence of the Palestinian refugees remained unsolved. 
 
The Palestinian perspective 
 
 
When the Cairo Agreement was abolished, it consequently revoked the Palestinian 
refugees’ rights. The camps and their infrastructure had suffered heavy destruction, and the 
general economic situation deteriorated as the focus of the international community and the 
donor countries to UNRWA shifted away from the diaspora after the outbreak of the 1987 
Intifada on the Palestinian territories. In addition, the Gulf War of 1990-1991 increased 
economic pressures since the PLO, still sending resources to the diaspora refugees after its 
expulsion, was perceived as supporting Iraq against Kuwait, and lost much of its support 
from the Gulf states as a result.119 Lastly, the Oslo Peace Accords of 1993 had a large 
impact on the international focus and the economic situation. It sketched out hopes for a 
future Palestinian state and peace with Israel, but no solution was suggested for the 1948 
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refugees. They were addressed in two ways during the negotiations: Through the creation 
of a multilateral working group discussing their problem, and through including them as an 
item of the ‘final status’ negotiations, that were ever postponed. 120  Besides causing a 
further decrease in the funding to UNRWA, the lack of a solution for the refugees in the 
peace process evoked strong, negative reactions in the Lebanese government and public; 
which in turn caused measures against the resettlement of the refugees in Lebanon.121 
 
Summary 
 
The state of Lebanon was founded on a confessional imbalance which defined the political 
system, and confessionalism, clientalism and ideology all merged together to form it as a 
modern state. The Palestinian refugee community was large in relation to Lebanon’s 
population, and the country was an area of interest for several regional forces; especially 
for Syria and Israel during and after the civil war. Lebanon’s situation was different from 
its neighbours’ in many ways, and the differences in legislation and practises had 
consequences for the Palestinian refugees. These aspects are essential to achieving an 
understanding of the civil rights situation and will be the focus for the following chapters. 
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PART II 
Chapter 3. Lebanese legislation relating to the civil rights of the 
Palestinian refugees 
 
The status of the civil rights of the Palestinian refugees can partly be observed in Lebanese 
legislation, where stipulations of international conventions would normatively be 
implemented, and partly in de facto policies and practises. ‘Policy’ may signify legal 
decisions, but henceforth it is referred to as unwritten decisions, and not legislation, unless 
it is emphasized as a ‘legal policy’. The government never made the legal status of the 
Palestinian refugees clear, and therefore this study includes examples from both legislation, 
practical policies, and official statements, in order to make the presentation as accurate as 
possible. Practises will be the subject of Chapter 4, while this chapter will examine the 
legal situation of the Palestinian refugees. It looks at the main characteristics of the 
Lebanese legislation relating to them before and after the civil war, then views some 
legislation in detail and goes through legislative tendencies. First, it will give a brief 
overview of the Lebanese political arrangement. 
 
An overview of Lebanon’s political system 
 
At its formation as a nation state, Lebanon created a parliamentary system of government. 
The main legislative branch was Parliament, for which there were held popular elections. 
The executive branch consisted of the Presidential office and the government (sometimes 
referred to as the Cabinet), led by the Prime Minister. Parliament elected the President of 
the republic, and the President appointed the Prime Minister. A Chamber of Deputies 
within Parliament assisted the President ‘in the tasks of government and suggesting of 
legislation’. 122  The legal system was based on the system inherited from the French 
mandate and on the Code Napoleon.123 But the most defining aspect of Lebanese politics 
was that political representation was divided between Muslims and Christians according to 
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the National Pact and later to the Ta’if Accord, as well as among districts.124 However, 
despite the democratic structure and power sharing inherent in the system, it remained a 
predominantly presidential one. Before the Ta’if Accord, executive power was firmly 
vested in the President. Paul Salem writes that the President ‘served a six-year term; could 
not be removed from office; could dissolve parliament; could refuse to issue legislation; 
and through his ministers directed all policy and made all appointments in government 
institutions including the judicial branch.’125 Therefore, although the government and the 
Prime Minister were part of the executive branch, final executive authority lay with the 
President, and this defined the political system. 
In 1989, the Ta’if Accord amended the Constitution and became its new basis. The 
positions of Prime Minister and speaker of Parliament achieved real executive authority, 
and the President’s ability to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister was also removed. 
The Accord thus reduced the President’s power, strengthened the Parliament and the 
Cabinet, and altered the power balance to a fifty-fifty representation between Muslims and 
Christians, reserving more seats for both Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. The amendments thus 
divided political domination between the President, the Prime Minister, and the speaker of 
Parliament; reserved for Maronites, Sunnis and Shi’is respectively. No major decisions 
should now be made without consensus between these three.126 The Accord also stipulated 
reinstating Lebanese authority over all Lebanese territory, as well as the retreat of Syrian 
forces to the Beqa’a valley and the ‘establishment of special relations’ with that state.127 
This redeployment did not occur until 2005, as we saw above. Sources claimed that ‘it has 
been perfectly possible to enforce the country’s legislation, except in southern Lebanon and 
in the Palestinian refugee camps,128 but many considered the effectiveness of the Lebanese 
jurisdiction as poor and confined to the area of Beirut. 
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Palestinians in Lebanese legislation: Main characteristics 
 
The history of the Lebanese legislation relating to the Palestinians is quite straight-forward. 
Both in 1948 and 2005, the most striking characteristic of the Palestinians’ status in 
Lebanese law was that they were never defined as a specific group, and were generally 
excluded from the country’s legislation. Rosemary Sayigh writes that the lack of a clear 
definition of their status and rights, and the lack of a comprehensive body of law to govern 
them, caused a basic problem of the Palestinians’ existence in Lebanon.129 The lack of a 
clear legal policy also created a wide range of problems. The refugees had no predictive 
platform to rely on, and their host country’s relations to them were almost exclusively 
based on procedures that shifted according to the political situation at any given time. This 
stood in contrast to the other Arab host countries, most of whom integrated the Palestinians 
into legislation at an early stage. In Syria, a series of legislative measures aimed to facilitate 
the economic integration of the refugees.130 The Lebanese government, by contrast, did not 
legally address the status of the refugees at all until fourteen years had passed. 
In fact, the state of Lebanon did not pass much legislation at all in the first two 
decades after independence, and depended more on norms and liberalist policies. For 
instance, there was no Lebanese labour law before 1964. One reason for the lack of 
legislation and official interference was that the Lebanese state allowed private economic 
sectors to apply their own rules in order to encourage investments, based on a capitalist and 
liberal system. Although legislation increased after 1989, the liberalist policies remained 
prevalent, and this may have influenced the legislative treatment of the refugees. 
 
Defined as ‘foreigners’ 
 
The ‘Law Pertaining to the Entry Into, Residence In and Exit From Lebanon’ of 1962 (the 
Foreigner Law) was the first law that related to the Palestinians’ status in Lebanon. It reads: 
‘By foreigner is understood to mean, in this law, any natural or juridical person who is not 
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a Lebanese subject.’131 Decision no. 319 of the same year specified that foreigners without 
documents from their country of origin or foreigners who held residence cards issued by 
the Department for Palestinian Refugee Affairs (DPA) were included in this category, 
which in turn ensured the Palestinians’ right of residency.132 Although the Palestinians 
were a ‘special category of foreigners’, the categorization offered them no different status 
and no different rights than other foreigners. Apart from the right to reside in the country, 
only laws that applied to foreigners in general thus applied to them. This was the legal 
status that took the Lebanese government fourteen years to define. Through their fifty-eight 
years of residing in Lebanon, the refugees were legally defined only as an alien group with 
no more rights or responsibilities than any other visitor to Lebanon (and as we shall see, 
sometimes with fewer). And although Decision 319 specified the Palestinians as a 
particular category of foreigners, they were commonly not mentioned by name in official 
documents.133 This general attitude had implications, as we shall see, for the civil rights 
treated in this study. 
 
Permits and the power of individual ministers 
Foreigners were obliged to obtain permits for most employment, for travelling, for buying 
property, and so on. This policy was by default applied to the Palestinians. However, the 
laws governing foreigners were usually open to interpretation as they were not very 
specific, and since Lebanese officials had few laws to abide by when it came to both 
Palestinians and  other foreigners, the officials in a position to grant a permit could 
basically decide freely whether or not a Palestinian would obtain it. The most relevant 
officials to the Palestinians were the director of the DPA, and the Minister of Labour in 
Lebanon. The Palestinian lawyer Suheil al-Natour emphasized that the personal views and 
political affiliation of officials played an important role in Lebanon in the sense of how 
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they would interpret a law or decree.134 Individual officials could not issue decrees or laws, 
because the government was required to agree on all such legislation,135 but they could 
issue so-called memorandums or rulings that exempted or included groups of foreigners, 
and they could consider each case unhindered by other government branches. One 
interpretation might not have much effect on the refugee community, and another might 
cause severe restrictions.136 So the Palestinians were left to depend on personal decisions, 
often according to the official’s own views. This caused the refugees’ daily life to be 
unpredictable, and they were dependant on the political situation in Lebanon and on those 
who held the positions relevant to them.137 In most cases this did not have positive effects 
for the refugees, but in some cases it did. There are examples below of how such rulings 
affected the Palestinians both positively and negatively (see specifically Ruling 478 and 
Decision 79/1). 
 
The principle of reciprocity 
Another consequence of being defined as foreigners was that the Principle of Reciprocity 
also applied to the Palestinians, and this came to mean that they were in practise treated 
differently than other foreigners in the country. The principle of reciprocity states that 
‘favours, benefits or penalties that are granted by one state to the citizens or legal entities of 
another, should be returned in kind’.138 In other words, Lebanon would give any foreigner 
the same rights as a Lebanese citizen would be given in the foreigner’s own state. The 
problem was that the Palestinian refugees could offer no reciprocity. Even after the Arab 
League and Lebanon had recognized the PLO as the representative for the Palestinian 
people in 1964, this recognition did not lead to reciprocity. As a Palestinian state with the 
authority to grant its Lebanese foreigners rights did not exist, the Palestinians had no 
reciprocal rights in Lebanon. This affected the right to health especially. A Lebanese 
diplomat explained: 
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‘According to the Lebanese law, you can work on the basis of the principle of reciprocity. This is a problem 
for the Palestinians – they are not banned because they are Palestinians, but because of this principle.’139 
 
Refugees in general were exempt from the principle of reciprocity by the Refugee 
Convention,140 but, as we saw in Chapter 1, the Palestinian refugees were not protected by 
this document. Nevertheless, Lebanon was the only host country that dealt with the 
Palestinian refugees according the principle of reciprocity. 
Another difference from other foreigners became apparent in regards of nationality. 
As stated in the Lebanese Citizenship Law of 1925, a Lebanese woman married to a 
foreigner could not give her nationality to her child, even if it was born on Lebanese 
territory, since only the father’s nationality was taken into consideration legally. But 
citizenship could also be acquired through marriage and through presidential decrees.141 
The Arab League had called for all Palestinians to keep their Palestinian nationality when 
they fled in 1948,142 and Lebanon heeded the call. The consequence was that Palestinians 
in Lebanon could only be given Lebanese nationality by a presidential decree. This was, in 
fact, used in order to naturalize most of the Christian and wealthy Palestinians in the 1950s, 
and was not used again until 1994.143 In other words, the great majority of Palestinian 
refugees were unable to receive Lebanese nationality throughout the period. 
 
The Palestinian refugees in Lebanese legislation, then, were dependent on two principles. 
First, some laws affected them because Lebanese legislation defined them as foreigners, 
like any other visitor in the country. Secondly, some laws affected them negatively because 
they were unable to fulfil the principle of reciprocity. This meant that many laws in practise 
caused problems for them because they were Palestinians – the only group of foreigners 
unable to offer reciprocity. Therefore, they were often treated differently from other 
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foreigners although they were defined as such. I will now look into some of the legislation 
relating to them in the period of 1948-1969 and 1989-2005. 
 
General legislation in the period before the Cairo Agreement (1948-1969) 
 
There are several statements on human rights and responsibilities to be found in Lebanese 
sources, but most underline the responsibility for the Lebanese people. For instance, a text 
by the President Charles Helou from 1965 claims that ‘governments have a responsibility 
to ensure higher living standards for the people’, but emphasizes that this only relates to 
Lebanese nationals.144 No law or decree dealt with the civil rights of the Palestinians before 
the Cairo Agreement, which annulled the responsibility of the Lebanese government. The 
only documents relating to Palestinians from this period were documents of 
identification. 145  State decisions were issued either to create agencies to relate to the 
refugee community, or to define the rights of foreigners and thus of refugees. 
 
In 1950, as it became clear that there was no imminent solution to the refugees’ situation, 
the first governmental intervention came in the form of the Central Committee for Refugee 
Affairs (CCRA), whose function was simply to cooperate with UNRWA.146  It was a 
committee with limited power, and in the decade 1948-1958, it was the only governmental 
connection to the refugees. But the involvement increased after the 1958 military coup. In 
1959, the CCRA was replaced by a separate government agency; the Department for 
Palestinian Refugee Affairs (the DPA); a direct part of the Ministry of the Interior.147 
Decree no. 927, which defined the DPA’s tasks, was issued simultaneously and is 
considered the first piece of legislation relating to the Palestinians in Lebanon.148 It did not 
define their status in the country, but it created an administrative system for the government 
to obtain accurate records of the refugees. The following year another agency was created 
to deal with the Palestinian presence – the Higher Authority for Palestinian Affairs (HAPA), 
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by Decree 3909. 149  HAPA, too, was created in order to gather information for the 
government. It employed officers from the Lebanese military intelligence; the Second 
Bureau, which had been strengthened after the coup. The change of government thus had 
effects on the refugee community in terms of legislation, and it had significant effects on 
their rights. Khalil Shatawi, a former director of the DPA, emphasized that the position 
became clearer in regards to the refugees after 1958, as more restrictive and preventive 
policies were issued. But except for limited labour legislation and documents of 
identification, no official documents relating to the Palestinians can be found from this 
period: Apparently, procedures and policies were not written down. 150  Although its 
resources and influence changed over the years, the DPA’s area of responsibility was still 
limited to documentation and organization. It issued identity cards and laissez-passers to 
the refugees; approved applications for marriage and other aspects of life; cooperated with 
UNRWA and organized the placement of the refugee camps.151 
 
The Ta’if Accord and its aftermath (1989-2005) 
 
The Ta’if Accord was the basis for the new Lebanese Constitution after the civil war ended 
in 1989, and it was the legal document with the most impact on the legal and practical 
situation of the Palestinian refugees after the civil war. In fact, apart from the definition of 
the refugees as foreigners, it was the most decisive piece of legislation relating to their 
general status throughout the whole period. Some of the changes after the Accord merely 
put into law what had been a matter of practise before, and some were entirely new.152 But 
regarding the Palestinian refugees, nothing that happened after the Accord can be seen as a 
fundamental change in political attitudes. However, the Ta’if Accord officially rejected 
tawtin; the resettlement of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon; by making it 
unconstitutional. The Constitution’s preamble from 1990 reads: 
‘There shall be no segregation of the people on the basis of any type of belonging, and no fragmentation, 
partition, or settlement of non-Lebanese in Lebanon.’153 
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National laws that might imply tawtin would from then on be considered unconstitutional. 
And as other changes included the establishment of a court to review the constitutionality 
of laws in 1995, the importance of constitutionality was greatly emphasized. 154  The 
Constitution overruled the country’s other legislation, and this gave a new perspective on 
the country’s conduct regarding the refugees. In practise, the constitutional rejection of 
tawtin also came to mean blocking ‘intermediate steps’, such as any law facilitating the 
implementation of civil rights: Such steps might eventually lead to tawtin, and were 
therefore deemed unconstitutional.155 This was followed by a more active legislative policy, 
directly banning Palestinians from certain areas and privileges. No legislation dealt directly 
with civil rights and the Palestinians were rarely referred to specifically in this period either, 
but more legislation restricted them from enjoying the privileges of other foreigners, such 
as the right to own property, which was specifically banned for Palestinians in 2001.156 The 
law met with criticism within the government, on the basis that it discriminated openly 
against Palestinians as any other foreigner might buy and own land and property. The 
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), among others, called the law illegal.157 Some legislation 
had positive effects, but Palestinians in Lebanon basically felt that the Ta’if Accord and its 
subsequent anti-tawtin laws put into writing what was informal before. Suheil al-Natour 
said: ‘When the guns stopped, by the Ta’if agreement, the War of Laws began.’158 
 
The creation of the CCRA, the DPA and HAPA, the Foreigner Law, and Decision no. 319 
in the period before 1969, and the Ta’if Accord after 1989, were the only legislative acts 
ever made to define the Palestinians’ general status in Lebanon. 
 
Laws relating to specific civil rights 
 
As for the particular civil rights, there was issued some legislation governing rights to work 
and freedom of movement. One law related to the right to own property, and one also 
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related to the right to social security. There was no legislation at all related to the rights to 
health or housing, so these will be examined in the next chapter. Following is an overview 
of all the legislation relating to the refugees’ rights to work and freedom of movement. 
 
The legislation below is called ‘law’, ‘decree’, ‘ruling’, or ‘decision’. Laws were issued by 
the Parliament and decrees by the government; and both were perceived as ‘laws’, ranking 
the same in a legal hierarchy. Rulings and decisions were issued by the ministers in office, 
often interpreting and applying the laws and decrees.159 They could not overrule the laws, 
but could add on to them, and they were subject to more flexibility as they could be 
eradicated or changed by each minister. The legislation will be presented here and 
reviewed in relation to the ICCPR and the ICESCR in Chapter 5. 
 
The right to freedom of movement 
 
DECREE 7706, 1954 
Decree 7706 was issued in 1954 and freed foreigners from being charged for visas when travelling from 
country to country.160 This decree only applied to Palestinians after they were defined as foreigners in 1962. 
What the situation was prior to this could not be found in the sources. 
 
DECREE 10188, 1967 
The next legislation related to the freedom of movement was Decree no. 10188, which stipulated that 
Palestinians were exempt from producing documents when travelling between Lebanon and Syria.161 On 
travelling to other Arab countries, Palestinians must possess such documents. Issuing the documents was up 
to the DPA. It was thus up to the director of the DPA whether or not a Palestinian would receive travelling 
documents, since it was established that this procedure was not ruled by legislation but by procedure; and 
therefore by whoever was the director at a given time. 
 
These decrees are both legally and in practise exceptions from the common Lebanese 
conduct of the Palestinians. Decree 7706 especially had a positive effect for the 
Palestinians. The background for this might be that in 1954, two Arab League resolutions 
stated that the member states should grant Palestinian refugees temporary travel documents 
and exempt refugees from fees relating to visas and renewal of travel documents. 162 
Though Lebanon never implemented the Casablanca Protocol, which stipulated that the 
Palestinian refugees ought to be given certain rights (see Chapter 2); it tried to adhere to 
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some of the Arab League decisions, such as the one aiming to preserve the Palestinian 
nationality. The abovementioned legislation seems to be another example of adhering to the 
Arab League stipulations. 
 
RULING 478, 1995 
The next law dealing with travel rights was issued after the abolishment of the Cairo Agreement: Ruling no. 
478 of 1995, issued by the Minister of Interior. It reads: ‘…every Palestinian refugee who came to Lebanon in 
1948 and who wishes to leave it, must obtain an exit and return visa from the Public Security, and in 
exchange for the payment of fees.’163 
Legally, the ruling was questionable. It was arguably consistent with the Foreigner Law, but in order 
to be valid, new Lebanese legislation must be published in the newspaper the Official Gazette, and Ruling 
478 was not. 164 The ruling also contradicted the text of the Palestinians’ existing travel documents that were 
still valid: ‘It is requested (…) to allow the holder of this document freedom of movement, and to provide all 
that he requires by way of aid and guidance.’165 
 
This ruling overruled any privileges that Decrees 7706 and 10188 had granted. It was now 
written in legislation that Palestinians must pay fees for their travel documents, and Syria 
was not an exception. We see how one result of the Ta’if Accord was that the Arab League 
policy that Lebanon had previously adhered to was made invalid. Also, this was a ruling 
issued by the Minister of Interior, and exemplifies the effects that one minister’s decision 
could have on the Palestinian community. 
 
The background for the ruling was the decision in that year by Libya’s President Qaddafi to 
evict all foreigners in the country as a protest against the Israeli-Palestinian peace process 
of 1993.166 Many Palestinians were working in Libya at the time, and quite a few of them 
were registered as refugees in Lebanon. Maybe 2,000 Palestinians came back before the 
government reacted with fears that all of Libya’s ex-residents holding Lebanese travel 
documents, around 15,000 people, would flock back.167 Thus the authorities issued the 
order to hinder Palestinian refugees coming back to Lebanon. But aside from hindering 
those with travel documents to enter Lebanon from Libya, the re-entry visa also caused 
heavy restrictions on the already present refugees’ freedom of movement. Many 
Palestinians were employed abroad in different countries, and the demand for a re-entry 
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visa made them unable to return to Lebanon.168 Obtaining re-entry visas before leaving was 
both near impossible and highly expensive, and the visas had to be renewed every six 
months; so it also forced most refugees to stay in Lebanon even if they had contracts for 
labour abroad. 
The order was recalled in 1999 at the change of government, when the new Prime 
Minister Salim al Hoss and President Emile Lahoud came to office. International pressure 
and internal politics have been given as reasons for the change, as al-Hoss wanted to prove 
that the former government’s decision had failed: Frankly, the re-entry visa served the 
opposite of the government’s aim. 169  Although it probably kept a limited number of 
refugees out, it also caused many Palestinians to remain in Lebanon on account of fear of 
not being able to return; thus eliminating the high rate of emigration which had been 
encouraged by the government.170 
 
The right to work 
 
THE FOREIGNER LAW, 1962 
The first general law relating to employment for foreigners was the Foreigner Law of 1962, which restricted 
some fields of work to Lebanese nationals and limited the foreigners’ until then rather extensive possibilities. 
It stipulated that employers should give priority to Lebanese workers, and that if this was not done, the 
foreigner’s labour permit should be cancelled.171 
 
DECREE no. 17561, 1964 
The next decree was Decree 17561 of 1964, which restricted foreigners’ rights further.172 It emphasized that 
foreigners must obtain labour permits, and it defined the principle of reciprocity. Decree 17561 stated that all 
rights enjoyed by Lebanese wage-earners should be enjoyed by foreign workers, as long as their country of 
origin provided equal treatment for Lebanese workers.173 
THE LABOUR LAW, 1968 
In 1968 the Lebanese Labour Law was issued, and it stipulated that fines would be issued for each day an 
employer hired someone without a permit.174 The law did not include the free professions. 
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LAWS REGULATING THE FREE PROFESSIONS, 1950-1993175 
In 1950, pharmaceutical practise was made exclusive to Lebanese nationals and foreigners offering reciprocal 
treatment. Next followed a law in 1951, which reserved the profession of engineering on the same basis.176 In 
1970, the profession of law was regulated by the same principles, and the profession of medicine was made 
equally exclusive in 1979.177 Decrees from 1982 and 1993 limited professions further.178 
 
These laws meant that although the demand for work permits and the application of the 
principle of reciprocity was not in effect until 1962, some types of work were closed to 
Palestinians from an earlier stage. Two professions had been made exclusive to Lebanese 
by 1951, and through the years more legislation was passed with regard to Palestinians 
seeking to practise free professions in Lebanon. This, then, was a third aspect of the labour 
situation of the Palestinians in Lebanon: The practise of some trades, such as law, medicine, 
pharmaceutics and engineering, became reserved to members of professional associations, 
or ‘syndicates’.179 They were regulated by separate legislation which prohibited anyone 
who was not affiliated to those syndicates to practise that profession.180 The syndicates 
required applicants for membership to be Lebanese citizens or to be foreigners who offered 
reciprocity for Lebanese workers in their countries of origin. Governmental officials were 
generally not willing to interfere with their decisions. 181  These free professions thus 
followed the same principles as other types of employment, but were governed by 
Lebanese associations and were closed more directly to Palestinian workers than were the 
other types of work. 
 
DECISION no. 621/1, 1995 
In 1995, Decision 621/1 was issued. It was an amendment to Law 17651, and it repeated the listed entries and 
clearly defined the restricted professions. Now, Palestinians were restricted from seventy-two professions 
altogether. Article 1 of the decision reads: 
 “The understated jobs and professions are restricted to Lebanese citizens only: 
 Workers: 
 All type of administration and banking jobs, especially: 
general manager, manager, deputy manager, staff manager, treasury, accountant, secretary, 
documentation, registry, computer, trade representative, marketing representative, trade consultant, 
workers’ supervisor, store manager, sales workers, exchange jobs, jeweller, laboratory, pharmacy 
and electrical workers, electronic, painting, glass fixing, mechanics and maintenance, doorman, 
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concierge, guard, dyer, cook, butler, hairdresser, elementary/secondary and high school teachers, in 
case of need for foreign language teaching (foreigners are exempted), engineering in all specialties, 
landscape and land survey works. Priority should be given to Lebanese for all types of jobs and 
professions.”182 
 
This list related to employees, and a similar list was established for business owners; 
restricting ownerships to ‘Lebanese citizens only’. An interesting aspect is that article 2 of 
the same decision exempted from these lists foreigners residing in Lebanon since birth; 
foreigners with a Lebanese mother; and foreigners married to a Lebanese woman for more 
than a year. The article further states: ‘The Minister is entitled to give final approval in any 
of the above mentioned cases.’183 The exceptions should have exempted most Palestinians 
from the restrictions, as the majority of them had resided in Lebanon since birth.184 But in 
practise, very few Palestinians were granted work permits or final approvals from the 
Minister of Labour. Jobs not requiring permits were primarily in the areas of agriculture, 
construction and other forms of manual labour, and these became the dominant areas of 
work for Palestinians, beside operating small businesses and shops inside the camps. 
 
DECISION 79/1, 2005 
In 2005, the Minister of Labour Tarrad Hamadeh, with the support of the government,185 issued Decision no. 
79/1, which exempted Palestinians born in Lebanon and officially registered at the Ministry of Interior from 
the restrictions of Decision no. 621/1.186 
 
This was an attempt to reduce the restrictions that Palestinians were subject to, and a 
second example of the influence of individual ministers. It opened some work domains, but 
the decision had little practical consequence since the Palestinians were still subject to the 
demand for labour permits, and were still banned from all professions ruled by a syndicate. 
When asked about the reasons for the decision, the Ministry of Labour replied that ‘the 
Ministry does not wish to answer the question’.187 
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In an interview given to a private journalist and NGO activist,188 the Minister of 
Labour referred to the decision as a ‘memorandum’, which had the power to change some 
employment stipulations, but not all. For instance, he was unable to interfere with the 
syndicate laws, and the memorandum could be changed by a new minister. According to 
the U.S. Committee for Refugees, the memorandum did not meet much opposition among 
Lebanese politicians.189 Some negative responses were heard, but mostly, the Decision met 
little reaction at all. Even politicians known for opinions hostile to the Palestinians in 
Lebanon approved the content of the memorandum; among them Member of Parliament 
and Minister of Industry Pierre Gemayel, who claimed to be in favour of improving the 
condition for Palestinians in Lebanon, and claimed that the memorandum would ‘guarantee 
their return’ to Palestine. 
 
Summary 
 
We have seen that the Lebanese government consistently avoided clarifying the legal status 
of the Palestinian refugees in the country. They were not defined as anything but a category 
of foreigners, and most of the negative effects that legislation had on the refugees’ lives 
and civil rights stemmed from this definition of them as foreigners, as well as from the 
application of the principle of reciprocity, which led directly to banning the Palestinians 
from rights that other foreigners were able to enjoy. 
 
Few laws mentioned them specifically. Decisions no. 927, 3909 and 319 were all adopted 
in order to create institutions that could relate to the group in terms of formal registration 
and issuing of papers, not in order to interfere with their everyday life.190  The refugees’ 
right to health and housing were not mentioned by law at all. Their right to freedom of 
movement was not restricted by law until 1995, but their right to employment was to a 
great extent taken away in 1962. With the Ta’if Accord, legislative directives that withdrew 
the few rights they had were issued. Many of the laws reflected politics of avoiding 
integration of the refugees, and almost all the legislation that did relate to them led to a 
deterioration of their situation rather than to a amelioration. So throughout the period, the 
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main tendency of the Lebanese government towards the Palestinians was to have no clear 
legal policy and no clear definition in law. The lack of a clear policy suggests that the 
government avoided any definition of their responsibility toward the Palestinians. When 
the extent of that responsibility was determined in 1962, it proved severely limited, and this 
led the government branches to deal with the Palestinians in an ad hoc manner, where 
legislation was influenced by political changes and personal views. 
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Chapter 4. Lebanese policies and practises relating to the civil 
rights of the Palestinian refugees 
 
We have seen how the legal situation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon was unclear 
and granted them limited or no civil rights. This chapter will look at the development of the 
actual civil rights situation in the areas of health, housing, freedom of movement and work, 
and also looks at the Lebanese government’s unwritten policies and practises in relation to 
the refugees. It aims to show which practises were prevalent; either as consequences of or 
in spite of the legal situation. 
 
The Lebanese government related to the Palestinians first and foremost as foreigners, but 
the refugees were also divided into different categories depending on when they arrived in 
Lebanon, as we saw in Chapter 2. This division did not have many consequences for the 
legal situation, but had repercussions in practise. The only legal implication was in the 
context of identity papers, which allowed the refugees’ temporary residence in Lebanon 
and gave them permission to move around the country as well as to leave it. If a Palestinian 
belonged in the registered category, their identification papers were easily obtained, and 
travel documents were issued for a five-year period. 191 If they were in the un-registered 
category, their identification papers were issued in the same manner, but their travel 
documents were only issued for one year at a time. If they belonged to the non-identified 
category, they had no identification papers and thus no right of movement within or out of 
the country. Although Lebanon recognized the non-identified refugees as a category with 
particular problems,192 we shall see that procedures differentiated between the categories to 
a greater extent than the legal situation did. 
 
The right to health 
 
The right to health and housing were under UNRWA’s mandate, and no legal stipulations 
regulated the conditions in these fields at all. But they were affected by the government in 
some ways, for instance since UNRWA ‘impinged on matters of public interest and 
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governmental policy in the host countries’,193 and since UNRWA by definition had to 
cooperate with the respective governments. 
 
Before 1969 
 
The situation in Lebanon did not differ much from that of the other host countries’ until 
1952, and this first period was marked by several supportive official statements and 
promises. For instance, in 1948, the Prime Minister promised to give ‘all necessary aid’ to 
the refugees.194 But four years after, a representative of the Chamber of Deputies said to the 
National Assembly: 
‘Nous avons observés dans quelques camps des situations qui donnent la chair de poule. (…) Comment la 
conscience, comment le gouvernement et la commission préposée aux questions des réfugiés peuvent-ils 
tolerér cette situation? Il s’agit d’une question humanitaire que le gouvernement ne peut pas négliger.’195 
 
Apparently, the assurances of all necessary assistance had not been fulfilled, while in Syria 
and Jordan, the Palestinian refugees had access to governmental health facilities.196 The 
account was motivated by the speaker’s having witnessed appalling conditions in the 
camps, and his description was backed by numerous sources from UNRWA and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at that time. 197  Following this, the 
President Bechara al Khoury visited some camps, and restated that the refugees should be 
housed, fed and receive emergency aid.198 The government, then, did make official visits 
and knew at least some of the reality of the camps. Overcrowding, lack of sanitation and 
undernourishment led to health problems, and the relief schemes were rather ineffective in 
the first years.199 In 1948-1950, the refugees received basic health care from the ICRC. The 
organization’s priority was medical assistance, but the refugees did not have access to 
                                                 
193
 Jabber, Fuad (ed.) (1970), 384. 
194
 Jean Malhat, collection of ministerial declarations, 81f, in al-Natour 1993, 38. See Chapter 6 for more 
about this. 
195
 Rishad Azar, Sessions of the Lebanese Parliament, 24.4.1952, page 2139; in al-Natour 1993, 39. Misprint 
in al-Natour, 39. 
196
 Takkenberg 1998, 171. 
197
 UNRWA 1982: A brief history 1950-1982, Interim report of the director of the UNRWA 1951, al-
Husseini 1998. When known, the confessional and political affiliation of the sources that are quoted 
throughout the study will be given, on account of their possible influence on the source. Here, the speaker’s 
affiliations are unknown. 
198
 Al-Natour 1993, 39. 
199
 Due, among other things, to the inability to mobilize enough resources (al-Husseini 1998, 9). UNRWA 
1982: A brief history 1950-1982, 160. 
  51 
advanced medical care such as hospitalization.200 When UNRWA took over the medical 
facilities in May 1950, it did however claim that the sanitary conditions and clinics were 
satisfactory.201 This implies that the early priority of medical services had given results. 
 
However, the Palestinians were restricted to the health facilities provided for them in the 
camps and by UNRWA. As we saw in the previous chapter, the Palestinians’ right to health 
was not dealt with in Lebanese legislation, and in practise, the Palestinians also did not 
have rights to the Lebanese health care system. The Lebanese health system was 
completely absent in the camps. The Lebanese government consistently emphasized that 
the rights to health and other social services for the refugees were the responsibility of the 
international community. Access to Lebanese public health care was therefore denied them 
completely. One reason for this may be that the private sector was much more important in 
Lebanon than in other Arab countries, affecting the health sector.202 
In theory, Palestinians had access to private health facilities, but were in practise 
kept from them due to the cost. 203 But the refugees did have some access to private health 
care, since UNRWA signed agreements with private hospitals for advanced treatment. 
UNRWA rented beds from different private hospitals, and these were offered to the 
Palestinian refugees, with most of the cost subsidized by the agency. There were 238 such 
beds available in 1950, and 226 in 1951.204 
UNRWA’s own services were free of charge and medical services were provided 
through movable and permanent clinics.205 In 1961 UNRWA operated eighteen general 
clinics throughout Lebanon. They then had agreements with seventeen hospitals, and 365 
hospital beds were available to Palestinians.206 In 1969 that number had shrunk to 274.207 
No other hospitalization was available for the Palestinians than that which UNRWA rented. 
The fact that the number of available beds sank from 238 in 1950 to 226 in 1951 is worth 
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noting –  the number was very small, but every other host country had a rapid increase in 
available hospital beds in this period.208 
 
From 1952 onwards, UNRWA reported a continuing ‘dramatic improvement’ in health 
care inside the camps, and started to focus more on educational programs in all the areas of 
its operation.209 And medical services in Lebanon differed further from those of other 
countries, both positively and negatively. For instance, the hospital situation in Lebanon 
was the worst of the region. The outburst of epidemic deceases were critical in the early 
period and the government did not offer any treatment for fighting them or vaccinating 
children.210 But there were fewer refugees in Lebanon who were left out of the UNRWA 
ration program than in the other host countries, and Lebanon was reported to have the best 
results on child health care in the UNRWA areas of operation although children suffered as 
a result of long-term deficiencies in their daily diet.211 
In the 1960s, legislation formalized the de facto restrictions that had been in place, 
through the application of the principle of reciprocity (see Chapter 3). However, during the 
late 1960s, the PLO built the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) as a parallel health 
structure in order to offer hospitalization and fill the gaps of the UNRWA services. There 
were twenty PRCS hospitals in Lebanon in 1969. They were well equipped, according to a 
newspaper article referring to a report on the refugee conditions,212 and therefore, despite 
the more stringent legal situation, the 1960s were better for the refugees in terms of health 
care. The fact that the number of hospital beds had shrunk in 1969 was probably due to 
both the parallel hospital structure and the focus of UNRWA on education, and UNRWA 
deemed the situation as adequate.213 
 
After 1989 
 
The civil war had laid waste most of the medical services in the camps. Many hospitals and 
clinics were damaged or completely destroyed. Broken infrastructure, open sewage and 
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water pipes were problems in every camp. Most of the PRCS hospitals were destroyed or 
closed due to the expulsion of the PLO. PRCS staff reported that drugs and equipment had 
been removed from their facilities by Lebanese doctors and the Lebanese Army (LA).214 
 
Lebanon’s economy was in a crisis, and the private hospitals that UNRWA had agreements 
with now faced financial difficulties, causing repercussions for the Palestinians. The 
economic crisis resulted in contracts being made with some of the least developed hospitals 
in the country, according to a report from the Palestine Return Centre.215 Sources from this 
period agree that although Palestinians were not overtly banned, the Lebanese health care 
system remained both legally and practically reserved for Lebanese nationals because of 
the principle of reciprocity.216 Only 3.5 per cent of the refugees visited a government health 
institution in 2005. As a comparison, thirty-five per cent of the Palestinian refugees in 
Jordan did.217 But it must be noted that the Lebanese public hospitals were hardly sufficient 
for Lebanese nationals, much because of the war’s destructions.218 
 
For UNRWA, also, financial shortage had become a chronic condition. Much important 
maintenance work was not carried out due to the decrease of funds after the Oslo Peace 
Process, as the donor countries started prioritizing the Palestinian Authorities in terms of 
monetary support. UNRWA had to cut down on social services in the region in 1998.219 In 
2001 the agency spent only seventy dollars per refugee, where it previously spent 200 
annually.220 Some services that had been free in the past now became paying services. The 
number of UNRWA clinics in the camps had risen to twenty-two in 1991, but the number 
of subsidized hospital beds available had shrunk to 144. The number of people registered as 
‘special hardship cases’, cases that required monetary aid, were set at thirteen per cent; the 
highest in the region.221 Nonetheless, the Minister of Interior in 1998 stated that Lebanon 
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could not take the costs of providing health services for the Palestinians.222 Prime Minister 
Hariri also insisted that hospitalization was the responsibility of UNRWA, and stressed that 
UNRWA must get more funding from the international community in order to fulfil its 
responsibility;223 thus recognizing the problem and acknowledging that the health care in 
the camps was not satisfactory. In a report from an international visit to Lebanon in 1998, 
every camp visited had complaints regarding medical services.224 The UNRWA doctors 
saw an average of eighty-nine patients a day.225 Mother and child health care was the only 
part of the health services that had a development comparable to the other host countries.226 
At this time, the refugees in Lebanon had the highest infant and child mortality in the 
region227 – in sharp contrast to the situation in 1965. When ‘acutely ill’, it seems that 
refugees had access to services, but medical care for chronic illnesses and disabilities had 
become a large problem since the civil war. Even in cases of emergency, the Lebanese 
health system normally did not aid Palestinians. 
 The exclusion was  a fact, and was caused by both the faltering Lebanese economy, 
and the principle of reciprocity. A third factor was that the availability depended on the 
hospital in question. Sometimes doctors would choose to ignore that the patient was a 
Palestinian and file that she lacked identification. 228  Again, it was up to individual 
considerations how Palestinians were to be treated. But such cases were said to be quite 
rare and mostly occurred in areas far from the central municipalities. It was reported that 
the government withdrew licenses from private hospitals that made it a practise to treat 
Palestinians, although sometimes the Lebanese authorities closed their eyes to this 
practise.229 
 
Non-registered and non-ID refugees 
The non-registered and non-ID refugees were not eligible for UNRWA’s services for most 
of the period. The non-ID refugees had relied on the medical facilities of the PLO, and 
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suffered greatly since its expulsion.230 The non-registered refugees relied heavily on NGOs, 
at least until 2004, when UNRWA decided to grant services to the non-registered refugees, 
leaving only the non-IDs without services. 
Although UNRWA was the only legal and acknowledged provider of services, there 
were other organizations, NGOs, working in the camps, who were greatly relied upon.231 
The government did not interfere with their activities; perhaps due to the policy of ignoring 
what went on inside the camps, or because of the evident need. 
 
UNRWA’s review of the health situation as adequate in the 1960s was thus outdated in the 
post-war years. From a steady improvement in the 1950s and 1960s, although it never met 
the standards of the other host countries in most respects, the war devastated the health care 
programs. They were not rebuilt to a satisfactory level, much due to lack of funding, and 
never recovered.232 
 
The right to housing 
 
Although the right to housing was also under UNRWA’s mandate, the camps were on 
Lebanese land; and Lebanese law and restrictions played a greater part here than it did 
regarding the right to health. 
 
Before 1969 
 
Most of the refugee camps were erected between 1948 and 1952.233 All were originally set 
up on land made available by the Lebanese state; and the state remained responsible for the 
maintenance of law and order. Some camps were built on public domain at no cost; some 
on private land rented at a symbolic fee paid by the government or by UNRWA; and some 
on land leased by UNRWA (see maps 2 and 3).234 UNRWA had no figures from the first 
years, but suggests that about thirty-two per cent of the refugees lived in camps in 1951, 
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containing as much as seven families to one tent.235 In 1954, UNRWA started building 
more long-term facilities to replace the tents, and by 1959 all were replaced.236 After its 
creation in 1959, the DPA held the responsibility to provide locations for any new camps 
and was also responsible for the existing sites. It was prohibited to expand the sites once 
the camps had been established there. However, one camp was created in 1961, to 
accommodate refugees from ‘over-populated areas’ according to UNRWA.237 The camps 
were generally isolated from the national infrastructure, but some refuse collection was 
performed by local authorities.238 In 1961, the sanitary conditions in the camps seemed 
satisfactory in some respects although only half the camps had proper drains and sewers. 
It thus took more than ten years for all the Palestinian refugees to be housed in 
some sort of long-term concrete lodging, although the houses were hardly satisfactory as 
permanent homes. From 1960 onwards, the percentage of camp dwellers was rising, as 
poverty caused more and more Palestinians in Lebanon proper to apply for admittance into 
the camps. 239  The camp population reached fifty per cent of the total number of 
Palestinians in Lebanon in the late 1960s; the highest percentage in any UNRWA area. 
 
The fact that the state undertook to compensate the owners of some of the land used for 
refugee camps signals that a certain hospitality was present in the first years. 240  The 
permission to erect a new camp in 1961 although any expansion of the existing camp sites 
was prohibited, and the fact that refuse collection was performed by local municipal 
authorities in some camps, may also be signs of hospitality and good will. On the other 
hand, since the camp was built in order to lessen the burden on over-populated areas in the 
south, and since this took place in a time period when the government exercised much 
control of the camps (1958-1969), the reason it was established may also have been to ease 
the maintenance of law and order. Also, the south was declared a military zone in the 1960s, 
restricting Palestinian entry there,241 and a policy of reducing clusters of refugees near the 
borders to Israel was noticeable after some years. This explains some forcible transfers of 
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refugees that took place to the Beqa’a valley and other areas, which were often resisted by 
the refugees who wanted to stay close to the borders of Palestine.242 Other than erecting a 
new camp in 1961, the DPA did not offer new or expanded sites for the camps. 
Another policy was to prevent the concentration of refugees in and around Beirut; 
ensured for example by a ban on buildings outside the camps’ borders. Especially after 
1958, Palestinians were often fined for building or repairing houses without a permit. 
‘Repairs’ could include putting rocks on the zinc roofs to prevent them from blowing 
away.243 It was illegal to build houses with cement. 
After the DPA became responsible for finding camp sites, then, only one new camp 
was erected, and no permits to expand sites were granted. Since the refugees were not 
allowed to expand outwards, they built upwards. The buildings sometimes became 
dangerously tall; and were often built without proper basements, functioning in some cases 
as ‘multi-story death traps’.244 Some of those who had the means bought homes outside the 
camps, as there was no legal restrictions against Palestinians owning property before 2001. 
Altogether it appears that the government cooperated with UNRWA in the first years, 
although bans on expansion and repairs signalled a rising scepticism and a tight control. 
 
After the civil war 
 
Intense shelling, bulldozer clearings, and warfare had left the camps devastated. Most 
camps were damaged, and three were completely destroyed.245 These were not re-erected, 
although the government gave permission to re-erect one of them (Nabatieh). The two 
largest camps, Burj al Barajneh in Beirut and ‘Ayn al Hilweh in Saida, were also almost 
completely destroyed. In the south, ninety per cent of the camp population was affected by 
the warfare,246 while generally the camps in the north fared better than those around Beirut 
and in the south.247 
The government restricted the rebuilding to the original camp sites; that is to say 
that houses Palestinians had built on illegal grounds after the camp’s creation were not to 
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be rebuilt. Since three of the camps had been destroyed, overcrowding was apparent and an 
increasing problem. 248  The government also refused an UNRWA request to erect 
temporary shelters in vicinity of the camp sites. 
 
Bans and restrictions 
The bans on building became stricter after the civil war. There was issued a ‘secret’, or at 
least unofficial ban on constructing new buildings or reconstructing old ones in all the 
camps, including adding more floors to existing buildings.249 The Minister for Foreign 
Affairs said to the press in 1998: ‘What concerns Palestinians who are still living in 
Lebanese territory, it is forbidden to make modifications to the camps.’250 
The housing problems were thus aggravated by government restrictions that 
hindered improvements of the infrastructure, and inadequate drinking water and poor 
sanitation was partly caused by the policy of isolating the camps from the national 
infrastructure systems; thus doing in practise what the legislation had indicated.251 One 
newspaper report states that the government ‘openly admitted’ to be blocking UNRWA’s 
efforts of rebuilding.252 Whether or not the openness was a fact, UNRWA itself reported 
grave difficulties with regards to government relations; quite in contrast to the hospitality 
of the 1950s.253  In addition, all of UNRWA’s plans for construction since 1994 were 
hindered because of a military ban on bringing in any construction materials. The ban was 
a de facto situation, and no official sources explain how this ban worked – but other 
accounts give details.254 All entries of materials were subject to approval from the LA. The 
ban was especially effective in the south of Lebanon, where checkpoints oversaw exits and 
entrances and restricted the entry of building materials; physically hindering improvements. 
Refugees were often arrested for carrying cement or other materials into the camps. 
Representatives of the LA confirmed that such a ban existed.255 Although the ban was 
supposed to extend throughout the country, inhabitants of Burj al-Barajneh said that while 
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there was a ban in theory, no one was watching the entry of materials there. Again, the 
camps in the north fared better and were generally able to carry out reconstructions.256 
In addition to the bans, there were reports of decisions to demolish new or repaired 
structures in the camps near the city Tyre, and reports of constant threats of demolishing 
camps in Beirut.257 Prime Minister Siniora denied this in a meeting with UNRWA, calling 
the reports ‘completely false’.258 There were no reports claiming that such decisions had 
indeed been carried out, but Siniora did not give UNRWA permission to perform necessary 
environmental health rehabilitations or facilitate the entry of building materials. Neither did 
he approve building permits which the agency had requested. 
The fact that there were in general less bans and restrictions on the camps in the 
north might be related to the fact that the north was controlled mostly by Syria. The south 
was occupied by Israel and the Beirut municipality was administered by the Lebanese 
government, which suggests that the Syrians influenced the conduct regarding the camps in 
the north positively. 
 
The displaced refugees 
The bans and prohibitions caused immense problems for the Palestinians who had become 
displaced during the war. Some settled in what sources refer to as unofficial gatherings, 
usually in the vicinity of the camps (see map 3). Others lived in cramped shelters that were 
supposed to be temporary.259 As work on rehousing the displaced Lebanese commenced, 
the displaced Palestinians were evacuated from abandoned buildings. They were evacuated 
without compensation, but Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party 
(PSP), urged UNRWA to pay them compensation, and a newspaper reported that there was 
an argument between Jumblatt and UNRWA over the treatment of the Palestinians.260 
Many displaced refugees were placed in temporary shelters. One such shelter was an empty 
hospital building in Beirut that was taken into use by the NGO the Popular Aid for Relief 
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and Development (PARD) in 1985. The displaced refugees occupied the floors as if it were 
a village – laundry, vending and other everyday activities took place in the old hospital’s 
hallways. Water ran across the floors. Every family was given a single room; some built so 
hastily that one easily could see between the bricks. Up to fourteen people could live in one 
room, almost completely deprived of electricity or water. 261  In 1999, some 35,000 
Palestinians were housed in such provisional shelters.262 In 2005, Member of Parliament 
Bahia Hariri claimed that the displaced people occupying the houses would be evacuated 
and receive compensation,263 but no immediate changes took place. 
 
Une mort lente 
The camps stood as proof and symbol of the historic low point of the refugees’ general 
conditions. Lebanon had the worst housing conditions in the region.264  One Lebanese 
official described openly the grave needs of the overcrowded camps.265 In 1998, UNRWA 
reported that most of the refugees faced ‘deplorable living conditions’ – and although they 
were applying for funding, it hardly seems likely that they were exaggerating.266 In 2005, 
almost seventy per cent of the refugees had less than half a room.267 In Burj al-Barajneh, 
17,000 people lived in the space of two square kilometres. There was hardly any room for 
expanding cemeteries.268 Seventy-one per cent reported having no heating. Electric cables 
often hung low to the ground creating risky situations. The situation was similar for all the 
categories of refugees, with few additional problems for the non-IDs.269 
In 1998, the Minister of Interior expressed a reservation to intervene on the subject 
of housing, because relieving the conditions might encourage the Palestinians to stay in 
Lebanon.270 Prime Minister Hariri stressed that the problem was the lack of political will in 
the international community, but promised to ‘reflect’ on the question of housing 
regulations.271 In the same year, the Dbayeh camp was connected to the central water 
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system through an agreement between UNRWA and the local authorities, and an agreement 
was also reached on garbage disposal from two camps.272 Not much else happened, which 
signals that Hariri’s promise was more a figure of speech than an intent to change the 
regulations, although he acknowledged Lebanon’s responsibility to however slight an 
extent. 
 
The housing situation thus changed over the years, but overcrowding was a constant 
problem. Although the basic conditions were improved in the 1960s, as the tents were 
replaced by buildings and some of the sanitary conditions were satisfactory, the problem of 
overcrowding soon surpassed such improvements. And the years after the civil war saw 
deteriorating conditions on all parts: Overcrowding became more dire, and many of the 
previous improvements to houses and sanitary conditions were set back by destructions. 
The displaced Palestinians lived in even worse conditions than the general camp dwellers. 
No wonder, perhaps, that international reports refers to statements saying that ‘les 
conditions les condamnent à une mort lente.’273 
 
The right to free movement 
 
The rights to freedom of movement and work were necessarily subject to the host country’s 
regulations and laws, contrary to the issues of housing and health. Although the practises 
often were results of the legal situation, some practises were independent of it. 
 
One such practise concerned the autonomy of the camps. Who governed the camps from 
the inside, as well as their entrances, had strong implications for the inhabitants’ freedom 
of movement. Therefore, the autonomy or control of the camps will be an integral part of 
this section. 
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Movement within Lebanon 
 
In the first years, the refugees were in practise able to move freely in Lebanon, although 
security measures were imposed by the authorities in the 1950s. Sources disagree about the 
level of autonomy prior to 1958,274 but as seen above, the situation varied according to the 
political situation. The Palestinian camps were controlled to some extent by Lebanese 
intelligence services, but this was the case for Palestinian refugees in all host countries and 
did not cause much criticism.275 
 
After 1958, the situation became much more restrictive. There was a direct order by the 
Lebanese security forces to have checkpoints at every camp. In this way, President Shehab 
and his military intelligence, the Second Bureau, continued and strengthened the control of 
the camps, with serious consequences for the refugees’ freedom of movement within the 
country. Many Palestinians claimed that the decade of 1958 to 1969 was the most difficult 
period they experienced in Lebanon, in general terms and especially in regards to 
movement.276 Isolating the camps from the Lebanese society was a part of the official 
policy. According to interviews, inhabitants were not allowed to leave or enter without 
permission from either the Second Bureau or from the DPA (the latter if one wished to 
move from one camp to another).277 Such permits from the DPA were usually not given. In 
addition to the checkpoints of the Second Bureau, the LA had stations inside the camps and 
was in charge of upholding law and order, often inflicting what was perceived as 
harassment, terror and even torture through arrests and threats of arrests.278 One source said 
that it was often prohibited for more than two Palestinians to walk together, in case they 
might be preparing a demonstration; which was illegal. It was prohibited to listen to the 
radio or read newspapers. The army and the intelligence bureau carried the only weapons in 
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the camps, as the Palestinians were not militarily active in this period.279 These were all de 
facto situations, which lasted until the Cairo Agreement in 1969. 
President Shehab said that he knew what was being done in the camps, but that 
‘responsible Palestinians must understand his position… how am I to control the 
Palestinians?’280 In other words, he deemed the measures as necessary, or he wished to 
defend his position and control any elements of possible unrest. 
 
After the civil war 
Lebanon changed during the civil war. The government had initiated a policy of isolating 
the refugee camps completely instead of exercising control over them, and this remained 
the main official policy toward the camps. Despite the decreased suppression, a former 
director of the DPA stated that the situation in regards to the right to movement after the 
Ta’if Accord was in practise the same as in 1958.281 The DPA issued permits and registered 
movements from camp to camp.282 Some Palestinians said that they were required to report 
it if they wished to move from one camp to another, but need not apply for a permit; which 
gave them a relatively extensive freedom of movement in that respect.283 The Palestinian 
lawyer Suheil al-Natour believed that the overcrowded situation of the camps made other 
restrictions unnecessary, ‘since there was no room to move anyway’.284 
 
The DPA stated in 1998 that the basic premise in the camps was still that Lebanese 
jurisdiction operated.285 But in reality, Lebanese authority did not rule, and there was no 
official protection of the Palestinian refugees. Lebanese authorities claimed that it had not 
been possible to carry out the disarmament of the Palestinian militias that the Ta’if Accord 
required, and that the Lebanese authorities therefore were reluctant to enter the camps.286 
Instead of entering the camps, Lebanese troops were said to be stationed around them. But 
as seen above, troops were not stationed around all the camps, nor was the degree of 
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control over the comings and goings in the camps uniform. The placement of checkpoints 
throughout the country was varying, but in the south there were LA checkpoints at the 
entrances on a regular basis and there was only one entrance to every camp.287 One source 
explained that the checkpoints existed to hinder criminals from entering to hide inside the 
camps where the LA or other Lebanese authorities were unable to find them. 288  In 
November 2005, a newspaper reported that the municipality of Saida in the south of 
Lebanon started installing surveillance cameras at the main entrances of the camp ‘Ayn al-
Hilweh, and no officials denied this.289  Palestinian sources claimed that the Lebanese 
authorities had access to and were even welcome in many camps, and that they would be 
able to take them over at any time.290 But in some cases, the Palestinian camp committees 
who organized the infrastructure of the camps attempted to keep the authorities out. Since 
the authorities shunned entering in most cases, this caused a form of double isolation.291 
 
There was no legal system in the camps, and there was confusion in the sources as to 
whether or not Palestinians had access to Lebanese courts throughout the period. One 
source states that ‘should a Palestinian approach the Lebanese authorities in search of 
protection, he would be treated in the same way as would a Lebanese national’.292 But there 
was no record of any Palestinians ever approaching the courts in this way. 
 
The non-ID refugees in the camps 
At the checkpoints, camp residents were required to show the soldiers their documents of 
identification to be let through. This, naturally, caused grave problems for the non-ID 
refugees. The case that first proved the existence of this category of refugees happened 
when a Palestinian ran away from a checkpoint and was shot dead in 2001.293 It was later 
determined that he ran because he had no legal documents, which would have led to his 
arrest. In 2005, 94.5 per cent of the non-ID refugees claimed to face restrictions on moving 
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out of the camps and around the country – non-ID refugees were in fact unable to leave the 
camps or travel abroad at all.294 
 
Travelling abroad 
 
From 1954, the refugees were exempt from paying for visas when travelling from Lebanon, 
and also from paying fees for the issue of passports and for renewal and extension, as we 
saw in the previous chapter.295 Many refugees found employment outside of Lebanon, 
especially in the Gulf countries, and this was an important source of income. But from 
1959, refugees needed a document of travel from the Second Bureau in order to leave the 
country. Such documents were only given on rare occasions. A refugee applying for it had 
to present extensive documentation, and in addition, receiving the travel document could 
cancel their rights with UNRWA, since their ability to travel was interpreted as if they were 
‘rich enough to get by without assistance’.296 
 
There was a large number of Palestinian emigrants from Lebanon during and after the civil 
war, especially after 1993. Figures as high as 100,000 have been suggested.297 From 1989, 
the Palestinians were required to pay fees for visas and for passports.298 But apparently, 
leaving the country was not difficult until 1995, when Ruling 478 was issued by Prime 
Minister Rafiq Hariri (see Chapter 3). After this was lifted in 1999, there were few 
restrictions on leaving the country. 
 
The freedom of movement of Palestinians in Lebanon, thus, went through stages: In the 
first decade, there seems to have been limited restrictions on the refugees’ movement in 
Lebanon, and none on leaving it, though sources disagree. After 1958, there were severe 
restrictions on movement inside the country, and leaving it was also difficult. After the  
civil war the situation was both unclear and unstable, but the refugees faced fewer 
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restrictions than before; excepting the period of 1995 to 1999 when they basically were 
unable to leave Lebanon at all. After 1999, the situation seemed to stabilize, although 
checkpoints were upheld outside many camps, causing serious problems for some refugees, 
particularly the non-ID refugees. 
 
The right to work 
 
The legal situation regarding labour did not cause many specific problems for the 
Palestinians before 1962. There were two types of restrictions: First, the public sector was 
reserved for those who had been Lebanese nationals for more than ten years.299 Second, 
after 1950, some free professions were restricted to members of the professional syndicates. 
Also, the restrictions on movement initiated in the 1950s made it hard for Palestinians to 
work outside the camps. These general unrestrictive tendencies can partly be attributed to 
the welcoming attitude during the first years, and partly to the fact that the area of work 
was not generally object to extensive legislation.300 But the feeling was not unanimous 
among politicians. In 1951, the Ministry of Labour decided to start requiring labour permits; 
but the Ministry’s decision was opposed by President Bechara al-Khoury. The decision was 
thus cancelled, and the Prime Minister declared that ‘we are duty bound to accord the 
Palestine refugees the best treatment and cannot treat them as foreigners.’301 
This policy apparently was followed until 1958. However, an UNRWA program 
aimed at integrating the refugees into the economic life of Lebanon failed, 302  as the 
government was skeptical to any international program that might interfere with its own 
economic system. This was in particular because of the prominent position of the private 
market and the fear of official interference.303 
 
After 1958 the labour situation became more complicated, since it was practically 
impossible to move from one camp to another; also when one camp was closer to one’s 
workplace. And when the Palestinian refugees were defined as foreigners, they needed 
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labour permits for practically any type of work. In the 1960s Lebanon apparently had good 
opportunities for employment, causing a small percentage of refugees to become self-
reliant.304 Nevertheless, a more restrictive policy on issuing labour permits was established. 
There were no official records of granted labour permits, and different sources suggest 
highly varying figures. Among the suggestions of the number of granted permits in 1968, 
the highest was 2,448, and the lowest only 284.305 The number of economically active 
Palestinians in that year was around 19,000. It was up to the employer whether or not to 
hire a Palestinian even if he had a permit, but most were hired. Palestinians had no 
protection from the government, and employers were not bound to ensure any rights in the 
workplace. The principle of prioritizing Lebanese employees was implemented after 1962, 
and the threat of giving fines to employers hiring people without permits caused difficulties. 
 
Apart from the Lebanese labour market, UNRWA hired Palestinians; and five out of six of 
their employees were Palestinians.306 After the PLO’s arrival, some sixty per cent of the 
Palestinian workforce reported to be employed with the organization.307 
 
Changes after the civil war 
 
The war changed the situation of work, although not as dramatically as it changed the 
situation of housing and movement. The main deterioration was the general economic 
situation. In 2005, thirty-six per cent of the Palestinians were rated as poor, and fifteen per 
cent earned less than one dollar a day.308 Some Palestinians were forced to leave work for 
health reasons. 309  Also, the opportunities for employment waned when the PLO 
disappeared, and there was an unemployment crisis in the Lebanese market, making it 
harder to Palestinians to get hired.310 
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The Gulf War and the peace process 
After the Gulf crisis in 1991, when Palestinians world-wide were perceived to support 
Saddam Hussein, the Gulf states evicted Palestinian workers, and therefore, the general 
income level of the refugees sunk drastically.311 And after 1993, the PLO funds were 
transferred primarily to the West Bank and Gaza, and PLO services to the refugee 
population in the diaspora almost completely dried up.312 Also, as we saw above, UNRWA 
was forced to operate below earlier levels in Lebanon, reducing the number of Palestinian 
employees to four out of six.313 In 1993-2001 only around one per cent of the Palestinians 
were employed with UNRWA.314 
 
The restrictions on labour in Lebanon 
Labour permits, too, became increasingly hard to obtain. The sources vary here as well. 
One source states that no permits were issued between 1982 and 1992,315 and another that 
0.14 per cent of the Palestinians received permits between 1993 and 2001.316 One claims 
that 7,362 Palestinians were granted permits in 1995,317  while another claims that the 
number was only about one hundred.318  Whatever the actual numbers, the process of 
obtaining a labour permit was made ‘extremely complicated’ after Decision 621/1 in 
1995. 319  Applicants needed documents from the employer and a sizable fee to the 
authorities; a process requiring repetition every twelve months. The camps in Beirut were 
claimed to be the ones facing the worst restrictions.320 
These difficulties come in addition to the fact that many types of work were 
reserved for Lebanese nationals. Since 1989 the policy of labour permits and the 
reservations for Lebanese practically stopped the Palestinians from working in anything but 
construction and agriculture; the only areas not requiring permits. But due to lack of 
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employment opportunities, not many Palestinians reported working there, either. 321 
Refugees claimed that employers in general were sceptical towards Palestinians and more 
often hired Lebanese or other foreigners.322 This could be related to the anti-Palestinian 
sentiments after the war, or to the government’s fining anyone who hired people without 
labour permits – the illegal workers were usually Palestinians. 323  No refugees were 
employed in public administration in 2005, compared to fifteen per cent of the Palestinian 
refugees in Jordan;324 but it must be noted that the public sector in Lebanon was smaller 
than that of Jordan. All this caused a large part of the refugee population to work in the 
black market, with low payments and no insurance. Although the unemployment crisis 
probably was one reason for the restrictions, similar restrictions had been in use since 1958. 
The policy also contrasted with a practise of allowing Syrians to work without restrictions. 
 
Most refugees rated unemployment as their single most important problem in Lebanon.325 
In 1991, the unemployment rate was thirty-eight per cent, and in 2005 it was sixty-six per 
cent. 326  Over sixty-five per cent of the workforce worked inside the camps. Non-ID 
refugees were by definition ineligible for employment, as they had no legal documents with 
which to apply for labour permits. Still, at fifty-eight per cent, their unemployment rate was 
lower than for the other categories in 2005. This may be explained by the fact that most 
worked for the PLO when they arrived in Lebanon, and some still received what they 
called ‘wages’ from the PLO, even though they did not in practise work for the 
organization any longer. 
 
Summary 
 
The camps in Lebanon went through a severe deterioration compared to Palestinian camps 
in the other host countries in the region, and there was a vast gap between the services 
offered to the refugees and what the international standards stipulated. Although the 
conditions were never satisfactory, one report calls the development after 1989 and 1993 
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‘an astonishing contraction and withdrawal of services’, blaming UNRWA’s lack of 
funding and the economic crisis in the country for the situation; a view backed by 
UNRWA.327 Outside factors such as the Gulf crisis and the Oslo Peace Process added to 
the deterioration, but the Lebanese government also played a significant role. The 
government did not assume responsibility for the refugees’ right to health and housing, 
although it did offer some housing assistance in the early years. The rights to freedom of 
movement and employment were not controlled to a great extent in the first decade, but 
were restricted all the more after 1958. The right to health suffered because of official 
neglect more than from restrictions, and also because few public hospitals existed; and the 
private nature of the Lebanese economy was thus a factor here. But for the rights to 
housing, free movement, and work, the governmental restrictions were among the most 
important problems from 1958 to 2005.328 
 
We saw that legislation only related to certain civil rights, and that most of the negative 
effects occurred because the Palestinians were legally defined as foreigners. In this chapter, 
we have seen that de facto policies, bans and restrictions played at least as large a part as 
the legislation did in relation to the status of the Palestinian refugees’ civil rights situation. 
Such policies were mostly unwritten and undocumented. And although they changed over 
the years, the result was that the Palestinian community typically did not enjoy civil rights 
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in Lebanon. In other words, the tendencies of elusiveness and the lack of a clear policy 
suggested in the previous chapter can be seen in the unwritten practises as well, suggesting 
an official disregard of the Palestinian refugees. The practises may have been clear to those 
experiencing them or to those performing them, but the fact that the official conduct was 
never in fact ‘official’, suggests that the government meant to avoid clarifying its 
responsibility or agenda. 
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Chapter 5. Lebanese legislation and practises in relation to the 
civil right conventions 
 
In the previous chapters we have seen that for the most part of the period in question, the 
Palestinian refugees generally were not granted the rights to health, to housing, to freedom 
of movement or to work in Lebanon, and that the actual situation was unacceptable. We 
saw that the main legal problem was that the Palestinian refugees were defined as 
foreigners, which in reality meant that they were granted no rights because they were 
unable to offer reciprocity from their own state. In addition, the de facto procedures 
initiated by the Lebanese government hindered the realization of civil rights further, and 
the result was that the Palestinians lacked civil rights for most of the period in question. 
Most other refugees were not treated according to the principle of reciprocity 
because they were protected by the Refugee Convention, which the Palestinian refugees 
were not. 329  But formally, treating them like foreigners was not in violation of any 
international right, and neither was relating to them by this principle. There were, in other 
words, no formal breaches on the international conventions in the Lebanese conduct. 
However, Lebanon was the only host country that applied the principle to the Palestinian 
refugees, and the consequences of the conduct was that the Palestinians were in fact 
deprived of their civil rights for such a prolonged period that it resembled a permanent 
situation. The definition of them as foreigners, and all it entailed, relied on the outdated 
condition that the situation was temporary. The consequences of the definition – including 
the application of the reciprocity principle – and the extended period of time this occurred 
in, therefore, were that the status of the civil rights of the Palestinian refugees became 
unreasonable and in de facto violation of the civil right conventions. I thus conclude that 
the government’s treatment of the refugees as foreigners, although the definition is 
formally justifiable, was unreasonable and led to a violation of their civil rights. 
 
In this chapter, the situation is reviewed in light of the Convention of Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
We saw in Chapter 1 that the legally binding aspect of the civil rights was not operative 
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until the conventions were established and ratified, which in Lebanon’s case was in 1972. 
However, the rights had also been defined in the International Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) in 1948. By applying these definitions to the whole time period we may 
see whether a civil right was restricted before and after 1989, and whether the civil right 
conventions were violated after 1989. 
 
The right to freedom of movement is defined in the UDHR’s Article 13: 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. 
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country (…).330 
 
The right to work is defined in the UDHR’s article 23: 
(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work 
and to protection against unemployment.331 
 
The rights to health and housing are defined in the UDHR’s article 25: 
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his 
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to 
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control.332 
 
Lebanon hindered or withheld these civil rights before the conventions were operative, but 
it was only after 1972 – or 1989, due to the time period of this thesis – that one could claim 
that the civil rights were ‘violated’, in a legal sense. 
 
The right to free movement 
 
Article 12 of the ICCPR reads: 
‘Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of 
movement and freedom to choose his residence.’333 
 
The next paragraph reads: 
‘Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own’.334 
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The right to move freely inside or out of Lebanon was not hindered by legislation until 
1995. On the contrary, some privileges on leaving the country were granted by decrees 
7706 and 10188. Ruling 478 of 1995 clearly violated the latter article, but when it was 
lifted in 1999, there was no legislation that violated the right to freedom of movement. 
However, we saw in Chapter 4 that the positive effects of decrees 7706 and 10188 were 
counteracted by procedures which caused difficulties both in obtaining travel documents 
and in moving freely inside Lebanon. In the first decade there were no documented 
hindrances to the right to freedom of movement, but after 1958 there were obstructions on 
free movement within the country especially. After 1989 the procedures varied, but the 
camps in the south experienced permanent restrictions. 
This becomes an example of how policies and procedures mattered more to the 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon than legislation did, and of how it is necessary to look at 
the practises in order to get a clear picture of the actual civil rights situation: By legislation, 
the right to freedom of movement was only hindered in the period of 1995-1999; but by 
unwritten policies it was hindered continuously from 1958. 
 
The right to work 
 
Article 6 of the ICESCR reads: 
‘The States Parties to the present Convention recognize the right to work, which includes the right of 
everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take 
appropriate steps to safeguard this right.’335 
 
Article 7 of the same convention states that the state parties to the convention recognize the 
right of everyone to enjoy just and favourable work conditions, ensuring, for instance, fair 
wages and safe and healthy working conditions.336 
 
The first Lebanese labour legislation that had effects for the Palestinian refugees was issued 
in 1950, when the profession of pharmacy was restricted to Lebanese nationals and 
foreigners who could offer reciprocity. The de facto situation after 1958 also hindered the 
fulfilment of the right to work, because the hindrance of free movement within the country 
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restricted the areas where the Palestinians were able to work. But beside this factor and the 
situation of the professions of pharmacy and engineering, the right to work was unhindered 
until 1962. Legislation had no impact on the general labour situation until 1962. From then 
on, all the Lebanese labour legislation except Decision 79/1 restricted the Palestinian 
refugees’ right to work, either banning certain employment opportunities, requiring labour 
permits, or making it difficult for employers to hire workers without permits. In addition, 
the de facto procedures made it increasingly difficult to obtain work permits. Because of 
the consequences of the principle of reciprocity, the demand for labour permits and the 
professional syndicates, the right to work as defined in the ICESCR’s Article 6 was 
hindered since 1962. The consequences of the labour laws came to violate Article 7, as the 
Palestinians were forced to work mostly in the black labour market with lower fees and 
often unsafe working conditions. After 1989, then, the labour laws in Lebanon were in 
actual violation of several articles of the ICESCR. Decision 79/1, on the other hand, rather 
looked to re-establish some of the rights restricted by earlier legislation. 
 
Here we see clearly that the use of the principle of reciprocity led to a discrimination of 
Palestinian workers, as they were the only group specifically left out. Besides hindering the 
right to employment, this also breached with the ICCPR’s stipulations on discrimination, 
which states that ‘the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons 
equal and effective protection against discrimination’; for instance based on national origin 
or ‘other status’.337 The category of ‘other status’ includes non-nationals.338 The result of 
defining the Palestinians as foreigners, therefore, led to a violation of their civil rights and 
proved discriminatory. Some, among them a government representative, openly felt that 
Lebanon’s labour laws were discriminatory. 339  The principle of reciprocity caused a 
violation of the ICESCR in legislation after 1989, and also hindered the fulfilment to the 
right to employment from 1962 on. The situation of work for Palestinians in Lebanon went 
through a continuous deterioration. The actual availability of work in Lebanon, as well as 
outside factors such as the Gulf crisis must be registered as causes; but the governmental 
restrictions were the most damaging to the everyday situation. 
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The right to health 
 
Article 12 of the ICESCR reads: 
‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health.’340 
 
The article’s second paragraph further states: 
‘The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right 
shall include those necessary for: (a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant 
mortality and for the healthy development of the child; (b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental 
and industrial hygiene; (c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and 
other diseases; (d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention 
in the event of sickness.’341 
 
No legislation referred to the Palestinians’ right to health, but Lebanon’s practical conduct 
hindered the fulfilment of that right throughout the period. It has been made clear that the 
Palestinians never enjoyed a highest attainable standard of physical or mental health, and 
the government’s part in this was felt mostly through its absence. The Lebanese state did 
not help the refugees attain a higher health standard although the need, especially for 
hospital care, was apparent. Also, there had been problems relating to all the aspects 
defined in paragraph 2: The Lebanese state accepted no responsibility for the healthy 
development of children or for improving the environmental hygiene in the camps; offered 
no treatment for epidemics; and there were never created conditions in Lebanon which 
assured ‘medical service’ and attention to the refugees – not in the event of sickness; not 
even in the event of emergencies. Apart from promises in the first years, the government 
consistently emphasized the responsibility of UNRWA alone. The conduct thus breached 
with the standards defined in the ICESCR, and violated the convention. 
 
The right to housing 
 
Article 11 of the ICESCR reads: 
‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living 
for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement 
of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, 
recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.’ 342 
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No legislation referred to the Palestinians’ right to housing, but Lebanon’s practical 
conduct of the Palestinian refugee hindered the fulfilment of this right as well, especially 
after 1989.  The refugees’ standard of living was far from adequate throughout the period, 
although the government aided the ICRC and UNRWA by renting land for some of the 
camps and offering other types of assistance in the first decade. After 1958 the government 
typically followed a different strategy; it did not take many ‘appropriate steps’ after making 
land available for the camps and erecting a new one in 1961. Action was rather taken in the 
opposite direction, with the refusal to rebuild the camps after the war; the bans on 
construction; and prohibiting improvement of the houses. The conduct thus breached with 
the standards defined in the ICESCR, and violated the convention after 1989. 
 
The Lebanese Constitution 
 
Thus, the civil rights of the Palestinians were not fulfilled in the period of 1948 to 1969 or 
in 1989 to 2005. After 1989, many explained the civil right violations with the quotation 
from the Constitution rejecting tawtin; the resettlement of the Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon.343 However, paragraph B of the preamble of the Ta’if Accord reads: 
‘Lebanon is also a founding and active member of the United Nations Organization and abides by its 
conventions and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Government shall embody these 
principles in all fields and areas without exception.’344 
 
The Lebanese Constitution stated that conventions such as these were to prevail over 
national laws when in conflict.345 The conventions were at the top of the legal hierarchy, 
and national laws and procedures should be compatible with them. Since the consequences 
of defining the Palestinians as foreigners was that their civil rights were in fact violated 
near permanently, this might be interpreted as a violation of the Lebanese Constitution as 
well.346 Again, the conduct was formally justifiable, but caused unreasonable results which 
breached with the international standards. Basically, either way of action could be 
understood as unconstitutional: Granting the refugees civil rights was believed to be equal 
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to risking tawtin, and not granting them rights caused violations of the international 
conventions; and thus of the Lebanese Constitution. 
 
Summary 
 
There were some exceptions to the general impression that the Lebanese government did 
not fulfil the Palestinian refugees’ civil rights: The right to residence was met; and the 
rights to work and freedom of movement were almost unhindered from 1948 to 1958. But 
for the most part, the Lebanese government did not realize the civil rights of the Palestinian 
refugees, either because of consequences of the legislation, or of de facto policies. The 
policy with regards to health and education was to ignore the problems or disregard any 
responsibility. With regards to the freedom of movement and partly to the right to work, 
suppression was a policy in the period of 1958 to 1969. A third policy was that of isolation, 
which was the case with all four rights after 1989. And lastly, with regards to the rights to 
work, freedom of movement, and especially housing, a policy of issuing restrictions was 
the case; particularly after 1989. The next part of the thesis will look at explanations for 
this situation and the general Lebanese attitudes toward the Palestinians. 
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PART III 
Chapter 6. Lebanese attitudes and statements regarding the 
Palestinian refugees 
 
In the previous chapters of this thesis, we have seen how the civil rights of the Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon were violated, either by the Lebanese government directly, or as a 
result of their lack of involvement. This part of the thesis will look at different explanations 
for this situation. Before presenting the different reasons and theories offered by Lebanese 
sources and discussing them, this chapter will look at Lebanese attitudes towards the 
Palestinians during the time that the Lebanese government was in charge of them, in order 
to contextualize the legislation and practises, and to give an understanding of the prevalent 
attitudes in each decade. 
 
The fact that there was no fixed legal policy on the Palestinians in Lebanon implied an 
elusiveness or vagueness toward the Palestinian refugees, and the tendencies in practise 
were generally corresponding to those suggested by legislation. The vagueness could have 
had many causes, but the active isolation and unwillingness to intervene suggests that it 
was founded on a deliberate disregard of the refugees as an area of official responsibility. 
When it comes to the attitudes and statements of Lebanese officials throughout the period, 
similar tendencies can be detected, compatible with the legislation and practises. 
Vagueness and disregard are suggested by the fact that few official statements were given 
at all throughout the period. Although UNRWA referred to the government showing its 
support and claimed looking forward to ‘further cooperation’, the agency reported 
requiring assistance to every relief program; 347  and although Prime Minister Siniora 
responded by expressing the government’s willingness to offer additional help, 348  the 
conditions did not change notably. Hardly any official plans or studies were issued 
throughout the period. Another clear tendency was the rejection of tawtin,349 as after 1989 
most statements referring to the Palestinians mentioned this rejection either for 
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constitutional reasons, or on the grounds that they were the responsibility of the 
international community. 
Some proposals stood in contrast to these typical tendencies, signalling some 
official disagreement or perhaps disorder. I shall consider the various statements below 
according to the time they were made, as well as to the confessional and political role of 
the speaker or writer. 
 
Attitudes in the period before 1969 
 
An early welcome (1948-1952) 
The Lebanese government and public welcomed the Palestinian refugees in the first years 
after their arrival, when the Red Cross (ICRC) was temporarily in charge of them.350 A 
number of Lebanese NGOs cooperated with the ICRC.351 Christian charitable organizations 
helped Christian Palestinians and Muslim associations helped Muslims, and this division 
led to the establishment of three small Christian camps of Mar Elias, Jisr al-Basha and 
Dbayeh, in the 1950s.352 The sympathy for the tragedy of the Palestinian people seemed 
total within the government, as the following statements show. The Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of 1948, Hamid Franjiye, declared: 
‘…nous ne les [les réfugiés palestiniens] priverons de rien et nous ne permettrons à personne de les humilier. 
Ce qui les touchera nous touchera. Nous partagerons avec eux jusqu’à la dernière bouchée de pain.’353 
 
This heartfelt statement seems to emphasize the feeling of both responsibility and 
brotherhood between Palestinians and Lebanese. Coming from the Foreign Minister during 
a parliamentary session, it was discussed in the government and probably expressed its 
common attitude. The statement was met with no contradictory statements as far as I could 
find. It was also a public declaration. Franjiye belonged to a Maronite family known for 
pro-Syrian leanings; quite the opposite from the Maronite community’s more common 
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political position.354 One sign that his speech was unique was that no equally supportive 
statements could be found in my sources by other members of his community. However, 
shortly after, another declaration of support was issued by the government, headed by the 
Sunni Prime Minister Riyad Solh. It said to give the refugees aid at the level decided by the 
Arab League; to assist as much as other host countries in the manner of humanitarian aid; 
to care for the health, housing and food of the refugees and grant all necessary 
assistance. 355  The support shown in this statement is without restriction, and coming 
publicly from the Prime Minister, it is another sign that this was the official attitude of the 
government. The most important context for these statements was the humanitarian 
catastrophe of 1948, and the fact that this was stated in the very same year that the refugees 
became refugees; before any problems for Lebanon itself had become apparent. The 
Central Committee for Refugee Affairs (CCRA) was created in this period, in the spirit of 
cooperation. 
However, we saw in Chapter 4 that the conditions in the camps in the years of 
1948-1952 remained appalling, according to both UNRWA and official Lebanese 
statements.356 Two tendencies thus became apparent in the government’s attitudes in 1948-
1952: Outspoken political and humanitarian support for the refugees; and a failure to 
follow up on the assurances. One could argue that the support, then, was merely rhetorical. 
But on the one hand, we saw that refugees in all the Arab host countries suffered in the first 
years, especially when it came to health and housing conditions. The scope of the 
emergency was enormous, and the hosts could hardly be expected to relieve it completely. 
On the other hand, in Lebanon, the outspoken support was not followed up in legislation, as 
it was in Syria and Jordan. Only two legislative acts resulted in any benefits for the 
Palestinians (decrees 7706 and 10188). One reason may have been the fact that Lebanon 
issued little legislation in general, in order to encourage private investors. But the delay of a 
recognition of the problem in Lebanon, and not only of the atrocities of Israel, suggest 
reluctance to deal with the refugees, as well as an expectance to see their transfer. 
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Rising scepticism (1952-1958) 
In the 1950s, Lebanon started suppressing all political manifestations of what soon was 
called ‘Palestinianism’ in the camps, while still supporting the Palestinian cause and 
identity verbally.357  The repression of Palestinianism may have been a signal to the camp 
dwellers that Lebanon would not accept any political trouble. The attitudes thus ranged 
from support to suppression, and the scepticism probably grew because the refugees stayed 
longer than initially expected.358 
A difference in policy soon became apparent with the Christian Palestinians. 
Although the early supportive statements had referred to all the Palestinians, many of the 
Christians were in fact naturalized in the 1950s by the Christian-dominated government, 
becoming Lebanese citizens. The fact that they raised the number of Christian citizens was 
held as the main reason for these naturalizations, which stood in such contrast to the 
common conduct which left the Muslim Palestinians stateless. The normal tendency was to 
reject of the settlement of the refugees in Lebanon, and this became one of the main signals 
of scepticism. Already in 1949, one policy was to remove aid systems in order to fund 
projects for the transfer of the refugees from Lebanon. This was initiated at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.359 The main focus of the ICRC was the planning of transfers to Palestine, 
and this may have encouraged the Ministry, but the argument that the Palestinians should 
not be settled in Lebanon can thus be said to have first appeared in 1949. However, the 
ICRC’s focus made them appear to be championing the refugees’ right to return, and since 
there was no consensus on this matter in the international community, it caused problems 
for the agency. As a consequence the schemes were dropped, and the ICRC initiated long-
term assistance planning instead. For Lebanon, this indicated that the refugees’ permanent 
establishment in the host countries was the solution backed by the international community 
and by the ICRC.360 The government openly resisted tawtin at least from 1951.361 The 
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arguments were that their country was already over-populated, that the confessional 
balance of Lebanon should not be disturbed by integrating 100,000 Sunni Muslims, and 
that the cause of the Palestinians should be protected. 362  It should be noted that the 
rejection of tawtin was supported by most Palestinians, and the right of return was more 
and more often used as a reason for rejecting it. The Lebanese government emphasized that 
the responsibility for the problem itself primarily belonged to Israel, then to the 
international community and especially the UN, who had accepted Israel’s statehood.363  
Thus, the care for the refugees was a task for the UN. After a few years Lebanon rejected 
any responsibility regarding civil rights or humanitarian services,364 and only came to offer 
the tasks that the Department for Palestinian Refugee Affairs (DPA) undertook (see 
Chapter 3). In other words, Lebanon indirectly put the responsibility for resolving the 
problem on the international community, and the tendency, as we saw, was to disregard the 
problem. 
Although the situation was not solved as quickly as they had hoped, the government 
still welcomed UNRWA to Lebanon. For instance, the government let out land so that 
UNRWA could erect camps, and UNRWA referred to the Lebanese government as 
‘hospitable’ in 1950.365 This may have been because the creation of UNRWA and the 
UNCCP signalled that the UN did heed its responsibility. Until the UNCCP was stripped of 
its mandate for protection of the refugees, there was no reason for the host countries to 
suspect the UN agencies of planning a permanent implementation of the refugees. 
 
The difficulties of the situation of the Palestinians before 1958 did not come so much from 
official restrictions, but more from their unclear status. The indistinct attitude did not have 
consensus in society, though. One indication that Lebanese views were inconsistent, was 
the reaction of a Lebanese newspaper of 1951 to the attitudes the refugees were exposed to: 
‘You [the government] are welcoming thousands of Kurds and Assyrians as co-religionists and citizens; 
however you deny the right of those, in the expulsion, humiliation and poverty of whom you had a hand, to 
take refuge with you and to give you their energy, love, power and property.’366 
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This article shows supportive attitudes, and also attacks the negative attitude in Lebanon. 
This signalizes that the attitude of the public or the media may have been more supportive 
than the government’s, and that some were critical of the official conduct regarding the 
refugees. 
 
Coercive suppression (1958-1964) 
We saw above that some Palestinians characterized President Shehab’s  military regime as 
the most difficult period of all.367 Few documents were issued, but the changes of 1958 was 
a change for the worse due to restrictions, bans and surveillance that were inflicted on the 
camp dwellers. The practise of dealing with the Palestinians according to policies rather 
than to legislation became more widespread; as restricting Palestinians from certain areas 
of the country and complicating the process of obtaining permits was widely practised, but 
never written into legislation. The Palestinian lawyer Salah Dabbagh said: ‘It’s so illegal, 
so inhuman, that you can’t find it written down.’368 The military nature of the government 
probably affected the conduct. 
There was no consensus on the situation after 1958 among neither Lebanese nor 
Palestinians. For instance, Joseph abu Khalil of the Phalange party claimed that the camps 
had been controlled, but that it had not been an unreasonable situation: 
‘Ecoutez, c’est un oppression si l’état s’occupe de sa sécurité? Puis que les Palestiniens se permettaient des 
choses inacceptables, c’était normal que le Deuxième Bureau s’occupe de la sécurité de l’état.’369 
 
Although most agreed that things became more difficult, people varied from saying that 
there were no problems before 1958 and that the harsh measures were mostly imposed for 
security reasons, 370  to saying that it was always hard, and that Shehab only made it 
somewhat worse by virtue of increasing the Second Bureau’s powers. 371  There was, 
however, an almost general agreement that there had been a tight control and some stern 
measures. The harsh policy was probably due to a growing scepticism toward the 
Palestinian community, and a real fear of integration. The strengthening of the military and 
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intelligence services also caused a stricter, more brutal line toward the camp residents. Oral 
accounts of the strict control issued by the government back this argument.372 
 
The fedayin: Support and fear (1964-1969) 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Palestinians were politically inactive until the Cairo 
Agreement, at least partly due to the suppression of Palestinianism and the control of the 
camps. Subsequently, there were no official ‘complaints’ about their behaviour; for 
instance, President Helou said in 1969 that the Palestinian presence was never an ‘acute 
problem in the past’.373 But this was stated in relation to a new concern of the government; 
for after the PLO entered Lebanon, complaints became frequent. Helou’s motive for 
claiming that there were no problems in the past may have been to emphasize the threat of 
the changed situation after 1967 to the public, which by then was already divided on the 
matter of PLO. The political awakening was the first occurrence inside the camps that may 
have been interpreted by the government as threatening. There were also clashes between 
the Palestinians and the Lebanese Army (LA). But official statements repeatedly expressed 
support for the Palestinian cause as well. In 1967 the Chamber of Deputies stated that it 
was ‘believing in the justice of the Palestinian cause’,374 and in 1969, in relation to Israeli 
threats to Lebanon, the Prime Minister Karami stated that the resistance fighters ‘deserved 
admiration and respect’. 375  President Helou, too, expressed support alongside the 
statements of warning. 376 The government, then, expressed both concerns and support. 
The content in such statements from the government can be attributed to their 
confessional affiliations, as the Prime Minister was a Sunni Muslim and the President a 
Maronite. Karami’s affiliation may have placed him on the side of those who supported the 
PLO, or his admiration could be quite real. His motive may also have been to show the 
world that Lebanon was not less supportive than the rest of the Arab world.377 Charles 
Helou’s contrasting statements may signal that he did not entirely support the PLO, but 
wished to avoid conflict since the public and parts of the government greatly supported the 
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fedayin. In any case, both statements supported the ‘cause’, and among the demands of the 
Palestinian cause was the right of return, which Lebanon supported undivided. 
As the country was polarized into pro- or anti-PLO groups, the Palestinians in 
Lebanon was a subject of more discussion than it had been in the past, and statements 
became more frequent. There was more legislation from this period and it was cautiously 
formulated, mostly restricting the possibilities for employment further (see Chapter 3). 
Since the influx of Palestinians to Lebanon grew, the slight increase of legislation may 
reflect a growing fear of the PLO’s power, as well as a desire to keep the organization in 
check through issuing more detailed decrees. But the restrictions that Lebanon put on the 
fedayin was one of the reasons that the PLO and the Arab League worked out the Cairo 
Agreement which effectively ended the Lebanese authority over the refugees. 
 
The tendencies of the period of 1948-1969, then, were first and foremost similar to those 
already established: A vagueness and a reluctance to deal with the refugees as a specific 
category; as well as a disregard of any official responsibility, even in the period generally 
marked by positive and welcoming attitudes. A third element was the official rejection of 
tawtin coupled with supportive statements of the Palestinians, especially in regards of their 
right to return. Coercive use of power occurred during Shehab’s regime. Lastly, a tendency 
of official support for the fedayin was related to the Lebanese polarization. 
 
Attitudes after the civil war: Resentment and indifference 
 
The twenty years when the Lebanese government had no responsibility for the Palestinian 
refugees, 1969 to 1989, saw major changes in Lebanon. The war legacy was the setting that 
new – or rather, clearer – attitudes grew in. Most strikingly, the public support for the 
Palestinians had changed to resentment. Hilal Khashan’s survey from 1994 show that forty 
per cent of the Lebanese people would resist tawtin militarily, giving a clear picture of the 
level of hostility.378 The mutual distrust was also apparent in another survey from 1992,379 
where more than fifty per cent of the Palestinian refugees regarded the Lebanese  
government as a ‘source of worry about personal safety’. 
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Post-war blame and harsh measures (1989-1993) 
 
One common attitude after the civil war was that the Palestinian resistance had used 
Lebanon as its fighting ground for long enough. Official statements attacked the Palestinian 
presence as an invasion and an atrocity, at a time when the country was war-torn and 
exhausted.380 Although the Palestinian cause never lost the official rhetorical support and 
Palestinians and Lebanese still shared the same views on the former’s right to return,381 
many Lebanese, officials and public, openly blamed the Palestinians for the civil war and 
claimed that they were the sole reason for the Israeli attacks and for the division and 
militarization of the Lebanese – quite contradicting the earlier support for the cause, which 
had included the attacks against Israel. The attitude was manifested in negative statements; 
in policies of almost complete isolation of the refugee camps; and in legislation, following 
the Ta’if Accord. The official policy was to restore Lebanese control over the camps,382 but 
as a rule, the government did not interfere inside the camps, and rather guarded the 
entrances with military checkpoints. The rejection of tawtin was always repeated. In 1998, 
Prime Minister Hariri said that ‘Lebanon will never, ever integrate the Palestinians’.383 He 
made no attempts to discuss why they could not give them civil rights. The rejection of 
tawtin, then, was consistent, and usually went in parallel with support for the right of return. 
The fact that so many of the refugees had taken a part in the civil war caused waves of 
‘anti-Palestinianism’ through Lebanon.384 The negative official statements, thus, were well 
received, and in accordance with public attitudes. 
But there were some exceptions to this attitude. The lawyer Wadie Said states that 
the government only considered three outcomes in regard to the Palestinians: The first was 
naturalization, which was rejected; the second was their return to Israel, which was the 
ultimate goal; and third was a combined settlement where some of the Palestinians might 
become naturalized.385 Some sources expressed doubt that the right of return would ever be 
fulfilled in reality and said straightforward that if no Palestinian state was created, tawtin 
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would become virtually inevitable.386 This last option was seldom spoken out loud. Most 
responded to such statements by saying that it made the need to press for return was even 
greater. 
 
The 1991 committee: An exception or an example? 
One possible exception to the common policy was when the government created a 
committee in 1991, at the end of the war. It discussed the remaining weapons in the camps, 
security for the Palestinian camps, and social and civil rights of the refugees. It had two 
government representatives and some from the PLO, and was dissolved after a few 
meetings. A former PLO spokesman, Salah Salah, was one of the members of the 
committee, and he explained that the issue of weapons was agreed upon. 387  The 
Palestinians collected all weapons into the camps and gave all large and medium weapons 
to the LA. The government then proposed that the light weapons, e.g. hand weapons, were 
to remain in the camps. Khalil Makkawi, the director of the similar committee established 
in 2005, and officers with the LA, confirmed this. 388  Salah further stated that the 
Palestinians arranged for the remaining weapons to be controlled by the Palestinian camp 
police, guards, and bodyguards. When it came to the security of the camps, he claimed that 
the Lebanese representatives told the Palestinians it was their own responsibility. They 
started negotiations regarding the civil rights, and Salah said that the ministers agreed to 
grant them all rights except citizenship and government positions and asked for a 
memorandum on what the Palestinians wanted, which was given to them. Salah explained 
the further developments: 
‘We decided to have a meeting in every two weeks, to continue. But when the time of the [next] meeting 
came, they phoned us asking to postpone the meeting, for there were some details they needed to prepare. 
And it is still postponed up to now.’389 
 
Salah believed that the reason the committee failed was that the Lebanese delegates never 
intended to grant the Palestinians civil rights, and used it as ‘bait’ to collect the Palestinian 
weapons. He thus did not consider this committee as an exception to the general tendencies. 
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Having experienced hardships in earlier periods and having been personally let down by 
the Lebanese committee members, it is easy to understand his resentment. Salah’s 
interview was different from the rest of my interviews, as he offered to tell his story instead 
of answering questions, which he did afterwards. He dwelled on the question of the 1991 
committee after he was asked specifically about it, and seemed to clearly recall the detailed 
process of the committee. His conclusions about the intentions of its members had time to 
develop between 1991 and 2006. In retrospect, since the fifteen years of postponement had 
given no improvement to the refugees’ situation as had been promised, those conclusions 
were profoundly pessimistic. 
Khalil Makkawi, on the other hand, believed that the failure was due to the 
Lebanese representatives’ lack of power because of the Syrian presence. 390  He also 
emphasized that they did not represent all the branches of the government that were related 
to the Palestinians, and that this too had limited their power. But he claimed that the 
committee’s intentions had indeed been to ameliorate the situation in the camps, and that 
the attempt made by the committee had been a contrast to the general official tendency. In 
contrast to Salah, Makkawi represented the Lebanese government, and was the head of a 
new committee set to deal with much of the same problems as in 1991: Its main issues were 
the weapons that still existed in the camps; the lack of any official Palestinian 
representation in Lebanon; the socio-economic conditions in the camps; and the civil rights 
of the refugees. However, this committee had representatives from all the governmental 
branches involved with the Palestinians, quite unlike the committee of 1991. For Makkawi, 
emphasizing the external reasons for the former committee’s failure instead of focusing on 
the internal difficulties, placed the chances of the new one in a more optimistic light. 
The two accounts, thus, draw different conclusions. The Minister for Culture in 
2006, Tariq Mitri, was not affiliated with either the 1991 or the 2005 committee, and he 
combined the two positions. He believed that Syrian pressures to some degree influenced 
the failure of the committee, but that the Lebanese themselves had a say in it: 
‘To a great extent it’s true. (…) But you also have to consider the Lebanese themselves. Especially the 
Christians and the Shi’ite Muslims who have had unhappy experiences with the Palestinians, were not 
prepared to deal with them in a fair, just and reasonable, peaceful manner.’391 
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The Oslo Peace Accords: Growing hostility (1993-1995) 
 
After the Peace Accords between Israel and the PLO in 1993, Lebanese statements became 
increasingly hostile toward the refugees, as did its conduct. For Lebanon, the peace 
between the Palestinian Authorities (PA) and Israel created a crisis. The agreement made it 
clear that a future Palestinian state would be limited to the West Bank and Gaza, while the 
absolute majority of Lebanon’s refugees originated from northern Galilee in current Israel. 
In addition, the lack of a solution for the refugees was interpreted by Lebanon to mean that 
the PA might be prepared to abandon their right to return for the sake of a Palestinian 
state.392 It was also obvious that Israel was not prepared to budge in its stance not to allow 
any large number of former residents flock back inside its borders. In reaction to the peace 
accord, President Hrawi and Prime Minister Hariri, along with a ‘bevy of cabinet ministers’, 
reaffirmed that tawtin was out of the question, citing the Lebanese Constitution.393 Such 
statements told the international community that Lebanon would not take on the 
responsibility of Israel, the UN and the PA. Statements emphasizing the international 
community’s responsibility and neglect of the refugees were common, both by Lebanese 
and Palestinians, and the tendency yet again was to support the right of return.394 
 
This occurred in the same period as when a ‘naturalization decree’ was issued in Lebanon. 
The rejection of tawtin was a cornerstone of the Lebanese conduct regarding the Palestinian 
refugees after 1989, but in 1994, the state nevertheless naturalized some 100,000-220,000 
persons of various nationalities due to several claims to nationality after the chaotic war.395 
Among the naturalized were perhaps 30-35,000 Palestinians from the so-called Seven 
Villages bordering Palestine; the first Palestinians who were naturalized since the 1950s.396 
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The decision was met with confusion and caused political outrage among officials.397 The 
confessional distribution of those naturalized was unclear, although one source estimates 
them to be two thirds Muslim and one third Christian. 398  The DPA stated that the 
Palestinians were originally Lebanese citizens who had fled after the establishment of 
Israel’s borders, and simply had their ‘nationality restored’.399 The party secretary of the 
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), Charif Fayad, said that the naturalization concerned 
Lebanese who did not have papers; Palestinians and others who had the right to citizenship 
because of marriages; and pro-Syrian Palestinians.400 Syrian pressure may be one reason 
for explaining this decree, which stood in contrast to most other decrees relating to the 
refugees. But as the details of the process were obscure, it is not within the scope of this 
thesis to determine its circumstances. The naturalizations, however; together with the crisis 
of the peace process; formed the background to some rather harsh statements heard in this 
and the following years, seeming to result directly from these circumstances. 
 
‘Human garbage’ 
In 1994, the Greek Catholic Minister for Tourism, Nicolas Fattush, referred to the 
Palestinian refugees by saying that ‘Lebanon will not be a dump for human garbage’.401 
This was criticized by other Lebanese as too harsh a statement.402 Since the position as 
Minister for Tourism did not deal specifically with the refugees in the country, it may not 
have been an official stance at all, but rather a personal one. 403  Most probably, his 
statement was a reaction to the peace process and also to the naturalization decree which 
met with negative reactions from several Christian groups. 
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A three-step plan 
Also in 1994, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Faris Buways, issued a ‘three-step plan’ to 
encourage Palestinians to leave Lebanon.404 It consisted of Ruling 478,405 as well as a 
refusal to cooperate with UNRWA through banning construction and repairs of houses in 
the camps; a policy initiated during the civil war and still applicable in 2005. Buways told 
the newspaper al-Safir that Lebanon’s eventual goal was to be rid of all Palestinians.406 As 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Buways had a more direct relation to the Palestinian affairs 
than Fattush, and his statements probably reflected the official view, on the background of 
the peace process especially. And in this context, Ruling 478 was not entirely surprising: 
Although it was issued in response to an outside event, it was part of a plan that encouraged 
the Palestinians to leave Lebanon. 
 
Boycott of the international community 
In addition, Lebanon was the only Arab host country to not take part in the ‘refugee 
working group’ chaired by Canada in relation to the peace process, set to discuss the 
problem of the refugees and to come up with solutions for them. When a final solution for 
the refugees was not included in the peace accord, the Lebanese responded by refusing to 
discuss them at all. This could be seen as part of the policy of ignoring the problem, but it 
is also likely that the intent was to reject the shift of the international focus to the 
Palestinian territories. As an example of the Lebanese view, in 1994, the speaker of 
Parliament Nabih Berri said: 
‘Canada is part of a conspiracy against the Lebanese and Palestinian people and responsible for resettling 
Palestinians at the expense of Lebanon and Palestine.’407 
 
In 1997, he also said that resettling the Palestinians in Lebanon was ‘not subject to any 
discussion or compromise.’408 His statement that the expense was also paid by Palestine 
was consistent with the support for the Palestinian cause, and in general, the statement fit 
the pattern of Lebanese statements after the war, although he may have been influenced by 
                                                 
404
 Majed 1995, 11. 
405
 The demand for all Palestinians to obtain return visas in order to enter Lebanon (see Chapter 3). 
406
 Khalidi 1995, 28. 
407
 An-Nahar, Nov. 27, 1994, in Haddad 2000: “Sectarian Attitudes as a Function of the Palestinian Presence 
in Lebanon”, 13. 
408
 An-Nahar Feb. 12, 1997, in  Haddad 2000: “Sectarian Attitudes as a Function of the Palestinian Presence 
in Lebanon”, 13. 
  93 
his party Amal’s violent history with the Palestinians.409 But mostly, this seemed like a 
statement that could be backed by most Lebanese at the time. 
 
Hizbollah: An exceptional party 
Hizbollah’s conduct toward to the Palestinian refugees, on the other hand, was an exception. 
Since its introduction to parliamentary politics in 1992, the party’s leader Hassan Nasrallah 
vocally supported granting the refugees at least some civil rights on various occasions, 
albeit without committing the organization to this goal.410 The party had not taken part in 
the War of the Camps during the civil war, and also had rejected the Ta’if Accord, but why 
they supported the Palestinians so strongly was unclear.411 The fact that Hizbollah was 
Islamist and morally supported the poorer groups in society may have mattered. They were 
hardly the only party to ideologically support the poor, but the leftist parties, such as the 
PSP, had been weakened after the war and lost much of their assets. Also, Hizbollah’s need 
for support outside of the Shi’a community may have influenced their views, although the 
Palestinians had no impact on Lebanon’s political life. 
 
Unawareness and indifference (1995-2005) 
 
Another aspect detected within official statements, especially after 1993, was a lack of 
knowledge regarding the actual situation inside the camps. One example of a 
misconception was when the Minister for Culture in 1995, Raymond Eddé, estimated the 
number of Palestinians in Lebanon to be 700,000,412 even when UNRWA’s estimate, which 
was probably too high, said they were less than 350,000.413 Also, the researcher Simon 
Haddad speaks of how Christian groups held that resettling the Palestinians would increase 
Lebanon’s population by 25 percent,414 when UNRWA and others claimed they formed 
between ten and twelve percent of the population. Such exaggerations may have served an 
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objective of emphasizing the problem.415 Another type of a possible misconception was 
how some official Lebanese saw the camps as virtual islands of wild crime and violence, 
while camp dwellers and NGO workers denied such accusations.416 An officer of the LA 
asked me, on hearing that I had visited the camps, whether I had had a military escort. On 
receiving a negative answer, he was surprised and worried, although I had experienced 
nothing that resembled a threatening situation during my visits. The Minister for Culture in 
2006, Tariq Mitri, was part of an official delegation to visit the camps – the first since the 
1950s – and he recounted his experience to me: 
‘I saw the Prime Minister before going to Sabra and Shatila, and an official there told him: ‘But this is a good 
minister, why are you giving him a one-way ticket?’. [He also said to me:] I don’t want you to take risks.’ I 
said, ‘I’m not taking risks, don’t worry about me.’ But that’s the perception.’417 
 
Another source claimed that there was some dangers in the largest camp, ‘Ayn al-Hilweh, 
but that the other camps seldom experienced much violence or loose weapons.418 Camp 
dwellers and NGO workers may have wished to give as positive an impression as possible, 
and concealed some facts. But during my own visits their statements seemed more accurate 
than those of the LA officers. One officer also claimed that the refugees ‘all had wonderful 
houses’, a misconception proved wrong. These exaggerations were probably not due only 
to actual ignorance, but also to the policy of isolation. The government made no official 
visit to the camps before 2006. 
 
Two controversial attempts 
Although few spoke openly in favour of the refugees’ civil rights, there were examples of 
this in official attitudes. For instance, in 1994, the Minister of State for the Displaced, 
Walid Jumblatt, attempted to implement a scheme to rehouse 4,000 of the 6,000 displaced 
Palestinian families.419 It proved unsuccessful and provoked strong opposition within the 
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government. The arguments were that such schemes would ‘stir up unwanted ethnic 
tension’ and that the permanent nature of the scheme violated the Ta’if Accord and the ban 
on enlarging the Palestinian areas. Ministers threatened to resign in such numbers as to 
destroy the government. It turned out that the Palestinians were against the plan as well, on 
account of their right to return. These strong reactions were probably, again, due to the 
Oslo peace process and the anger related to the government’s naturalization decree. 
Walid Jumblatt was the leader of the PSP; PLO’s closest ally in the war. The PSP 
has been consistent in its support for the PLO and still expressed much solidarity with the 
Palestinian cause and refugees during my fieldwork in 2006.420 Given Jumblatt’s political 
background and the time his suggestion was made, his motive was probably to relieve some 
of the pressure of the displaced refugees. This was an example of what individuals might 
accomplish – or at least attempt to accomplish – in Lebanese politics, and not of a change 
in the government’s policies. But Jumblatt was in fact supported by Prime Minister 
Hariri421 – a rather unexpected support, considering Hariri’s later statements (see above). 
This speaks for a change in the Prime Minister’s views: He was not as determined ‘never, 
ever’ to integrate the Palestinians in 1994 as in 1998, and this poses an interesting question 
as to how dedicated Hariri really was in rejecting tawtin. His role as Prime Minister may 
have led him to try and solve some of the problems of the displaced and to deal with the 
crisis at hand. He may also have wished to support the PSP for internal political reasons. 
The ambivalence among and differences between politicians also resulted in at least 
one piece of legislation, as we saw above in Decision 79/1 of 2005,422 which opened some 
job opportunities for the Palestinians. One probable reason behind this decision was the 
political affiliation of the Minister for Labour, Tarrad Hamadeh. He was, according to al-
Natour, ‘known for his affiliation with Hezbollah which has always advocated the rights of 
Palestinians in Lebanon; he also happens to be in agreement with the socialist party on 
principal issues.’ 423  The Ministers in 1993 and 1995 were affiliated to the Syrian 
Nationalist Party and the Arab Ba’ath Party respectively.424 But the decision was supported 
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by the government;425 at least it was not revoked or resented officially; and so it does speak 
for a certain official change. Another suggestion entirely was that the Syrian withdrawal in 
March 2005 motivated the change. It caused hundreds of thousands of Syrian workers to 
leave the country, and transformed the previously overcrowded labour market.426 
 
Completing the circle: Reduced resentment 
The few reactions to Decision 79/1 stands in contrast to the angry reactions to Jumblatt’s 
resettlement attempt in 1994. This could be because the decision had few real 
consequences, as Palestinians still needed permits and were banned from free professions; 
but it could also stem from an actual decreasing resentment in the Lebanese society. Simon 
Haddad’s survey from 2000 showed that seventy per cent of the Lebanese viewed the 
Palestinians ‘unfavourably’, and twenty-two per cent ‘favourably’.427 But still, the hostility 
had lessened since 1994. In 1994, fifty-six per cent of the Maronites and thirty per cent of 
the Sunnis would have resisted tawtin militarily; while in 2000, their respective percentages 
were only twenty-six and seven. 428  Also, sixty-eight per cent of the respondents to 
Haddad’s survey from 2000 were in favour of granting Palestinians civil rights.429 This 
gives an image of the situation six years later. It seems, then, that the public resentment 
lessened as the memories of war subsided further into the past. The government, too, 
seemed less hostile toward ‘positive’ decisions. But this did not create any real changes.  
The amount of money Lebanon contributed to the Palestinians at different times 
also follows the division of Lebanese attitudes into three periods – the early welcome of 
1948-1952; the scepticism and support of 1952-1969 and the strong resentment after 1989. 
In 1951, Lebanon contributed a total of $457,800 to the refugees; not much less than the 
other Arab host countries.430 Not only does this confirm the government’s welcome, but it 
also shows that Prime Minister Solh’s promise of aid consistent with the Arab League’s 
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suggestions was in fact kept; in contrast to rest of the promises of the statements of that 
period. In 1969, the total Lebanese contribution to the refugees was $846,875; an amount 
much lower than the contributions of the other Arab host governments,431  signalling the 
scepticism, but also the fact that the PLO had funds that were used in Lebanon. The 
contributions from 1989 and 1990 show that the tendency had turned and stagnated. 
Lebanon contributed with $365 in 1989; a lot less than the others states.432 An obvious 
reason for the dramatic decrease was the cost of the civil war. The amount did not increase 
much later – the government contributed $15,360 in 2003 and nothing at all in 2004.433 
Obviously, the amounts may have grown and diminished for a number of reasons other 
than the general attitude towards the refugees, but it seems to be consistent with the 
conception of hostility and a growing indifference. 
 
Summary 
 
In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 it was suggested that vagueness and disregard towards the refugee 
camps were prevalent official tendencies, with isolation or control as typical results. This 
chapter has shown that these were also common in attitudes and statements, and has added 
other tendencies, namely rejection of tawtin and outspoken support for the Palestinian 
cause. There might seem to be a contrast between support, repression, vagueness and 
ignorance, but in fact, most of these attitudes were probably different results of the same 
fundamental stance. The policy seemed clearer and less changeable after the Ta’if Accord, 
at least until the changes in 2005; but the tendencies of the period after 1989 were quite 
similar to those of the earlier period. The support of the right of return had always been 
unambiguous, although general support was only occasionally suggested in legislation and 
practises; the main examples being the early legislation on movement and the 
governmental assistance with housing in the early years.434 The rejection of tawtin was 
intensified and written into the Constitution after 1989, but it was also consistent. We saw 
how the rejection of tawtin was an aspect that was tied closely to the government’s 
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reluctance to deal with the refugees. The tendency of disregard was constant, but seemed 
stronger after 1989 and led to an actual isolation of the camps. The vague approach was 
still present in general, but the conduct was more intent on discouraging resettlement, and 
some officials in fact offered very clear opinions on the Palestinians.435 In other words, the 
same attitudes existed, but were intensified. This suggests a continuance in basic attitudes: 
Rhetoric support, rejecting tawtin, vagueness and disregard – resulting in either isolation, 
restrictions, or an actual lack of knowledge. 
The examples of statements and actions given in this chapter suggest that official 
attitudes remained rather consistent with such typical tendencies and general principles, but 
also responded to regional and national events such as the influx of the PLO and the Oslo 
Peace Process. After about a decade of downright official and public hostility, indifference 
to the Palestinian refugees again seemed the prevalent attitude, suggesting a similarity to 
the period before 1969. It thus seems that the main policies shifted between support for the 
Palestinian cause, disregard, elusiveness, repression and rejection of tawtin throughout the 
period, and that political events caused waves of genuine support, hostility, and the use of 
coercive force or oppression. 
 
The rejection of tawtin, then, was apparent in all facets of governmental conduct regarding 
the Palestinian refugees, while the support can almost exclusively be seen in statements 
aiming to explain the rejection of tawtin. In the following chapters, this matter will be more 
closely examined. 
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Chapter 7. Justifications for the Lebanese policy toward the 
Palestinian refugees 
 
In the preceding chapters we have seen that the Lebanese government generally did not 
grant the Palestinian refugees civil rights, and we have also looked at the contexts of 
changing official and public attitudes that were important for the development of the 
situation. This part of the thesis deals with the reasons for the situation. The two chapters 
that follow will present and examine the different explanations for the deprivation of civil 
rights that I discovered during my fieldwork. The explanations, or perceptions, were given 
by Lebanese interviewees. They are not necessarily causes for the situation, but they were 
perceived or used as such. Those that I interviewed were officials, current or former, as 
well as researchers and one journalist.436 Some of the justifications were derived from and 
have been suggested by literature or reports as well; but all were mentioned by the 
interviewees too.437 I also talked with Palestinian lawyers, human right workers, and one 
former politician. Some of the explanations were commented on by these Palestinian 
sources as well, but they are not treated in the same way, since it is the Lebanese 
perceptions I seek to detect. In Chapter 8, I proceed to discuss the reality behind the 
explanations, considering whether or not they may explain the lack of civil rights. These 
chapters do not distinguish as clearly between time periods as those that dealt with 
empirical evidence did, since their topic treats beliefs and opinions rather than empirical 
data from different time periods.438 
 
When asked directly, most Lebanese interviewees confirmed that the Lebanese state did not 
implement the civil rights of the Palestinians in the period after the war. There was some 
disagreement about the situation in the first decades, however.439 Some emphasized that 
they did not know much about the period before the war,440 others claimed that the civil 
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rights had or had not been granted. Although there was general agreement that the rights 
were violated in the period after 1989, the justifications for the situation differed. Some 
offered what they held as legitimate reasons for the violations, and others felt that the 
Lebanese government had no justification and ought to change its conduct. Most 
Palestinian interviewees emphasized the latter, but there was not at all consensus on this 
among the Lebanese. All interviewees, including the Palestinians, stated that the 
responsibility lay with the international community. The Member of Parliament (MP) Farid 
el Khazen claimed that civil rights were solely the responsibility of the UN, and 
representatives from the Lebanese Army (LA) shared this view.441 By contrast, with or 
without being asked directly, many said that Lebanon too had a responsibility.442  The 
former director of the Department for Palestinian Refugee Affairs (DPA), Khalil Shatawi, 
explained in detail how he saw the Lebanese violation of rights according to the civil right 
conventions.443 Whether or not Lebanon was believed to be responsible, most felt that the 
situation was unacceptable in most respects, although some focused on the humanitarian 
situation for the refugees,444 and others focused on the lack of control the government had 
over the camps.445 
The three officials I interviewed that held the most sympathetic views toward the 
Palestinians were Khalil Makkawi (the head of the 2005 committee for dialogue), Khalil 
Shatawi (the former DPA director), and Tariq Mitri (the Minister for Culture). They were 
not affiliated with any party and were not self-declared rightists or leftists. Makkawi led the 
new committee (discussed in Chapters 1 and 6), which in itself was a sign that he might be 
supportive of granting the refugees rights. Shatawi was claimed by several Palestinians to 
have been the ‘only positive director of the DPA’ during that agency’s existence.446 Mitri 
was a long-time supporter of the Palestinians’ cause, with several Palestinian friends and 
connections. Charif Fayad, the party secretary of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) also 
emphasized that he was in favour of granting the refugees civil rights; a view that may be 
                                                 
441
 Interview with Farid el Khazen 23.03.2006. Interview with LA officers wishing to remain anonymous. 
442
 Interview with Charif Fayad 27.02.2006, interviews with Tariq Mitri 07.03.2006 and 27.03.2006, 
interview with Khalil Makkawi 10.03.2006. 
443
 He claimed that the state violated the rights to own property, to free movement, to social security, to health 
and to employment; but that the latter was the same for all foreigners (interview with Khalil Shatawi 
01.03.2006). 
444
 This was the case, for instance, with Mitri, Shatawi, Makkawi, and Majed. 
445
 This was the case, for instance, with el Khazen, the LA representatives, and abu Khalil. 
446
 Wafaa el-Yassir, Haifa Jammal, and Suheil al-Natour. 
  101 
seen as consistent with his fellow party member Jumblatt’s earlier suggestions and with the 
party’s former alliance with the Palestinians.447 The representatives from the LA and the  
writer and MP Farid el Khazen (for the Free Patriotic Movement) were generally less 
positive toward the Palestinians. Joseph Abu Khalil (of the Kata’ib, or Phalange, party) 
said that they ought to enjoy civil rights, but that the main problem between the refugees 
and the Lebanese state was the weapons in the camps. The journalist Ziad Majed was a 
strong critic of the Lebanese conduct, and the researcher Simon Haddad held a more 
neutral opinion, emphasizing that the situation was unacceptable rather than who was to 
blame. 
 
The rejection of tawtin 
 
The justifications that were given can be grouped into seven main explanations. All were 
mentioned or confirmed by more than one person, and suggested more than once. They are 
here further grouped into four all-encompassing categories. The first category was the 
Lebanese goal of rejecting tawtin, that is the resettlement of the Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon; and avoiding steps that might lead to it. Second was pragmatic causes such as the 
Lebanese economy. A third category referred to political events and influences, and finally 
were explanations based on the identity and distinctiveness of Lebanon as a country. Some 
of the explanations belong in more than one category, and we will see how some are 
closely related to one another. Questions to keep in mind are why the Lebanese government 
wanted to avoid tawtin, what the reality of the economic situation and the political 
influences was, and how the specific conditions of Lebanon related to the civil right 
situation? 
 
Those who use the rejection of tawtin as a reason for not granting the refugees civil rights 
most often related tawtin to Lebanon’s confessionalism. Two other causes for rejecting 
resettlement were emphasized as well; the refugees’ right to return, and the belief that the 
situation of the refugees was temporary. 
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Lebanon’s confessional balance 
 
We saw in Chapter 1 that although many have discussed the rejection of tawtin and its link 
to Lebanon’s confessionalism, few have analyzed the consequences of and the arguments 
behind that rejection in relation to the refugees’ civil rights. Lebanese officials, the 
Lebanese public, Palestinian refugees, and international researchers all emphasized 
Lebanon’s confessionalism as an explanation for the specific situation in Lebanon. 
Although almost everyone related it to tawtin, the government rarely named the 
confessional balance as the reason for rejecting it – we saw above that this only 
occasionally occurred.448 Because Lebanon was the home of such a mosaic of groups, and 
because its political system was based on that mosaic, there was a fear of integrating the 
Palestinians, most of whom were Sunni Muslims, into the Lebanese society; especially 
since they would form a rather large percentage of the population. This argument thus 
related to two of the differences from the other host countries; the confessional makeup and 
the size of refugee population in relation to that of Lebanon. 
 
Lebanon’s size and priorities 
Because of the small size of Lebanon, the refugee population formed a much higher 
percentage of the population there than in most other host countries (with the exception of 
Jordan). The exact size of the Lebanese population during the years is unknown, due to the 
lack of censuses since 1932, but based on estimates, and taking into account that the 
Palestinians were probably fewer than UNRWA’s registers showed, they still formed 
somewhere between eight and twelve per cent of the population.449 About the same number 
of refugees arrived in Syria as in Lebanon in 1948, but in Syria, they formed about two and 
a half per cent of the population;450 and integrating them would naturally take less effort 
than in Lebanon. Also, Syria did not suffer from limited resources. And although a higher 
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percentage fled to Jordan, Jordan was underpopulated, and the refugees were an asset as 
much as a burden.451 Many sources confirmed that this was an important factor for the 
different situation in Lebanon. 452 In a report from 1951 which consisted of resettlement 
proposals submitted to the UN General Assembly, both newspapers and the government 
claimed that Lebanon’s population made Lebanese officials reject tawtin.453 And fifty years 
later, the Maronite Patriarch was reported to have said, during a sermon: 
‘If the resettlement of the Palestinians in vast under-populated Arab countries is not acceptable then the 
effects on a small highly over-populated country like Lebanon would be even more dire.’454 
 
But the greatest fear was not that of overpopulation, but rather that of disrupting the 
confessional balance. The high numbers of Sunni Muslims would tip the balance in favour 
of this confessional group if the Palestinians were granted citizenship, and this might lead 
to justified claims that the representation in government should be changed, causing the 
government and political system to collapse. The Palestinian lawyer Salah Dabbagh 
claimed that some of the Christians were afraid that the fragile balance might be tampered 
with as a consequence of the Palestinian presence: ‘This is always a fact that was in the 
background of the history of the Palestinians in Lebanon.’455 Thus, the argument was that 
any sign of settling the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, such as their receiving rights, 
might be interpreted as if Lebanon was arranging for their permanent settlement there. In 
consequence, acts that might be perceived, specifically by Israel, as intermediate steps 
toward integration, were avoided. Joseph abu Khalil said that the confessional equilibrium 
was the very ‘raison d’être’ for Lebanon, and the reason why the Palestinians were treated 
differently than in the other countries.456 Lebanon’s neighbours did not pursue the same 
strategy, but in Lebanon, civil rights such as the right to work, free movement, health and 
housing were claimed to be perceived precisely as such risks. 
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Consensus on rejection 
Although Lebanon’s confessionalism caused conflicts in 1958 and in 1975, upholding the 
confessional balance – or imbalance – and not tampering with that system was seemingly 
important for almost every group in Lebanon. The argument that linked confessionalism to 
the problem of the Palestinian refugees started as early as 1951. During my fieldwork, 
every Lebanese whose interview I recorded except one confirmed the confessional balance 
as one of the reasons why the Palestinians were not given rights.457 Some brought it up 
spontaneously when they heard what my subject was; others mentioned it when I asked 
what they saw as reasons; and others confirmed when I asked specifically whether the 
confessional balance played a role. 
But the explanation was not as officially emphasized as were several other 
justifications. In fact, although the majority of the people I talked to believed that the 
confessional balance was one reason why the Palestinian refugees did not have civil rights 
in Lebanon, many of the interviewees believed that it was an underlying factor that the 
public and the official Lebanon did not speak of openly. The Minister for Culture Tariq 
Mitri said, when I asked him why Lebanon had not granted the refugees rights before 1969: 
‘I think in the background there was always fear that they would disrupt the fragile communal balance. (…) 
Shi’ites are afraid that Sunnis become more numerous, Christians are upset because Muslim communities are 
growing… but no one says that. I think it’s in the background.’458 
 
Mitri, then, believed that the factor was important to all the confessional groups, and this 
does seem to be the case. In light of the above, the naturalizations that took place in 1994 
seem strange indeed. There apparently was a consensus on rejecting tawtin, so why would 
the government naturalize Palestinians at this point? The Seven Villages were in an area of 
debated nationality, and one suggested reason was that Syria and Hizbollah pressured the 
government toward naturalizing their population because that would be a sign that the 
Seven Villages were part of Lebanon, not Israel. This would allow Hizbollah to keep its 
weapons when Israel withdrew, according to the Ta’if Accord.459 
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However, consensus or not, considering how the other countries granted the 
refugees civil rights without resettling them, the confessional argument is still unsatisfying, 
and therefore this thesis examines the other factors influencing Lebanon’s unique situation. 
 
The right of return 
 
Another explanation given for the Lebanese government’s withholding civil rights from the 
Palestinians was the Palestinian refugees’ right to return and to compensation for loss of or 
damage to property, established by the UN General Assembly Resolution 194. In addition 
to being founded on international decisions, it was an argument supported by the refugees 
themselves. Obviously, Resolution 194 was not easy to implement, or even to discuss in the 
UN since Israel never accepted it. Nevertheless, the right was recalled in multiple UN 
resolutions and statements during the years.460 
Supporting the right of return was a focus of the Arab League, and the argument 
was held in common by all the host countries. The content of Resolution 194 was stated 
and restated by Lebanon’s government and society since 1949. But for Lebanon, it also 
became one of the reasons applied for rejecting tawtin. The argument was that if the 
refugees were settled they would lose their right to return; even though Resolution 194 did 
not state that a new citizenship would alter a refugee’s right to return to her original home 
country.461 Emphasizing this right became a different way to reject tawtin for the Lebanese 
government, instead of blaming the rejection on its own confessional nature. By supporting 
the right of return, the government appeared to be denying the refugees intermediate civil 
rights in order to protect their most important and permanent right. Palestinians also 
emphasized their rejection of Lebanese citizenship. The Palestinian lawyer Salah Dabbagh 
explained the Palestinian position by telling me of his father: 
‘My father was entitled to get a British nationality, and he declined. He said ‘the British are the cause of our 
situation. Should I become British?’ It might be as if, psychologically, they would lose their identity. But this 
doesn’t mean they don’t want civil rights.’462 
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The right of return thus became the banner under which everyone in Lebanon gathered, 
citizens and refugees alike. It was still emphasized when I conducted my interviews. Tariq 
Mitri stated, when asked what were the most important issues regarding the relationship 
between Lebanon and the refugees: 
‘Officially, everybody says we want the Palestinians to return to Palestine. Now, most Palestinians in 
Lebanon come from Northern Palestine, the Palestine occupied in 1948 – the chances that they return where 
they came from are not very high. But we keep sort of hammering the official position, that the law, the right 
of return, should be exercised and so on, so that these people will go back.’463 
 
Mitri was critical to the argument although he was supportive of the principle of the right 
of return, probably because he was among those who argued that the refugees ought to be 
granted civil rights, and did not agree with the argument that this would lead to tawtin. 
There were those who focused on the fact that Israel showed no sign of allowing the right 
to be fulfilled during the 58 years that the Palestinian refugees had existed as a group, and 
therefore believed that the right of return was lost.464 But for those who might end up with 
the economic burden of settling them, the right to compensation was perhaps equally as 
important as their return to Palestine. 
 
The belief that the situation was temporary 
 
Another argument equal for all the host countries was the initial belief that the refugee 
situation was temporary. In 1948, the refugees were set up in temporary tented camps and 
were cared for under a temporary mandate. The host countries believed that the refugees 
would return to their homeland and that their stay was not at all permanent. The belief is 
not difficult to understand: Every Arab state was at war with Israel and the international 
community had declared that the refugees had a right to return home. Khalil Shatawi, the 
former director of the DPA, divided the decade of 1948-1958 into two; 1948-1952 were 
marked by the catastrophe itself, and the refugees were met with official support and 
hospitality. The years of 1952-1958 was a ‘period of observation’ marked by a wait-and-
see mentality in which Lebanon made no decisions regarding the refugees, and did not 
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consider integrating them into society.465 Some claimed that the belief did not subside until 
the 1960s or the Arab catastrophe of 1967, when Israel again defeated its neighbours.466 
The fact that the Arab countries fought a third war with Israel seems to say that they 
believed in a chance of winning. On the other hand, Lebanon did not take part in the six-
day war. Lebanon was sceptical prior to 1967: On the contrary to confiding that the 
situation would be solved, the Lebanese government grew sceptical of the future 
developments once the changes of the international system caring for the refugees had 
taken place. The attitudes of the first caretaker of the refugees inflicted little fear in 
Lebanese society, because the main focus of the Red Cross was planning the repatriation of 
the refugees to Palestine. But UNRWA was in fact created because the short-term relief 
programs had to be developed into more long-term schemes; followed by a growing 
scepticism in Lebanon, as we saw in the previous chapter. Thus, the perception that the 
Lebanese government did not ‘consider’ integration appears mistaken. And after the civil 
war and especially after the 1993 peace process, the belief that the situation would be 
temporary was replaced by a suspicion that the international community was planning on 
‘dumping’ the Palestinian refugee problem on the host countries. In response, the right of 
return was repeated even more often. 
However, the belief that the situation was not permanent was one of the expressed 
explanations why Lebanon did not deal with the Palestinians’ rights in the early period. 
Apparently, the idea of granting the refugees civil rights did not even occur to the Lebanese 
government and the belief led to the disregard of civil rights and integration. Aspects of the 
explanation appear quite likely, but it has not been much discussed. I have not found it 
mentioned in official sources, but it was suggested in several of my interviews. 467  It 
belongs in the category of rejecting tawtin not because Lebanon was the only government 
that believed the situation was temporary, but because it was suggested that the government 
rejected the refugees’ temporary integration because of it. 
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Economic justifications 
 
Granting the refugees civil rights such as health care, housing and employment would put 
an extra burden on the Lebanese economy, and the state of Lebanon’s economy and 
scarcity of natural resources were explanations for why the state never granted the 
Palestinian refugees civil rights. The explanation was that implementing civil rights or 
tawtin was impossible due to realistic conditions and also not a priority, usually followed 
by an opinion that the economic burden of the refugees ought to be taken by the 
international community and the UN.468 Some claimed that there were too few resources 
and that the economy was too fragile,469 while most feared that the resources and economy 
might suffer if the Palestinians were to be integrated.470 It was also an explanation used by 
Palestinians.471 In addition, Lebanon’s private economic system was held as an explanation. 
Sources using these explanations generally referred to the entire period, although the 
economy was most frequently presented as a problem after the civil war. 
 
Lebanon’s economy and resources 1951-1975 
We saw in Chapter 6 that Lebanon’s contributions to UNRWA was not much smaller than 
that of the other Arab host countries in 1951, and in 1969 the amount had risen, although it 
was now less than its neighbours’ contributions. Although much of this can be attributed to 
the general attitudes of these years, it also signals the fact that the economy of Lebanon in 
the 1950s and 1960s was in fact blooming. The above-mentioned report from 1951 claimed 
that Lebanon was the most developed country in the region.472 Its economy kept growing 
during the 1960s, when Beirut was called the ‘Paris of the Middle East’ and the country 
had a different attitude than its neighbour altogether.473 While Syria adapted a socialist 
form of economy and nationalized most of the major enterprises,474 Lebanon had a laissez-
faire, capitalist economic system, which led to different economic priorities than those of 
many other countries in the region. Lebanon’s economic system was heavily reliant on the 
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market and on private investors; not unlike the Western economies. We saw that the 
majority of the health and education facilities were private, and private enterprises became 
a trademark of Lebanese economic life. Its priorities, then, were not socialist or pan-Arab; 
but rather liberal and capitalist. 
In spite of the explanation that Lebanon’s resources were scarce, facts show that they were 
in fact quite rich, as the country was ideally suited for agricultural activities.475 The report 
from 1951 claims that a lack of resources or over-population were not necessarily problems, 
as long as proper developments were introduced.476 Other reliable reports also emphasized 
the potential of Lebanon’s resources (the resources were not developed to the extent 
suggested, though).477 But because of the size of the country in relation to the size of the 
Palestinian community, settling the Palestinian refugees would necessarily require more 
resources from Lebanon than from Syria. 
 
Despite the above, both the economic situation and the state of resources were given as 
explanations why the Palestinian refugees were not granted civil rights both before and 
after the  civil war.478 Both obviously were related to Lebanon’s size. Neither Lebanon nor 
Syria struggled with unemployment, but the arrival of the refugees did not suggest any 
threat to Syria’s future economy, as it was claimed to do in Lebanon. Syria was in fact 
under-populated, and the refugees were seen as assets by some.479 We saw that the Syrian 
legislation included the Palestinians from an early stage and this might well be one reason. 
The economic situation in Lebanon was sometimes linked to the belief that the situation 
was temporary: Even though the country was wealthy, the government did not believe that 
the Palestinians would stay as long as they did, and thus were not prepared for the 
economic cost of hosting them. 480  The economic system was referred to rather more 
frequently: The Lebanese government did not really control the health and education 
                                                 
475
 Economic Intelligence Unit 2005, 21. 
476
 Twenty-five per cent of the total area was under cultivation and at least 500 additional square miles could 
be, and the 100,000 acres that were under irrigation could be increased five-fold. Also, the country had 
several water resources (The Arab Refugee Problem. How it can be solved, 1951, 52). 
477
 Economic Intelligence Unit 2005, United States-Lebanon Agricultural Mission of 1948. 
478
 Beside interviews, Thicknesse in 1949 (44f.) and Helou in 1965 (5ff.) both claimed that the economic 
situation was a problem. 
479
 Takkenberg 1998, 167. 
480
 Interview with Farid el Khazen 14.03.2006. 
  110 
facilities.481 I have not found official statements saying this, but it was a frequent argument 
among the interviewees. 
 
Lebanon’s economy and resources 1989-2005 
After the war, Lebanon’s economic situation changed drastically, and the argument that the 
economic crisis was the reason that the Palestinians did not have civil rights became a 
common one. The civil war damaged the infrastructure, cut national production by half, 
and changed Lebanon's position from being the most developed country in the Middle East 
to being a country in need of rebuilding. The country’s resources had also been subject to 
massive destruction.482 An increasing use of private funding was sought; limiting the state-
run health and education facilities further. At the same time there was a growing fear that 
the Palestinians would become a long-term economic burden for Lebanon. 483  Among 
measures taken was legislation that eased restrictions on foreign ownership of real estate, 
alongside legislation restricting Palestinians from owning real estate (see Appendix 2). 
Despite improvements, the country still faced significant economic problems in 2005, 
especially regarding debts and the failure to produce a growing economy.484 As for its 
resources, the EIU country profile report from 2004 suggested that Lebanon still had much 
potential for further development.485 
 
Political influences 
 
Political events that were not directly tied to the refugee situation sometimes influenced 
that situation. Such were the wars with Israel in 1956, 1967 and 1973, the coup of 1958, the 
civil war, the Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, and the Oslo peace process. These were all 
contexts that the refugee situation in Lebanon was situated in, and most were not seen as 
‘reasons’ why Lebanon did not grant the refugees civil rights. Two of them were, however, 
perceived precisely as such: The legacy of the civil war, and the Syrian presence. 
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The war legacy 
 
Lebanon’s confessional balance, the right of return, and the economic situation were all 
frequently given explanations, but the civil war and the role that the PLO played in it was 
also one of the most common explanations for the refugee situation, mentioned by the 
majority of the interviewees and by most other sources and writers as well.486  Some 
mentioned it as a justification for the rejection of civil rights, while others used the civil 
war in order to explain the anti-Palestinianism and why the government had blocked civil 
rights after the end of the war. 
We saw in Chapter 2 that the PLO was one of the major actors in the Lebanese civil 
war of 1975-1989. And much of the Lebanese population long held an opinion that the 
PLO was to blame for the outbreak of the war itself and for its consequences: The Israeli 
shelling and invasions, the devastations, the economic crisis and downfall of the blooming 
economy; and also the confessional and political division of the Lebanese people. Some 
sources claimed that the military role of the Palestinians was the defining factor when it 
came to Palestinian-Lebanese relations, saying that their involvement in the war was what 
brought foreign powers into Lebanese politics. 487  But the interesting aspect of this 
explanation is not the war itself, but rather the attitude; the blame of the PLO and the 
refugee community who was left to receive the blame. The fact that so many people 
claimed that the civil war was a reason for not granting the refugees civil rights seems to 
make little sense, since the war only broke out in 1975 and the situation before that was not 
taken into account. But in spite of that, the belief was strong enough to produce a 
justification for the refugees’ lack of civil rights; which signals both the emotional nature 
of the argument and that a new Lebanese discourse was created around the war legacy. 
This will be examined more closely in the next chapter. 
 
Syria’s influence and control 
 
Another political influence held as a reason why the Lebanese government did not grant the 
Palestinian refugees civil rights was the influence of Syria on Lebanon after 1989. Syria’s 
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interference in the war was seen as an excuse to ‘legally’ occupy Lebanon, as its forces 
were established there during the war and stayed until 2005; fifteen years after the charge 
Syria had been appointed to had ceased to exist. In addition to taking control of the 
northern parts of the country, many maintained that Syria controlled the government, 
issuing orders and pressuring politicians, either channelling pro-Syrian Lebanese such as 
Hizbollah and the President Lahoud, 488  or threatening people’s lives. Apart from the 
murder of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005, Syria was blamed for numerous other 
assassinations or attacks targeting anti-Syrian journalists or politicians.489 The writer Paul 
Salem states that relations with Syria went so far that Syria’s control led all major decisions 
in the state, that it controlled the President, the Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers 
and the army and security branches.490 Whether or not Syria directed the government’s 
decisions, it certainly exerted pressure, perhaps more easily since Lebanon was already 
open to clientalist politics; and by default since it brokered the Ta’if Accord to begin with. 
Some earlier statements from other sources than my interviews denied that there 
was any real Syrian hegemony.491 For instance, one source stated that the ‘courts were 
operating normally and all Lebanese laws were in force.’492 This was stated prior to the 
withdrawal, however, and were challenged by statements issued after the Syrian 
withdrawal, claiming that Lebanese legislation had not been functioning as usual. 
 
As for the Palestinians, it was stated that it was Syria’s control of the government that 
hindered positive developments in regards to them, and this was one of the explanations for 
the lack of the Palestinians’ civil rights.493 For instance, Syria was to blame for the failure 
of the 1991 committee, and refused any legislation that would ease the living conditions.494 
The argument has hardly been discussed in earlier studies, and it was also less cited than 
                                                 
488
 Emile Lahoud was elected President of Lebanon 1998 and was still in office in 2005, due to a much 
protested unconstitutional procedure. 
489
 Tueni et.al 2005.Meeting with Ziad Sayegh. 
490
 Salem 1998, 16f. 
491
 Statements given at a time when Syria was still in control had an entirely different context and audience 
than statements given after their withdrawal. The interviews were given after a lot of ‘anti-Syrian’ feelings 
had been let loose. One example is how, since their withdrawal, one fourth of Lebanon’s population 
demonstrated against the Syrian presence on March 14, 2005. Seeing how assassinations and arrests were still 
actual threats, some probably wished to appear loyal to Syrian alliances, but this did not occur during my 
interviews. Most spoke freely about their opinions on the Syrian influence. 
492
 Danish Immigration Service 1998, 33, 36f. 
493
 Interview with Farid el Khazen 14.03.2006, Makkawi 10.03.2006, Fayad 27.02.2006, Mitri 27.03.2006. 
Said 1999, 316. For various quotations, see Appendix 5f. 
494
 See Chapter 6 on the 1991 committee. 
  113 
the most common explanations (the civil war, the economy, the right of return and the 
confessionalism), but it was not among the most rarely mentioned explanations either. 
When sources explained the lack of civil rights by blaming the Syrian control, they did not 
defend the lack of rights as a justified result – on the contrary, it was claimed that Lebanon 
would not have behaved likewise. This makes the argument unique: All other explanations 
attempted to justify why Lebanon had not or could not integrate the refugees, while this 
argument put the blame on another country and did not defend it. 
Few of my interviewees discussed why Syria would want to keep civil rights from 
the refugees, except that they wanted the camps to remain a ‘card’ possible for them to play, 
and to keep the Palestinians pro-Syrian and anti-Lebanese in order to maintain a strength in 
Lebanon. 495  In that light, we might understand more of Hizbollah’s support to the 
Palestinian refugees as well. Hizbollah was directly supported by Syria, and the party may 
have wished to use the refugees as a ‘card’ although they had no voice in Lebanon’s 
political life, ensuring some form of loyalty. However, these are matters that are beyond the 
ambitions of this thesis to determine. 
 
Whether or not Syria did prevent the government from ameliorating the situation of the 
Palestinian refugees is not likely to be revealed in the near future. On the one hand, not 
long after the Syrian withdrawal, a Lebanese committee was created to discuss the 
Palestinian weapons and civil rights, the results of which remain to be seen (see Postscript). 
Although several contexts for the new committee other than the Syrian withdrawal were 
suggested,496 its establishment backed the argument that Syria’s influence had aggravated 
the refugee situation. On the other hand, we saw above that the refugee camps in the 
Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon generally fared better than the others regarding 
restrictions and bans;497 suggesting that Syria rather reduced the hardships of the refugees 
than increased them. And remembering the ‘bevy of cabinet ministers’ who were ready to 
leave when Walid Jumblatt suggested relocating the refugees in an abandoned area, as well 
as the multiple other examples from before the war, it seems unlikely that things would 
have been different if Syria had not controlled parts of Lebanon. 
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The distinctiveness of the Lebanese society: Lebanon’s identity 
 
Instead of focusing on hard facts such as resources, or on principles such as the right to 
return, some of the people I interviewed mentioned the nature of Lebanon herself as a 
reason for the conduct regarding the refugees.498  This is an explanation that is hardly 
mentioned at all in previous studies, and was not mentioned by as many interviewees as 
were some of the other justifications. 
There are three explanations for the lack of civil rights based on aspects that made 
Lebanon unique in relation to its neighbours. One was the economic system already looked 
at. The others were Lebanon’s democratic structure, and the population’s feelings of 
national identity.499 This distinctiveness appeared before modern Lebanon was created, and 
were a part of the country’s creation as a modern state. The mandate created a state with a 
small majority of Christians who did not necessarily ‘feel’ Arab in the same way as the rest 
of the population did.500 In contrast to the other countries, which had one or two religious 
groups obviously larger than its minorities and would naturally be in power at end of the 
mandate, in Lebanon the Maronites’ power was confirmed under the mandate. The creation 
of Lebanon in itself thus established its differences compared to the others of the region, 
and one could say that the distinctions were all related to the confessionalism looked at 
above. 
 
Lebanon’s democracy 
The first explanation, which was also often related to Lebanon’s economic system, was 
Lebanon’s democratic structure and open society. Although confessional and clientalist, 
Lebanon had a certain democratic political system, including popular elections and power 
sharing; if only in name until the civil war and controlled by foreign forces after. The 
system was established by the mandate and came to include a significant and encouraged 
private sector, freedom of speech, a largely free press, individual freedoms rarely limited 
by legislation, and the cooperation between confessions. This was all part of what was 
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meant by the term ‘open society’, and was part of the explanation for why the situation in 
Lebanon was different from the other countries.501 Although the freedom of Lebanon was 
far from perfect – the country has experienced a high number of politically motivated 
assassinations since independence – its politics were clearly structured differently from its 
neighbours. The Maronite Farid el Khazen and the Druze Charif Fayad, although they were 
affiliated with opposite political parties, both held the differences in political systems as 
crucial for the question of the refugees.502 El Khazen and Khalil Makkawi claimed that one 
consequence of the open society had been that the PLO was able to behave the way it did, 
precisely because Lebanon was an open country, in contrast to Syria who would not allow 
this amount of freedom for the fedayin.503 In relation to this openness, the Prime Minister 
of 1969, Rashid Karami, said: 
‘Our country has a liberal and democratic way of life. We give shelter to the advocates of various political 
movements and foreign ideologies. (…) How can we logically single out the Palestinians and prevent them 
from expressing their opinions?’504 
 
The open society was thus closely related to the history of the Palestinians in Lebanon. But 
in spite of being presented as an explanation, the focus on the democratic outset did not 
really explain why the refugees were rejected civil rights; only why the PLO was able to 
operate within the system. If anything, a democratically structured system could be 
expected to grant more rights to its long-time guests than a despotic one, such as Syria. It 
was, however, connected to the other two factors of Lebanon’s distinction: Its economic 
priorities, and its feelings of identity. 
 
Feelings of identity 
The other aspect of the open society related more closely to the lack of civil rights. We 
have already seen that the economic system ensured other priorities for Lebanon, and some 
suggested that Lebanon’s situation made its people feel differently than the people of Syria 
and other Arab republics or kingdoms. Tariq Mitri put it this way: 
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‘Lebanon is a country that’s always been conscious of its specificity that it’s different; it’s Arab, but it’s 
different from the other Arab countries.’505 
 
It cannot be taken for granted that all Lebanese were aware or in agreement of such a 
notion, but several of my interviews confirmed a consciousness about this, and throughout 
the fieldwork it was quite common for the Lebanese interviewees to evaluate their own 
feelings of identity. And one of these feelings was the openness that could be detected both 
in the political structure and in the society’s mentality. Lebanon’s openness toward foreign 
investors and economy, tourists and religion also opened it to different influences. Despite 
the positive effects this could have, it also caused difficulties. For instance, the journalist 
Ziad Majed said that there was no unanimity about the identity of Lebanon, and that there 
were divided opinions relating to all the major events in the neighbouring countries.506 
There was no agreement whether Lebanon should participate in the 1967 war: Its Christian 
population, to a large extent, wanted Lebanon to remain neutral, while the Muslims 
basically did not. We also saw in Chapter 2 that there were divided reactions to the 
partition of Lebanon from Syria after the First World War. There were even split feelings 
toward Israel during the civil war, when there was a need for a strong ally for the Lebanese 
right. This divided mentality possibly led to the idea that Lebanon should behave 
‘neutrally’ towards the Palestinians refugees as well; for instance detected in the  way the 
government reacted to the belief that the situation was temporary.507 This contrasted with 
other Arab states, which viewed Palestinians as fellow Arabs and allied with their cause. 
Lebanon was also divided when it came to supporting Arab regimes or the Western world 
when they were in conflict, and to pan-Arabism.508 The Syrian government and public was 
positive to the ideology that arose in the 1930s and displayed a form of Arab solidarity; and 
after the Ba’ath party came to power in 1963, one could say that the Syrian government 
was pan-Arabist. Though the Arab countries held different ideas of what it was, pan-
Arabism stood for Arab brotherhood and Palestinians were an important beacon for the 
ideology. Many of the Muslim groups of Lebanon certainly felt affiliated with pan-
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Arabism,509 but many others, Muslims among them, felt differently. For instance, from 
their founding in 1936, the Maronite Phalange or Kata’ib party claimed to be descendants 
of the Phoenicians rather than of the Arabs. 
Another impediment was that the private economic system which might suffer 
under pan-Arabism or socialism. The Palestinian lawyer Salah Dabbagh offered his views 
on the Lebanese identity that he had grown up with, arguing that since Lebanon’s identity 
was not pan-Arab, many Lebanese were politically inclined not to accept the Palestinians, 
and that this meant as much in relation to them as the confessional structure.510 The fact 
that Dabbagh was a self-declared pan-Arabist probably made him emphasize this point, but 
it certainly seems like one of the factors that made Lebanon different. In any case this 
discord caused divided feelings of identity, whether it was Arab or not Arab, Western, 
socialist, liberal, pro-Syrian or anti-Syrian. 
 
Feelings of superiority 
Finally, the political, economic and emotional differences were declared to manifest in a 
feeling of superiority over the rest of the region. Tariq Mitri suggested that the uniqueness 
of Lebanon had both positive and negative effects: While having a history of hospitality, 
such as when they welcomed the Kurds and Armenian refugees, he said that the country 
also had a ‘history of xenophobia against foreigners.’511 Others also suggested that in the 
consciousness of many Lebanese, there was a sort of a xenophobia towards Palestinians 
and especially Syrians, because of the history of Syria’s relations with Lebanon, and 
because of the ‘Lebanese ego’ that said they were ‘better than the other Arabs’.512 But 
xenophobia may not be the only factor here: The Syrians represented a country that had 
controlled Lebanon for decades, and were despised for that as much as for being ‘inferior’ 
Arabs. And as for the Palestinians, public resentment toward them began mainly after the 
war. The fear that the Palestinians would continue the Syrian influence was also strong, and 
strengthened by the government’s discourse. In other words, the Lebanese conduct 
regarding the Palestinians was not necessarily uniquely anti-Palestinian. Certain factors 
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made Lebanon especially critical of this group, but in general, it was claimed that there was 
at the core a kind of superiority towards all others. Ambivalence, then, was a factor in 
Lebanon – or, as Suheil al-Natour put it: ‘The Lebanese are so polite, but they are not 
fair.’513 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter has presented the explanations that were given by Lebanese for the civil rights 
situation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Lebanon’s confessionalism, the right of 
return, the economic situation and the civil war were mentioned by most of the Lebanese 
sources and previous studies. The Syrian control was mentioned by most as an influence at 
least. On the other hand, the belief that the situation was temporary and the distinctions of 
Lebanon (apart from the confessionalism) were explanations that were mentioned more 
rarely. One might assume that what was mentioned often was more likely to be ‘true’, but 
the fact that all of the explanations were known to the interviewees may rather signify that 
they were part of a discourse. Events that were not directly linked to Lebanese-Palestinian 
relations shaped Lebanon’s perceptions and the government’s handling of the Palestinian 
refugee problem, creating an influence at least as strongly argued for as the rejection of 
tawtin or pragmatic causes. Pre-war Lebanon had consisted of many political groups. The 
war roughly created two, and the end of it gathered them all into one as regards the 
Palestinian issue. In the next chapter I will discuss the justifications presented here. 
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Chapter 8. The Palestinian discourse and the Lebanese realities 
 
In the previous chapter, we examined the explanations that Lebanese sources gave for the 
civil rights situation of the Palestinian refugees. Several of the justifications cannot in fact 
explain the situation on their own, and in this chapter I will discuss how they relate to each 
other. This chapter introduces two aspects of the Lebanese society and government that are 
crucial to my discussion. These are the discourses – here defined as belief systems514 - 
prevalent in the Lebanese society, and the use of hegemonic power in relation to discourse. 
I will examine the most relevant discourse related to the Palestinian refugees and especially 
to their civil rights within the Lebanese society; that of the fear of tawtin. Examining the 
Lebanese belief systems makes it easier to see the links between the various explanations 
for the situation, and I shall argue that the ‘Palestinian discourse’ determined the Lebanese 
government’s conduct toward the refugees. 
 
Disturbing the confessional balance? 
 
Rejecting tawtin because of the confessional balance remained a constant factor in the 
history of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Rejecting tawtin led to rejecting civil rights 
or integration of the Palestinian refugees for fear of disrupting the balance. But would 
granting the refugees civil rights actually have done so? In fact, the only civil right that 
might have a direct impact on the confessional distribution of power was that of citizenship; 
a notion hardly ever suggested by Lebanese or Palestinian representatives.515 Civil rights 
would not necessarily lead to citizenship: Neither Syria nor Egypt granted citizenship along 
with the rights that they did bestow on the refugees. Thus there was no logical necessity 
that one should lead to the other. The Minister for Culture in 2006, Tariq Mitri, said: 
 
‘Some years ago Lebanese would say ‘we don’t want to do anything that resembles normalizing the situation 
with the Palestinians, for normalizing is a prelude to resettlement.’ And I think we need to change that logic 
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and say that there is something unacceptable and abnormal in every sense in the Palestinian camps. This 
abnormality has to be dealt with. And this will not affect the consensus about tawtin.’516 
 
Mitri thus felt that the consensus about tawtin was not the problem, but that the logic 
behind that consensus was skewed. He was sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, and his 
history of connections with the Palestinians must be taken into consideration when 
interpreting his statements, but for this discussion, he indirectly mentioned a crucial point 
to the problem: The fear that the Palestinians would be settled became the logic that 
hindered their civil rights – not any necessary link between tawtin and civil rights. That 
fear became a Palestinian discourse; guiding the Lebanese government’s conduct toward 
the refugees; consisting of the notions of confessionalism and tawtin and of an idealism 
tied to Palestine; and gaining other characteristics as time passed. 
 
Creating a Palestinian discourse 
 
The Palestinian discourse observed in Lebanon had several layers, and the existence of 
such a discourse was first suggested when I mentioned that all the explanations of the 
previous chapter were given more than once. The usual procedure of my interviews let the 
interviewee respond to the open question of what were the reasons why the Palestinian 
refugees did not have civil rights in Lebanon. If some condition that I or other sources 
presumed were influential – for instance that of Syria’s control – was not a part of that 
spontaneous reply, I asked about it specifically. In such cases, none of the explanations I 
presented were received as unexpected or as new ideas to the interviewees, even when they 
disagreed that they had an influence. They were all well-known justifications for the 
situation, and did not appear as spontaneous reflections.517 Some sources said that they did 
not understand the logic behind some of the arguments, but they still knew of them. It 
seems, then, that the Lebanese relations to the Palestinian refugees was a part of society’s 
discourse. 
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The discourse of tawtin 
 
Who defines a discourse? 
Whoever defines the prevalent discourses in society also holds a certain power over that 
society, and the discourses may be defined by the media, by the civil society, by the rulers 
of a country, or by other dominant establishments.518 In this case, Lebanese political power 
was not vested exclusively by one such establishment – it had always been shared between 
several groups, and there was never one group which inarguably defined the discourses in 
society. But the Palestinian discourse of tawtin, which later included holding the refugees 
responsible for the civil war, was at least strengthened by the government and other 
hegemonic figures such as the zu’ama and the religious community leaders, as we have 
seen in statements. Therefore, I find the hegemonic nature of power in Lebanon to be 
important: It strengthened or even defined the Palestinian discourse; which in its turn 
defined the Lebanese conduct regarding the Palestinian refugees. The term ‘hegemonic 
power’ therefore requires something more of a definition. 
 
For the most part, with the exception of Shehab’s coercive regime, the Lebanese state did 
not coerce or force the population against their will. When, and if, the government 
exercised power, it was most commonly a form of hegemonic power, which basically 
consists of ‘shaping people’s ideas’ without coercing them, and where no commands or 
orders are necessary in order to establish a consensus.519 Hegemonic power is usually being 
applied when people agree as if they did not experience persuasion; but in fact are 
indirectly ‘persuaded’ by discourses spread through sectors like education, propaganda, and 
the media. Hegemonic power may be put to use in order to define the discourses of society. 
One scholar writes that ‘hegemonic power makes people act as if it were natural, normal, or 
simply a consensus.’520 But hegemonic power is complex, and may only be successful 
when ‘the preferred attitudes’ are not completely inconsistent with the interests of those 
who are subjected to it. This seems to agree with the specific Lebanese conditions 
accounted for in the previous chapters: After the civil war, a common discourse defining 
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the Lebanese relations to the Palestinian refugees was apparent. The public and officials 
seemed in clear agreement on protecting the confessional balance and blaming the PLO for 
the war. And although it is harder to define a common discourse outside of the government 
in the period before the civil war, tawtin was never suggested openly – even by Sunnis, 
whose numbers would increase by granting citizenship to the Palestinian refugees. This 
argues for the existence of a Lebanese discourse on the Palestinians that began with the 
Palestinian refugee situation itself – not only believed and upheld by the government, but 
by the Lebanese communities, as well. I will here go through the developments 
chronologically. 
 
The Maronite hegemony 
The Maronites’ political power was consistent from the creation of the state until 1975. 
One could say they created or at least supported the discourse on tawtin (that of rejecting it) 
from the onset, because preserving the confessional balance of the census of 1932 was a 
priority for the government. It was through the demographic calculations that the 
government remained in power, and it employed several measures of ensuring this; for 
instance including the mostly Christian emigrant population in the census.521 The Maronite 
President basically had all executive power, and thus were able to avoid changes to the 
representation. Suggestions of new censuses were consistently blocked. 522  One source 
explained that the government did not count the Lebanese population again because the 
modern state depended on the condition that had created it, and claimed that the state of 
Lebanon was founded on freedom of religion rather than on Islam, which was typical of its 
neighbours.523 However, religion came to define how Lebanon was ruled after all. The 
government did integrate Christians on various occasions, among them a large part of the 
Christian Palestinians, at the same time as rejecting tawtin defined the Lebanese position 
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toward the Palestinians in general.524 This was a sign that what increased the numbers of 
Christians had higher priority than the actual rejection of tawtin, although the government 
linked the possible dangers the Palestinians could bring directly to the confessional system. 
The Lebanese journalist Ziad Majed said that the naturalizations was done carefully and 
little by little so that it was not noticed much in the other communities. But for the public, 
tawtin was not a concept that they related much to in the early period in any case, and 
upholding the balance was mostly something the government dealt with alone. But based 
on statements from that period, it seems that the Christian public was not happy about the 
presence of a large, new Sunni community, and linked the presence of the Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon to a possible danger of disturbing the balance.525 As for the other 
communities, the Shi’a Muslims were not politically organized in this period and I have no 
sources stating any combined views for their part. The Sunnis were organized through the 
zu’ama system,526 but the fact that their numbers would increase if the Palestinian refugees 
were granted citizenship did not seem to be considered: The refugees’ possible impact on 
the balance was not mentioned by the Sunnis in any sources. It seems, then, that no 
Lebanese community argued for tawtin at any point in time, and that the Palestinian 
discourse was established from the very beginning, obstructing the possibility of granting 
them civil rights from an early date. 
 
The lack of any disagreement on resettling 100,000 Sunnis may seem strange in an 
environment where demographics is the basis for power. One reason might be that the 
zu’ama were traditional rulers of the Sunni community and were not particularly inclined to 
accept a mass of new Sunni Muslims who might not accept their hegemony within that 
community. The Palestinians might not adhere to traditions long established within the 
Lebanese society. In addition, many of them were highly educated, and this factor may 
have played a part in the perception that they could threaten the established hierarchy.527 
The nature of Lebanese political life thus suggests that it was not merely confessional 
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concerns that directed the actors’ motives, but also traditional, clientalistic systems that 
cared more for retaining the power of some families than looking for ways to raise the 
number of Sunnis on a general basis. 
Another reason may have been that although there was confessional discontent in 
Lebanon, the underrepresented communities did not necessarily wish for a complete 
change in the political system. The balance was essential to Lebanon as a modern state and 
the communities were used to living side by side. Although the civil war years saw a 
drastic change of priorities, it seems that the priority in the first decades was to retain some 
balance, both for the Christians, for the Sunnis and the Druze. Also, even though the 
government saw the possible danger that the Palestinians could be to the confessional 
balance, it was not an obvious link to the public at all – the Palestinians were believed to be 
in Lebanon on a temporary basis, and they never claimed to want Lebanese citizenship. 
The possible danger was most probably only apparent to the government after some years, 
and to researchers who have the luxury of viewing history in light of later developments. 
 
The downfall of the hegemony 
In the period from 1969 to 1989, the hegemony that had prevailed broke down. As we saw 
in Chapter 2, new political forces arose unrestricted by zu’ama bonds, and the civil war 
exploded into two main factions fighting over power without concern for the fragile mosaic 
of the country. As the leftist forces consisted mainly of Muslims, it seemed that the 
Muslims of Lebanon eventually had broken away from the traditional loyalties. But the fact 
that resettling the Palestinians in Lebanon might give the Sunni masses, not only the 
members of the zu’ama, more power, was no more an issue during the war than it had been 
before. Tawtin was never considered part of the fight, at least not openly.528 The reason 
may have been that the leftists were allied with the Palestinians, and the Palestinian 
national cause never opened for suggestions of citizenship anywhere but in Palestine. 
Idealism and political strategy, then, may have been a reason why tawtin was never a goal 
for the Sunnis during the war. 
 
As for the government, some sources emphasized that the reason that the PLO behaved as 
it did in Lebanon was, firstly, that Lebanon was an open society that could not simply 
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remove an opposition who disagreed with the government’s tactics and views529 – the 
confessional power sharing, although skewed, depended on a democratic structure. For the 
government, the hegemonic use of power was crucial to stay in control, and if the 
Maronite-dominated government had expelled the PLO at a time when it was widely 
popular among the population, they may have risked too much of a resistance. In that sense, 
the power of the Maronite government was firm and fragile at the same time.  
 
The new consensus 
The Palestinian discourse that followed the Ta’if Accord was very different from that of the 
war, when there had been no consensus at all. The compromise of the Ta’if Accord was a 
result of how all the different forces of identity and power relations now searched for a way 
to coexist. The compromise was to settle into unity again. Another change was how the 
PLO’s former allies had gained more political power, and the PLO was no longer a factor 
to the Lebanese politics.530 The war’s prevailing strategies toward the Palestinians were no 
longer relevant. The confessional imbalance was no longer openly protected only by those 
who had traditionally benefited from it, but by all groups in society. And the first sign of 
the change in public and official opinion toward the Palestinians was the Ta’if Accord itself, 
which banned any act that could possibly lead to tawtin. Everyone officially agreed that it 
was out of the question.531 The Palestinian lawyer Suheil al-Natour claimed that what was 
new about the Ta’if Accord was not its content but the agreement surrounding it, extending 
to the Palestinians’ traditional allies such as the PSP. The situation directly before and after 
the war had changed from a general lack of public involvement with the refugee problem to 
a broad public concern and anti-Palestinian feelings that had not been present before; an 
attitude with a high level of unity.532 The fear of a new war and the relief of peace, as well 
as the blame laid on the Palestinians, led practically all of Lebanon to uphold the new status 
quo. The main reason for the compromise of the Ta’if Accord was that none of the 
Lebanese parties won the civil war, and everyone was tired of fighting. The rejection of 
tawtin, the dissolving of militias and the ‘sacrifice’ of the former Palestinian allies was a 
price the Sunni, Shi’i and Druze groupings paid for peace. And the end of the war 
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introduced a Palestinian discourse which was not only supported by practically everyone, 
but now everyone also related to it consciously, in contrast to the pre-war situation. The 
former Prime Minister Ahmed Karami exemplified the agreement in 1999, where he said 
that ‘we are all, as Lebanese, against permanent resettlement, and no one can accept this 
disaster, this question is categorically rejected by all parties in Lebanon.’533 Although he 
represented the government, the fact that almost all of Lebanon shared this view can be 
seen in statements across confessional or political bonds. As the Lebanese journalist Ziad 
Majed put it, the war had led to anti-Palestinianism where the feeling had been neutral.534 
 
That the discourse was linked to fear was obvious after 1989, but fear may also have been 
important in the earlier period. While the Christian communities feared tawtin on account 
on losing their political power, as well as on account of conflict, the Muslim communities 
may have feared instability and conflict throughout the whole period, and did not wish for a 
complete change of system in Lebanon (except during the war). Besides factors such as 
how the zu’ama probably did not wish to be challenged by a new mass of Sunnis, it 
explains why tawtin was not supported by any Lebanese community at any point in time. 
The fear of instability was the decisive matter. It was connected to both the confessional 
balance mostly upheld by the government before the war; and to the fear of a new war; 
which everyone related to after 1989. And the existence of the Palestinian discourse, or the 
discourse on tawtin, puts the various explanations in a new and more comprehensive light, 
since to some extent they all sprung from or depended on that belief system. 
 
The war legacy and the Syrian control 
 
Some of the explanations presented in the previous chapter were based on events that took 
place decades after the refugees arrived in Lebanon, and therefore cannot assume to explain 
why they were never granted civil rights since 1948. But we see here how the explanation 
that the civil war was the cause of the lack of the Palestinian refugees’ civil rights followed 
the discourse that tawtin would lead to a disruption of the confessional balance. In light of 
the above, the explanations regarding the civil war and the Syrian influence make more 
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sense, as they were linked more closely to the fear of tawtin than was obvious at first 
glance: After 1989, it was feared that tawtin would lead directly to a new war. The 
Palestinian discourse had included new factors, most importantly the notion that the 
refugees were to blame for the war, which served several objects at once; most importantly 
blocking tawtin and civil rights at the same time as relieving the Lebanese parties of the 
responsibility of the war.  
Syria’s hegemony and the economic crisis of Lebanon were also presented as 
reasons for the civil rights situation to me, and when I emphasized how that only related to 
the latter time period, many claimed that the civil rights had not been violated before 
1989.535 From what we saw in Chapter 1, such perceptions may be attributed to memories 
being altered, to a wish for consistency, or, as we have seen, to discursive factors. The 
economic situation of Lebanon only deteriorated after the civil war, but was a part of the 
war legacy.536 And although Syria’s control over Lebanon was not applicable until after the 
civil war, that too was part of the war legacy; and thus of the Palestinian discourse. 
 
After 1989, the discourse of tawtin was more outspoken than before the war and could be 
overtly rejected because of the stipulations of the Ta’if Accord, and now it included that the 
Palestinians were to blame for the civil war, linking the discourse closely to the post-war 
consensus and anger toward the refugees. But there are several other possible factors which 
made the Palestinian refugees a scapegoat for the war and which caused such harsh 
measures and strong resentment in the following decade. Blaming the Palestinians was 
quite uncontroversial until 2000 at least, and although different factors led to this attitude, 
one of the most probable ones was the need for an external enemy.537 After the Ta’if 
Accord, blaming the different confessions or parties that had been fighting each other for 
the war would be dangerous: After all, they were now in something of an agreement, and 
the memory of war and fear of erupting into a third round of fighting was deep.538 An 
external enemy, therefore, was highly convenient. A threatening outsider is one of history’s 
most common causes for national unity and organization, whether the perceived threat is 
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real or not.539 Blaming Israel, which still occupied parts of Lebanon, might have been a 
preference, but aside from it being untouchable, most Lebanese believed that Israel had 
invaded in order to remove the PLO, not toppling Lebanon’s government.540 Syria, though 
accused of many offences later, could not be named the reason for the outbreak of war, as 
its forces had not been present in Lebanon until 1976. Left to blame was the PLO; as even a 
vanished threat can be convenient for a traumatized society. The fear of continued war, 
then, was connected with what I call scapegoatism; the Lebanese need to blame someone 
other than themselves in order to start solving the country’s internal discords. This feeling 
had diminished somewhat by 2000 and further by 2006, but there was a unity in Lebanon 
that the rejection of tawtin was essential, both in order to uphold the compromise of the 
Ta’if Accord, and because of the blame laid on the Palestinians. This strengthened the 
perception that civil rights could not, or should not, be granted to them. We thus see how 
Lebanon’s confessionalism and the legacy of the civil war connect.541 
 
In 2004, the Ministry for Social Affairs stated that since tawtin was not allowed on 
constitutional grounds, social support for refugees consisted of ‘finding permanent 
solutions to their problems through supporting their right to return’.542 This was an internal 
report with the goal of revealing statistic conditions in Lebanon, and not to offer advice on 
the refugee problem. Its suggesting which solution should be applied to the refugees 
implies the strength of the Palestinian discourse in the Lebanese society. 
We saw in Chapter 6 that the attitude, or discourse, was supported by the post-war 
government in 1990 and by all subsequent governments. The government may not 
deliberately have been part of the discourse, but it seems likely that the hegemonic power 
of the government was applied in Lebanon when it came to the attitudes regarding the 
Palestinian refugees after the civil war. Even though the government’s power in many 
respects diminished after the war, its statements and propaganda enhanced the rejection of 
tawtin, and the public were open to a notion that blamed their misfortune on someone other 
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than themselves. The hegemonic power use coexisted with the facts that Lebanon was 
weakened, was occupied by foreign forces, and had been subject to violations, and the 
perceptions met with a welcoming anger and projection. 
 
A focus on weapons 
The fear of a new war may also explain the great emphasis on Palestinian weapons during 
my fieldwork. Many Lebanese claimed that the Palestinian refugees still had an unknown 
amount of arms inside the camps, and that some groups also had access to weapons stored 
outside the camps.543 They were perceived as a threat and were even used as an argument 
by some for not granting the refugees civil rights, as the state could not treat them as 
refugees when they acted as a ‘militia’.544 The majority of the sources disagreed with that 
view, but during my fieldwork this was the most divisive issue between Lebanese and 
Palestinians and between Lebanese themselves. There was disagreement about the danger 
and quantity of the arms as well as about their effect on Palestinian-Lebanese relations.545 
This exaggeration of basically unseen weapons indicates the fear of a new war, and the idea 
that the refugees still controlled weapons unattainable by the government was a frightening 
one in a war-ridden country where all parties had given up their priorities precisely in order 
to end the violence.546 
Likewise, the focus on Syria’s control in relation to the Palestinians grew after their 
withdrawal in 2005. The issues may have been linked, as there was a Lebanese suspicion 
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that the Palestinians were a source of continued Syrian influence. This may explain some of 
the Lebanese focus on those weapons.547 
 
Another likely consequence of the prevalent discourse was the lack of national criticism 
against the standards of the refugees’ conditions, at least until 2000. There were some 
reactions in the early years; and that was during a period of little general interest or 
awareness. But the lack of protests after the war was striking, and the few exceptions from 
the general conduct seemed based on particular circumstances or personal feelings rather 
than political opposition.548 The government did not prioritize the refugees, and the anti-
Palestinian feelings probably stayed popular or oppositionist protests. For the Lebanese, 
rebuilding the country had a higher priority than any obligations towards the refugees.549 
Farid el Khazen, for instance, claimed that Lebanon had its own priorities and ‘could not 
care less’ about the refugees.550 The perception that the Palestinians suffered because they 
behaved as they did in the war, was a part of the discourse. This discourse saw a certain 
change in the later years, first signalled by the criticism of the 2001 law which banned 
Palestinians from owning property.551 
The Palestinian role in the war was not the reason why the refugees were not 
granted civil rights, and neither was the Lebanese resentment of them. But the blame laid 
on the Palestinians may explain why many Lebanese believed that the war legacy was the 
reason the government did not grant the refugees civil rights, and claimed that conditions 
before the war were not comparable to the those after 1989. The need of a scapegoat and 
the belief that the PLO was to blame, Syria’s hegemony, the focus on weapons and the so-
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called anti-Palestinianism are all elements of how I believe the word ‘war’ was embedded 
in the Lebanese society and its collective mind after 1989. ‘War’ became a discourse where 
associations of blame and bitterness toward the PLO and its countrymen, and sometimes 
toward Syria, would spring to mind automatically. 
 
The right of return, the belief that the situation was temporary and the 
economic situation 
 
In a similar vein as the above, the discourse of tawtin gives more meaning to the 
explanations that the refugees were never granted civil rights because Lebanon supported 
their right of return or believed that their predicament was temporary. These two 
explanations were factors in common for all the Arab countries hosting Palestinian 
refugees, but all except Lebanon granted the refugees some civil rights without being 
perceived as negating their right to return. These issues alone thus cannot explain why civil 
rights were avoided in Lebanon, but relating them to the fear of tawtin offers a context to 
why Lebanon reacted differently. Instead of focusing on internal issues and problems, 
emphasizing the right of return allowed the Lebanese government to deny a group of 
people civil rights and still appear as championing and supporting their rights as a people. 
And claiming that the sudden and tragic situation of 1948 did not require legal reactions 
can also be attributed to the government’s ardent rejection of the idea of tawtin, even in 
1948. 552  Also, the justification that the economy would suffer, even though it was 
blooming, was probably tied to the discourse. However, we shall see below that the 
economic argument had different aspects as well. 
That the Arab host countries and Lebanon among them emphasized the right of 
return did not mean that they necessarily had motives other than supporting the Palestinian 
cause. Some probably believed that refusing to integrate the Palestinians in new countries 
was critical in order to avoid that they lost their right to return to Palestine. We saw that 
during the war, one reason why tawtin was not an issue was the idealism for the Palestinian 
cause; so idealism certainly seems to have played an important role in the Palestinian 
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discourse throughout the years. But the explanations of confessionalism, the right of return, 
the belief that the situation was temporary, the economy, the war legacy and the Syrian 
control all at least partly originated from the Palestinian discourse including the fear of 
tawtin, which blocked intermediate steps. 
 
The distinctiveness of the Lebanese society 
 
The fear of tawtin probably influenced the initial Lebanese reactions to the situation in 
1948; including the response that followed when it was believed that the situation was 
temporary. However, the different consequences this had in Lebanon may have had other 
causes than just the fear of tawtin and all that entailed – namely other distinctive features of 
the Lebanese society. The two explanations of confessionalism and Lebanese distinctions 
are obviously closely linked since the confessionalism was a Lebanese distinction and 
several others sprung from it; but all cannot be explained by the same discourse. Lebanon’s 
open society and divided identity were other factors used as explanations for the lack of the 
refugees’ civil rights, created before or alongside the birth of modern Lebanon. This was 
linked to the belief that the situation was temporary: Although that case was true for all 
host countries, some claimed that the mentality was different in Lebanon than in Jordan and 
Syria, who ‘thought’ that the Palestinians might stay from early on, whereas Lebanon did 
not.553 We have seen that in Jordan the refugees were an asset as much as a burden, and 
that this may have been true for Syria as well. For Lebanon, other priorities were part of the 
small country’s mindset. The explanations involving the identity of Lebanon herself may 
further examine and explain the prevailing belief systems.  
Whether or not the Lebanese felt more different from their neighbours than any 
other nation’s population might is not really determinable. But the basis and developments 
of the country was different than those of the other Arab countries, and it is probable that 
the factors that shaped Lebanon – specifically its confessional mosaic and politics and its 
economic system – made the Lebanese people feel unique in the region. We saw above that 
discourses such as the belief that everyone would benefit from upholding a certain 
confessional balance were prevalent, and these also formed the Lebanese understanding of 
its own history. The ‘uniqueness’ of Lebanon can be said to have been one such discourse, 
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and isolationist attitudes may have influenced the lack of integration of the Palestinian 
refugees. The lack of any economic integration could also be attributed the country’s 
capitalist economic system. 
In other words, although the confessional concerns, and thus the Palestinian 
discourse, were part of the Lebanese distinctions, other distinctive factors also played in. 
The distinctions led to an isolationist government policy alongside the ‘openness’ of 
Lebanon, and the capitalist system and limited state control were also factors leading to the 
lack of integration, independent of the discourse defined above. 
 
One consequence of the open society was the reaction to the different influences that faced 
Lebanon, especially, perhaps, the pan-Arab ideology and the economic structures. Pan-
Arabism was an influence in several Arab countries, like Syria; while Lebanon adhered 
more to a nationalistic mentality. Syria’s economic interests did not conflict with 
integrating the Palestinians.554 In Lebanon, private investors decided much of the country’s 
economic priorities; and this partly explains why Syria granted the refugees the right to 
health and education, while Lebanon did not. Also, the private economic system could help 
explain why so few medical facilities were open to the Palestinians: The costs were too 
high, and the state-run hospitals were fewer in Lebanon than in other countries. In other 
words, Lebanon’s distinctiveness led to different priorities than its neighbours, perhaps 
especially evident within the economic sector. 
 
Reviewing the economic situation 
 
Here we find again the argument that the economy hindered the granting of civil rights to 
the Palestinians. The economic crisis did not hit Lebanon until after the war. It certainly 
aggravated the conditions, perhaps making an integration of the refugees impossible; but it 
cannot explain why the refugees were not granted civil rights before. However, it was a fact 
throughout the period that the percentage of Palestinian refugees was higher in Lebanon 
than in the other Arab host countries, and that integrating them would require more 
resources. Integrating the refugees in Lebanon thus would have a stronger impact on 
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Lebanon: Not because the country was poor, but because of its size. Those claiming that 
economy and resources were problems before the war may either have been misinformed; 
have wished to exaggerate the economic problem; or they were in fact referring to the size 
of the country in relation to the size of the refugee community. 
Thus, the ‘economic situation’ was one of the justifications specific for Lebanon 
that was among the reasons for the civil rights situation, independent of the discourse of 
tawtin, although they were related to each other. 
 
Summary: Merging the explanations 
 
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that discourses and influences affected the way 
that the Lebanese related to the Palestinian refugees, both in practise and when suggesting 
reasons why the state did not grant them civil rights. In summary, we may conclude that the 
Lebanese confessionalism and all it entails of discourses and fear; the distinctiveness of the 
Lebanese identity, including its economic and ideological priorities; and lastly, the 
country’s size compared to that of the refugee population, are in fact reasons why the 
situation in Lebanon was different from the other Arab host countries when it comes to 
granting the Palestinian refugees civil rights. Lebanon’s nature as a multi-confessional state, 
with its capitalist economy and open society gave the country an identity in which feelings 
of brotherhood and support toward the Palestinians was felt by some, and not by others. 
The size, confessional system and possibly other traits of identity caused a fear of tawtin 
that was not present in the other host countries. 
 
The other explanations either originated long after the onset of the refugee situation or 
would also apply to all the other host countries, but that does not mean that they did not 
have an impact on the situation. In all probability, they were affected by the all-
encompassing Palestinian discourse which rejected tawtin for various reasons. Real 
idealism and a belief that the situation was temporary probably interfered; especially if we 
view the latter in relation to the specific conditions of Lebanon. And for the most recent 
decades, the results of the civil war and the crumbling economy certainly made matters 
worse for Lebanon; integrating new, decisive factors into the discourse. The argument that 
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the lack of civil rights was Syria’s fault was, in all probability, mostly an excuse, although 
the focus on Syria’s role also was a part of the discourse. 
All the explanations given for the lack of civil rights were somehow related to 
rejecting tawtin. One might say that all were influenced or even created by the discourse of 
the fear of tawtin, and probably by other discourses originating from the uniqueness of the 
Lebanese society. The official avoidance of mentioning the confessionalism was probably 
that which led to an increased focus on other explanations such as the economy, resources, 
and the right of return. 
 
Lastly, it must be noted that the ‘real’ reasons for the situation probably changed and 
merged through the decades. At the core, there was always a fear of tawtin based on 
confessional and economic priorities, and the Lebanese government always related to the 
Palestinian refugees because of the country’s specific conditions of size, political system 
and ideology. In the 1960s, idealist support for the right to return was added and became 
one reason for the lack of integration. The attitudes of different governments also 
influenced the situation; perhaps especially that of the military government of that era. We 
cannot know if the situation would have been different in the absence of Syrian forces, or 
what would have been the case if the civil war had ended differently. But the discourse of 
blame and the economic crisis may have become new reasons why the governments did not 
grant the refugees rights. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusions 
 
The conditions of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have changed in time, though less 
than one might expect in a time period of almost sixty years. While reports claim that the 
living conditions of the refugees were better in 2005 than they were in 1948,555  such 
statements seem to say more about the desperate situation of the first generation than of any 
satisfactory conditions of the third. The topic of this thesis has been the situation of the 
refugees in relation to their civil rights, and although the elements of that situation changed 
from 1948 to 1958, from 1958 to 1969 and from 1969 to 1989, it has shown that most 
fundamental conditions remained consistent through the period when the Lebanese 
government was in charge of the refugees. I have attempted to clarify the reasons for this 
situation by way of using findings from my fieldwork, particularly opinions and statements 
derived from interviews with Lebanese and Palestinian sources. I have considered the legal 
and de facto status of the refugees and related the empirical findings to two civil right 
conventions, and concluded that the consequences of the Lebanese government’s conduct 
is that the civil rights of health, housing, freedom of movement and labour were not 
fulfilled for the Palestinian refugees during most of the period, and that the government’s 
role in this was extensive. Focusing on these four civil rights has to a great extent 
illustrated general Lebanese attitudes and practises. I have also attempted to account for the 
contexts and the reasons for this situation by presenting and discussing prevalent attitudes 
throughout the period, and by discussing the different explanations that were given by 
Lebanese sources. This last chapter will briefly summarize the findings, draw some 
conclusions, and suggest criteria for a future solution. 
 
Summaries and conclusions 
 
In the introduction to this thesis, I explained the necessity of determining what the civil 
right situation actually was during the period when the Lebanese government was in charge 
of the Palestinian refugees, and this was done to a great extent in Part II. Through the 
empirical findings here, we saw that the civil rights of the Palestinians were indeed violated 
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– either directly through legislative measures or restrictive policies; or indirectly by the 
government’s not assuming responsibility or offering aid. Relating this to my first 
condition, then, the government was indeed connected to the problem, and could also be 
held responsible for some, though not all, of the sub-standard conditions. 
 
The foreigner definition 
Some civil right violations were caused by de facto policies such as isolation of the camps 
and checkpoints restricting the movement of the Palestinians; but most originated from the 
fact that the Lebanese state defined the Palestinian refugees as foreigners, and related to 
them by the principle of reciprocity. This conduct relied on the temporality of the refugees’ 
condition, so after nearly sixty years that logic was clearly outdated. We saw that formally, 
this policy did not violate any international stipulations, but that it led to a deprivation of 
the refugees’ rights in reality. No other group of refugees worldwide were systematically 
treated according to this principle (at least not without international disapproval), and no 
other Arab host country dealt with the Palestinian refugees in the same manner as Lebanon 
did. The result was that the official Lebanese conduct toward the refugees was 
unreasonable. The argumentation throughout this thesis leads to the conclusion that treating 
the refugees as foreigners, and the way it was done in Lebanon, led to a violation of their 
civil rights. 
 
The official tendencies 
In Part III we saw that in 1948-1969 and 1989-2005, attitudes varied among both Lebanese 
officials and the public, and were often influenced by political events such as Shehab’s 
military coup, the influx of the PLO to Lebanon, and the 1993 Oslo peace process. We saw 
that among prevalent attitudes were popular support, suspicion, repression and resentment. 
A lack of knowledge about the actual situation was also a tendency at times. But some 
tendencies were almost consistent, regardless of the changes inside and around Lebanon. 
First was the lack of a clear, written policy in which the government showed its conduct 
toward the refugees, especially obvious in relation to their vague legal status. We saw that 
the definition of them as foreigners only had more implications than was perhaps expected, 
and formed the background for many of the violations. A second consistent tendency was 
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the general disregard of any official responsibility, exemplified by the limited state 
institutions relating to the refugees, the lack of any health system relating to them, and the 
policy of isolating the camps after the war. The third pattern was the rejection of tawtin, 
continuously repeated in statements since 1949 and put into law in 1989. And fourth was 
the support for the Palestinian cause of which the right of return became the beacon. I here 
conclude that the official support was almost exclusively vocal: Apart from a few pieces of 
legislation in the 1950s, no support was given by way of legislation. And apart from the 
welcoming attitudes with regards to the housing situation in the 1950s and early 1960s, as 
well as the lack of restrictions on work until 1962, support was hardly a tendency in the 
practises either. The motive remained the same throughout the period: Measures were taken 
to avoid integration, in order to avoid tawtin. On the other hand, the public attitudes were 
much more varying, from broad support through unconcern to downright blame and 
resentment; followed by a new unconcern and an increasing sympathy since around 2000. 
 
The explanations for the conduct and tendencies 
When presenting explanations for the situation, previous studies have mostly focused on 
Lebanon’s confessional balance; the right to return; Lebanon’s density and economic 
situation; and the role that the Palestinians played in the Lebanese civil war. My study has 
confirmed that all were important factors, and that the Lebanese confessionalism was 
highly significant; but has also included explanations that have not been thoroughly 
discussed in earlier works. These are the belief that the refugee situation was temporary in 
the first years; the distinctions of Lebanon as a country; and the extensive war legacy rather 
than the Palestinian role in the war itself; which included the exaggerated focus on Syria’s 
influence on the refugee situation and on the illegal Palestinian weapons. My assumption 
that ‘other factors’ influenced the situation thus proved more than correct: Aspects I 
believed to be influences only were in fact believed to be true reasons by several Lebanese 
sources. 
 
Reviewing the hypotheses 
My first hypothesis were that the Lebanese government ‘consciously avoided integration of 
the Palestinians’, among other things by not granting them civil rights; and the second was 
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that the reasons most commonly used for the conduct were Lebanon’s confessional balance 
and the role of the Palestinians in the Lebanese civil war. 
The first of my hypotheses, thus, seems to have been accurate: The Lebanese 
government avoided the integration of the Palestinian refugees, and not granting them civil 
rights was a means for avoiding integration. It seems probable that much of the neglect was 
deliberate; originating from intentions or motives, and not merely from circumstance or 
chance. Part III included statements and examples that showed that at least some of the 
official conduct followed motives and patterns, and debated the existence of discourses and 
mindsets influencing the official position on the refugees’ civil rights, which caused an 
avoidance of tawtin and of anything that might lead to it. 
One of my assumptions was that the government used laws, coercive power, 
attitudes, discourses and statements in order to avoid tawtin. We saw that the government 
did use legislation, although to a limited extent. As for coercive power, that assumption 
only fit the decade of 1958 to 1969: For the rest of the period, it can hardly be said that the 
Lebanese government used direct oppression to a great extent, although similar means were 
employed by way of checkpoints and alleged threats. In fact, we have seen that discourses, 
which influenced the attitudes, were perhaps the most frequently applied ‘method’ for 
avoiding it, particularly when it comes to involving the public in the period after the civil 
war. It is likely that official statements were used to strengthen the discourses relating to 
the Palestinians. Whether or not the discourse accounted for in Chapter 8 was ‘used’ by the 
government cannot be determined by the methods of this thesis. One can only speculate 
that the post-war attitudes were not created merely by the government but by the war 
experience as well; and that the government sometimes employed the existing discourses in 
order to achieve the goal of avoiding tawtin more easily. 
 
As for my second hypothesis, relating to the reasons that were most commonly believed to 
account for the civil rights situation, I found that the right of return was equally, if not more, 
emphasized than the confessionalism and the Palestinians’ role in the civil war. That the 
Syrian influence on Lebanon also was among the most commonly mentioned theories was 
rather unexpected. The explanations based on the economic situation and the 
distinctiveness of Lebanon; including the reactions to the belief that the situation was 
temporary; were not as common, but were still stated frequently. I assumed that there 
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would be excuses for the situation as well, but this categorization proved to be more 
complicated. All the explanations were excuses in some sense, since all except one were 
presented as justifications for a tragic situation. They did not ‘excuse’ the situation, 
however, but rather ‘explained’ it, mostly stating how it was impossible for Lebanon to 
integrate the refugees. The only actual excuse presented to me was that which blamed the 
Syrian hegemony over Lebanon. When that was stated as a reason for the refugees’ 
problems, it was claimed that the situation was not acceptable and that Lebanon would not 
have allowed it to continue – excusing it, therefore, by blaming external factors, which 
were probably exaggerated. 
 
Throughout the thesis we have touched on the existence of a Palestinian discourse, created 
deliberately or unintentionally, and remaining prevalent in the Lebanese society. We have 
seen that the power of ideas; the prevailing belief systems; had a strong hold on the 
Lebanese perceptions of the Palestinian refugees. The idea that they would disrupt the 
confessional balance led the government to avoid tawtin, and to ban their civil rights. This 
idea of what integration could entail had a larger impact on the situation than any pragmatic 
causes had. It was merely a risk; a possible outcome of integration; but the belief and fear 
of a confessional disruption nevertheless guided the government’s actions and motives to 
an extent which was more important than the actual, tangible obstructions facing Lebanese 
integration of the refugees (although these existed as well). The Maronite-dominated 
government strengthened the discourse before 1969, and it fit into the war legacy after 
1989 and was strengthened by hegemonic power use. It caused the Palestinian discourse to 
reign the Lebanese perceptions of the refugees’ possible impact on the Lebanese society. 
 
The reasons for the civil rights situation 
The question I asked in the introduction to this thesis was why the Lebanese government 
did not grant civil rights to the Palestinian refugees in the country, and why the civil rights 
situation was different in Lebanon than in the other Arab host countries. And the answer, as 
far as I am able to determine, was that the confessionalism of Lebanon; the identity of 
Lebanon; and the economic basis of the country were the reasons for the specific situation. 
The confessional make-up of the country and the Lebanese identity formed a discourse 
where the idea of integrating the Palestinian refugees practically came to mean the 
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downfall of the Lebanese political system and possibly of the foundation of the modern 
state. The confessional system was a tangible reason for fearing tawtin of a new mass of 
Sunni Muslims; and the Lebanese distinctions as a country caused different priorities, both 
economically and ideologically, than Lebanon’s neighbours perhaps experienced. But 
without the prevailing belief system which linked it all and caused the Lebanese to fear 
Palestinian integration, these two reasons may not necessarily have affected the refugees’ 
civil rights in the country. Other belief systems also played in, such as the economic 
priorities. But the main reason, following the analysis of this study, was beyond any 
tangible obstacles. 
 
Apart from the world of ideas and discourse, the aspect of the economic basis was also a 
pragmatic hindrance to the refugees’ integration. By ‘economic basis’ I mean the country’s 
size and resources in relation to the size of the Palestinian population, and not the actual 
economic situation of Lebanon. However, the nature of Lebanon’s economy may have 
been a reason for one aspect of the conduct: The government did not control the majority of 
the facilities of health and education. Therefore, one might say that it was exempt from 
responsibility with regards to some aspects of these. But the economic system does not 
explain the situation fully, and therefore can only be a partial cause. 
 
Apart from the above, it is evident that several other factors influenced the situation. 
Political events and changes, most distinctively the civil war, probably caused 
developments that otherwise would have been very different. The post-war economic crisis 
did not explain the situation, but it was an obvious influence. Idealism and the role of Syria 
may also have been such influences. However, whether the causes were ‘believed’ or ‘real’ 
did not have as much importance, and were not as easily determined as I first supposed. 
The conclusion to the question, then, would be that there were several influences 
challenging and changing the civil rights situation of the refugees, some of which led into 
mere speculation of what might have been if the conditions had been different. But what 
remains are the three specific conditions of Lebanon: Her size, confessional nature, and 
specific identity; conditions that Lebanon was born with or achieved along the ways of her 
development. These formed the ideas that came to govern the society and the government’s 
mindset and discourse relating to the Palestinian refugees. 
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Criteria for change and solution 
 
What we have seen in this study makes it obvious that the situation of the refugees in 
Lebanon is in need of solutions; at least of a temporary solution that leads to the Palestinian 
refugees enjoying civil rights during their stay in Lebanon. A solution is not necessary only 
for the refugees themselves, but also for Lebanon. By retaining the camps in appalling 
conditions, the refugee issue has been kept on the international agenda, and the tactic was 
somewhat of a ‘success’ in that regard. But at the same time, the conditions of the camps 
have given Lebanon a negative reputation in the international community.556 Also, the 
government’s conduct began receiving criticism from its own citizens in the later years, 
especially in relation to constitutionalism.557 We saw that some Lebanese explained the 
violations of the civil right conventions with the quotation from the Constitution rejecting 
tawtin.558 But granting the refugees civil rights would not necessarily lead to tawtin: That 
was only a common perception. In fact, the Lebanese democracy was seen as challenged by 
some by the refugees’ presence, since it was problematic that a democracy should deny a 
group of foreigners civil rights for almost sixty years. And since violating the UN 
conventions was understood as unconstitutional, one might argue that only one of the 
courses of action in practise led to violation the country’s Constitution, and that was 
withholding civil rights from the Palestinian refugees. 
Yet another problem for Lebanon could be detected in Simon Haddad’s survey 
from 2000, where forty-three per cent of anonymous Palestinians reported to either be 
unsure, or would in fact accept Lebanese citizenship if it was offered to them.559 Where 
there before had been consensus between Lebanese and Palestinians that Lebanese 
citizenship was out of the question, this apparently was no longer uncontroversial among 
the Palestinians in Lebanon. The official argument that the Palestinians themselves did not 
want tawtin, then, might become outdated. Although the majority of the Palestinian 
refugees still rejected citizenship, the living conditions deteriorated to a level where some 
felt they might be persuaded to give up their cause in order to gain some rights and benefits. 
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This result was quite the opposite of the ‘three-step plan’ of the Lebanese government, and 
shows that the conduct might lead to a reduction of the feelings of Palestinian identity 
instead of a strong focus on it. In addition, matters such as illegal weapons, crime, and 
continued Syrian influence were emphasized as problems for the Lebanese. The journalist 
Ziad Majed, for instance, felt it was crucial to grant the refugees rights in order to solve the 
internal problems in Lebanon as well as those of the refugee community.560 The discourse 
that civil rights would lead to a disturbance of the confessional balance hindered integration 
of a large group who, instead of becoming integrated in society as they had in Jordan and 
Syria, became a burden, a mass of impoverished, discontented people with negative 
associations to anything Lebanese. Leaving the appalling conditions as they are only causes 
the problems to grow deeper, and if the day comes when the Lebanese open for their 
integration, that will release much more resources than if the problem were dealt with at an 
earlier stage. Khalil Makkawi felt that this had been a problem throughout the years, saying: 
‘It [the refugee problem] was not treated properly from the beginning, on the humanitarian level. If we had 
treated it properly from the beginning, maybe it would not have been compounded unto this turn for the 
worse.’561 
 
The economic and international criterion 
The first criterion for a solution to the situation is of an economic nature. During my 
interview with him, Khalil Makkawi said that the needs were too great to be covered by the 
state of Lebanon; the economy was in too critical a state. If the donor countries to UNRWA 
were to fund the projects suggested by the 2005 committee he was heading, he believed 
that seventy per cent of the problem would be solved.562 The fact of the matter is that in 
2005, solving the refugee problem would need a fundamental financial support by the 
international community. And this conclusion brings us to a second factor: Although the 
responsibility of Lebanon has been determined, Lebanon was also a victim to events it did 
not cause. We saw that the international community neglected its responsibility toward the 
Palestinian refugees almost from the onset of the problem. The role of the UN in relation to 
the Palestinian refugees, therefore, should be revised. A former director of UNRWA, Lex 
Takkenberg, claims that  the political sensitivity surrounding the Palestine question had a 
                                                 
560
 Interview with Ziad Majed 17.03.2006. 
561
 Interview with Khalil Makkawi 10.03.2006. 
562
 Interview with Khalil Makkawi 10.03.2006. For his quotations about this, see Appendix 5c and 5d. 
  144 
considerable impact on how both the UNHCR dealt with Palestinian refugees,563 but it is 
clear that the role of the UN ought to be enhanced. The unreasonable level of responsibility 
laid on the Lebanese government is not the focus of this thesis, but for a solution, it is 
crucial to recognize that the international community has neglected a responsibility it ought 
to acknowledge. There is no justified reason why the Palestinian refugees should remain 
the only group whose human rights are left entirely unprotected. The responsibility of their 
host countries is out of proportion compared to that of other host countries. On that note, I 
wish to emphasize that after 1993 especially, the Lebanese suspicion that the international 
community wished to ‘dump the problem’ on Lebanon in fact seems rather well-founded. 
This notion is not just a Lebanese excuse for the situation. Therefore, for a solution to the 
problem, the international community should assume at least some political responsibility, 
and critical for a valid solution is that Lebanon not be made to pay the expenses of 
integration. For health and housing, the only tangible hindrance of granting the refugees 
civil rights is economic. But before a solution to the unemployment crisis in Lebanon is 
found, it can hardly be expected that the whole work force of the Palestinian refugees could 
be granted the right to work, although economic aid would ease this process as well. As for 
the freedom of movement, this has little to do with the economic criterion, and a second 
one proves imperative. 
 
The discourse criterion 
The second criterion consists of dealing with the prevailing Palestinian discourse in 
Lebanon. There is a flawed perception that granting the Palestinian refugees civil rights 
would lead to their settlement and their receiving a Lebanese citizenship which would in 
turn shift the confessional balance. Even though the logic behind this is proven void, that 
does not mean that the problem is solved. Acting with consideration for perceptions and 
belief systems is just as important as finding pragmatic solutions. However important, one 
cannot simply state that the logic behind tawtin is not conclusive, and tell a society to 
change its belief systems. Discourses must be overcome through studies, though discussion, 
and through a real focus on the problem in Lebanon while respecting the special Lebanese 
conditions. In order to discuss solutions to the problem, the Lebanese perceptions of what 
the problem is must always be one of the foundations for the discussion. In a similar way, 
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the Syrian control and the illegal Palestinian weapons were the two aspects that came 
across as the most imperative ones to the Lebanese government and society; and although 
they were not the cause for the treatment of the refugees, the issues were still perceived as 
crucial. A solution, however temporary, demands that one considers the importance of 
these factors to Lebanon, even though they cannot be categorized as reasons for the civil 
rights situation. However, for a solution that grants the refugees civil rights in Lebanon, the 
logic behind tawtin must be redressed. 
 
A possible suggestion 
One might hope that the further the new generations are from the memories of war, the 
discourses of society might fundamentally change. One suggestion for a solution that might 
change the discourse was touched on by a few of my sources and consisted of granting the 
Palestinian refugees Palestinian nationality. Tariq Mitri was one of those who brought this 
up, saying: 
‘For some, when they say ‘we don’t want the Palestinians to be settled here’, they have in mind the fact that 
the Palestinians should not be given Lebanese citizenship, even if they stay here. They could stay, but with 
another citizenship, a Palestinian citizenship, for example.’564 
 
In order to appease the fear of tawtin, one solution could very well be that the Palestinian 
Authorities granted the refugees a Palestinian citizenship without necessarily planning their 
actual return, formulated in ways that could never be interpreted as to challenge that right. 
This would mean that they were no longer stateless, and the risk to Lebanon would be 
reduced and might introduce civil rights as that, and that alone: Civil rights, and not tawtin 
or resettlement. It would obviously not solve every problem, but it could be one way of 
trying a new approach, and starting the creation of a new discourse in Lebanon relating to 
the Palestinian refugees. 
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Postscript 
 
The time period of this thesis ended in 2005 because of events which yet again changed the 
Lebanese circumstances, the consequences of which were not clear at the time I finished this study. 
These developments began with the UN Resolution 1559, issued in September 2004, calling for the 
Syrian withdrawal from and the disarming of all militias in Lebanon. The Syrian withdrawal was a 
fact in March 2005 after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, and these events created 
an atmosphere where the general focus was on Lebanon’s sovereignty and on the weapons of both 
Hizbollah and the Palestinians. It was in this atmosphere that the new committee of dialogue 
between Lebanese officials and Palestinian representatives was established, led by Makkawi. 
Whether or not the committee’s work will lead to significant changes remains to be seen, but the 
development nonetheless marks the first time in history that the civil rights of Lebanon’s 
Palestinians were being addressed in an extensive manner by the Lebanese government, as this 
committee had representatives from all ministries related to the Palestinians. Changes in the official 
attitude towards the Palestinians was reported by Palestinian researchers as well.565 One result of 
the committee’s work was seen in the reopening of the PLO office in Beirut in May 2006, which 
gave the Palestinian refugees some formal representation. 566  There was also increased contact 
between the PLO / PA and Lebanese officials, increased cooperation between Lebanese and 
Palestinian NGOs, and a few statements of late 2005 also signalled that something might be 
changing within official Lebanese-Palestinian relations. A Lebanese newspaper quoted President 
Lahoud saying that ‘protecting the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is a Lebanese responsibility.’567 
Lahoud was not known for being more pro-Palestinian than his predecessors, but this was a clear 
change from earlier statements. In a similar way, a meeting that UNRWA had with Prime Minister 
Siniora in 2005 (prepared with a paper referred to in the thesis proper568) apparently gave some 
results. About one year after the meeting, a newspaper reported that some of the camp projects that 
Siniora had supported had received funding from the donor countries and were now ‘well under 
way’, and that Siniora, like Lahoud, claimed that the Palestinians were under the government’s 
protection, although they were the responsibility of the international community. The newspaper 
stated that ‘Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s commitment to the projects, first conveyed to UNRWA 
during a meeting in October 2005, marked a turning point in a historically troubled relationship.’569 
 
The statements must be seen in light of the new committee, which in its turn must be seen in the 
light of Resolution 1559 which called for an end to all militias, including the ones inside the camps, 
and which was met mostly with accept in Lebanon; as well as the newly established Lebanese 
sovereignty. Besides the new PLO office, no results have yet been reported. Any developments 
were stalled by the war between Israel and Hizbollah / Lebanon which broke out and ended in July 
2006. The focus of Lebanon yet again turned to war and rebuilding, and the work with the camps 
was put on hold. The short war was followed by a governmental deadlock and crisis, still remaining 
to be solved. Whether or not work will be picked up again and the government will follow through 
on its statements once the issues are resolved, remains to be seen. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
LIST OF INFORMANTS 
 
 
LEBANESE INFORMANTS 
Where it is known, the informant’s confessional belonging is listed. 
 
INTERVIEWS: 
Joseph Abu Khalil: Member of the Kata’ib, or Phalange party. Christian Maronite. 
Charif Fayad: Party secretary of the Progressive Socialist Party. Shi’a. 
Simon Haddad: Writer and researcher. Greek Orthodox. 
Farid el Khazen: Member of Parliament representing the Free Patriotic Movement. 
Writer and professor at the American University of Beirut. Christian Maronite. 
Lebanese Army: Two officers who wish to remain anonymous (not recorded). 
Ziad Majed: Journalist of the newspaper al-Nahar. 
Khalil Makkawi: Former ambassador to London, New York, and the UN. Leader of the  
2005 committee of dialogue with the Palestinians in Lebanon. 
Tariq Mitri: Minister for Culture. Christian Orthodox. 
Khalil Shatawi: Former director of the Department for Refugee Affairs (1994-2000). 
Writer. Alawite. 
 
OTHER: 
Hussein Awwad: Independent Member of Parliament, affiliated with Hizbollah. Shi’a. 
Tannous Mouawad: Former general of the Lebanese Army. 
Ziad Sayegh: Media Planning Consultant with the Ministry for Social Affairs. 
Kamal Shayya: Leader of the Youth Advocacy Forum. 
 
PALESTINIAN INFORMANTS 
 
INTERVIEWS: 
Salah Dabbagh: Lawyer. 
Haifa Jammal: Human Rights Officer with the Norwegian People’s Aid, Lebanon. 
Suheil al-Natour: Lawyer and general director of the Human Development Center, Mar 
Elias refugee camp. Member of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 
Salah Salah: Writer. Leader of the NGO Social Communications Center (Ajial). Former 
representative of the PLO. 
 
OTHER: 
Khaled Ayed: With the Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut. 
Rola Badran: Spokesperson for the Palestinian Human Rights Organization. 
Mahasin Baraskaji: Leader of Association Najdeh in Burj al-Barajneh refugee camp. 
Ghanem Bibi: Director of the Arab Resource Collective (Lebanon). 
  163 
Rita Hamdan: Representative from Popular Aid for Relief and Development (PARD). 
Jamal Issa: Director of the news agency Misof. Member of Fatah. 
Issam Soudidan: Leader of the Vocational Training Course in Burj al-Barajneh refugee  
camp. 
Jaber Suleiman: Writer and researcher. 
Wafaa el Yassir: Leader of the Lebanese Norwegian People’s Aid, Lebanon. 
 
 
OTHER INFORMANTS 
 
Anni Kanafani: Leader of the Cultural Foundation for Ghassan Kanafani. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
LEGISLATION RELATING TO RIGHT TO OWN PROPERTY 
 
 
This is included in the Appendix because it does not touch on the civil rights that were the 
focus of this thesis. The property laws hardly affected the houses in the camps, but rather 
referred to Palestinians owning property outside of the refugee camps. 
 
Before 1969 there was no legislation regarding foreigners’ rights to property, as Lebanese 
law had initially been very liberal in relation to this.572 In 1969, however, Palestinians were 
included in Decree no. 11614, which stipulated the nature of non-Lebanese property rights 
in Lebanon. According to the decree, foreigners must file an application to the Minister of 
Finance who would pass it on to the Council of Ministers in the government. They then 
may or may not grant a property license. The decisions were not subject to appeals, and 
here is a good example of the way that individuals and policies determined the status of the 
Palestinians more than the legislation itself. Decree 11614 also barred foreigners from 
owning property within three kilometres from Lebanon’s borders, and stipulated the 
maximum size of the property according to the nature of the area.573  Property licenses 
exceeding 5,000 square metres could not be granted to ‘single’ foreigners (meaning a 
family); whereas companies may be granted ownership over areas that exceeded these 
limits. If this happened, there were strict limitations as to who could sign on as owners of 
the company.574 
According to the Ministry of Finance, Palestinian property outside the camps in 
1993 formed one quarter of foreigner’s property in Lebanon, or 0.00001 percent of 
Lebanon’s total area.575 
 
The second law influencing Palestinian property rights was Law 296 from 2001. This law 
was an amendment to Decree 11614, and cancelled all the rights of Palestinians to own 
property. After repeating Decree 11614’s condition that foreigners need apply for licenses, 
the law reads: 
‘A person not enjoying a nationality from a recognized state is not allowed to acquire any real right of any 
kind. This applies also to others if the acquisition is incompatible with the Constitution’s clauses regarding 
the rejection of the refugees’ settlement.’576 
 
This amendment did not only in its text and nature ban Palestinians specifically from 
owning property in Lebanon; it also caused Palestinians who had bought property on 
instalment before April 5, 2001, but who had not registered it since the payment was not 
completed, to lose the property. This way, some 5,000 families lost property that they had 
paid for.577 This inspired deputies and lawyers to protest, and the Minister for Justice, 
Samir al-Jisr, published a memo ordering employees to allow Palestinians to register before 
implementing the new law: 
                                                 
572
 Sayigh 1988, 17. 
573
 Marsûm raqm 11614. Al-Natour 1997, 372f. 
574
 Al-Natour 1997, 373. 
575
 Al-Natour 2003, 53. 
576
 Law n. 296, Article one-new, Official Gazette issue n. 15, 2001. 
577
 Al-Natour 2001, 11. 
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‘…it is the right of Palestinians who have paid for their real-estate properties, before the new law, to register 
if they have the necessary appropriate documents.’578 
 
The amendment was a discrimination of Palestinians based on their national origin, which 
violated the ICCPR’s fourth article (see Chapter 5). In addition, several politicians 
interpreted the law as being unconstitutional on the grounds of being discriminative. On 
April 20, 2001, ten deputies representing different parties appealed to protest the 
amendment. The parties represented included the PSP, Hizbollah, the Nationalist Syrian 
Social Party, the Hariri bloc, and the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party.579 This law, then, was 
one of the few which received collected protests cross-politically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
578
 Al-Natour 2003, 65. 
579
 Al-Natour 2003, 67. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
The Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon 
 
 
 
 
CAMPS IN 1961 
 
LEBANON REFUGEE CAMP PROFILES 
 
 
CAMP 
 
NUMBER OF REGISTERED 
REFUGEES 
 
 
Dekwaneh Camp 
 
4,731 
 
Burj el Barajneh Camp 
 
6,178 
 
Jisr el Pacha Camp 
 
1,451 
 
Mar Elias Camp 
 
472 
 
Shatila Camp 
 
4,065 
 
Dbayeh Camp 
 
2,251 
 
Nahr el Bared Camp 
 
7,806 
 
Biddawi Camp 
 
3,875 
 
Gouraud Camp 
 
3,335 
 
Wavell Camp 
 
2,582 
 
Buss Camp 
 
4,237 
 
Rashidieh Camp 
 
2,509 
 
Burj el Shemali Camp 
 
5,259 
 
Nabatieh Camp 
 
3,037 
 
Ein el Hilweh Camp 
 
13,312 (plus 274 unofficially registered) 
 
Mia Mia Camp 
 
2,003 
 
Source: 
UNRWA 1961, Activities in Lebanon, pp. 27-34 
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CAMPS IN 1989/2005 
 
LEBANON REFUGEE CAMP PROFILES 
 
CAMP NUMBER OF REGISTERED REFUGEES 
Mar Elias 612 
Burj el-Barajneh 15,484 
Dbayeh 4,002 
Shatila 8,212 
Ein el-Hilweh 45,004 
Mieh Mieh 4,473 
El-Buss 9,287 
Rashidieh 25,745 
Burj el-Shemali 18,625 
Nahr el-Bared 30,439 
Beddawi 15,641 
Wavel 7,551 
Dikwaneh & Nabatieh 
(destroyed camps) 16,282 
+ 9,595 refugees distributed throughout the camps. 
 
Source: 
UNRWA: Lebanon Refugee Camp Profiles, at URL http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/lebanon.html 
(downloaded 27.03.2007) 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
ADDITIONAL QUOTATIONS 
 
 
Related to Chapter 6: 
Lebanese Attitudes and Statements Regarding the Palestinian Refugees 
 
 
A) Jean Malhat, 1951 
 
Jean Malhat, collection of ministerial declarations, 81f, in al-Natour 1993, 38 (referred to 
on page 81). The statement read: 
 
‘Le gouvernement libanais s’associe aux gouvernements des pays frères dans toutes les 
dispositions qui visent à contenir les dangers qui pèsent sur la Palestine. Il a apporté sa 
contribution aux aides décidées par la Ligue arabe, a fourni des munitions et des armes. (…) 
Le Liban ne pouvait pas faire moins dans le domaine humanitaire et matériel. Il a accueilli 
des dizaines de milliers de réfugiés, a soignés les blessés et les a traités avec respect. (…) 
Le gouvernement veille à leur santé, leur assure logement et nourriture. Il leur apporte toute 
l’aide et l’assistance nécessaire.’ 
 
B) Kull-Shay, 1951 
 
“The Arab refugee problem. How it can be solved”, 1951, 25. From the newspaper Kull-
Shay (referred to on page 83). The statement further read: 
 
‘Who brought the Palestinians to Lebanon as refugees, suffering now from the malign 
attitude of newspapers and communal leaders, who have neither honour nor conscience? 
(…) The Arab States, and Lebanon amongst them, did it! Does not Lebanon share in the 
common responsibility for their fate? But when she is asked to shoulder the burden of the 
outcome of her participation in a political and military misadventure [the 1948 war], some 
newspapers and certain groups hasten to foretell calamities and disasters.’ 
 
C) Prime Minister Karami, 1969 
 
International documents on Palestine 1969, 580 (referred to on page 85). Interview 
Statements by the Lebanese Prime Minister Karami on Lebanon’s Policy as Regards 
Israeli Threats: 
 
‘…once a people decides to take up arms to defend their rights nothing in the world can 
stop them. I have said before and I now repeat, that the Palestinian resistance fighters 
deserve our admiration and respect.’ 
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D) President Sarkis, 1981 
 
International documents on Palestine 1981, 27 (referred to on page 87). Speech by 
President Sarkis: 
 
‘If the Palestinian cause has its sacred inviolability, the sanctity of Lebanon’s unity, 
security, sovereignty and independence is obviously second to the sanction of no other 
cause. Here our disappointment and bitterness when some behave as if it were permissible, 
in their view, to jeopardize values, principles and rights relating to Lebanon in the process 
of defending or settling another issue. (…) But how long must Lebanon continue to suffer, 
how long is it permissible for Lebanon to suffer, on behalf of others?’ 
 
E) Khalil Makkawi, 2006 
 
The former PLO spokesman Salah Salah and the director of a committee of Lebanese-
Palestinian dialogue established in 2005, Khalil Makkawi, explained the situation of the 
1991 committee (referred to on page 89). Here follow an extract of my interview with 
Makkawi, 10.03.2006. 
 
Maria Reme: Mr. Salah told me that they gathered some of the heavy weapons and handed them to the army – 
Khalil Makkawi: Correct. 
MR: He said all the heavy and medium weapons, and the army said they could keep the light ones inside the 
camps – 
KM: Correct. 
MR: And then they postponed the meeting and Mr. Salah never heard from them. 
KM: In my personal view, the Syrians did not want a deal, because most ‘Arafat and Fatah were dominant in 
Lebanon. Maybe Syria did not want a deal that ‘Arafat was involved in. In one way or other, maybe they 
torpedoed the negotiations. 
MR: Salah also told me that all the parties seemed pleased with the talks, and then it just… 
KM: …fizzled away. Of course, you cannot point at one thing and say ‘that’s why it failed.’ 
MR: But it was set up to deal with the problems? 
KM: Correct. But it did not succeed. 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
ADDITIONAL QUOTATIONS 
 
 
Related to Chapters 7 and 8 
All quotations are from Lebanese interviewees, unless otherwise noted. 
 
A) On the subject of the confessional balance 
 
 
The party secretary of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), CHARIF FAYAD, said, when 
I asked him about the situation in the first period: 
 
‘There is a problem in Lebanon; it is the sectarian balance. You know most of the Palestinians are Muslims, 
so if they are integrated in the Lebanese society, they will raise the Muslim share in the government. And 
Lebanon is a small country. If the Palestinians have the right to have land and property, this will help them to 
change their stature, and they will be Lebanese. From one generation to one generation, they work; they 
marry; they raise children – slowly and slowly, they will become Lebanese.’580 
 
He emphasized later that he and his party strongly supported granting the refugees civil 
rights, and that Lebanon should deal with the Palestinians as with ‘any other foreigner in 
Lebanon’: 
 
‘We have more than 500,000 Syrians, working and living in Lebanon, and most of them are not legal. So why 
must we fear the Palestinians? No. They must have their civil rights. What shall an engineer do, if he has no 
right to work in Lebanon? Shall we force him to leave the country? Or shall we leave him in poverty, and 
illiterate?’ 
 
B) On the subject of the right of return 
 
 
When I asked the Maronite MP and academic FARID EL KHAZEN why the refugees did 
not receive civil rights, he said: 
 
‘What kind of rights do you have in mind? Citizenship? (…) You would end the cause. Israel would tell us 
okay, you solved our problem. This is what they are saying.’581 
 
When I defined civil rights as including work and education, he said that these rights were 
handled by UNRWA, and that Lebanon did not have the economy to deal with them. 
 
* 
 
I asked the researcher SIMON HADDAD whether he believed that granting the 
Palestinians civil rights would lead to their implantation, and he said that the issue was 
linked to the right of return, especially in light of the peace process of 1993: 
                                                 
580
 Interview with Charif Fayad 27.02.2006. 
581
 Interview with Farid el Khazen 14.03.2006. 
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‘The Lebanese government is keen not to do any act or any action that could be understood by the Israelis that 
they are willing to negate the right of return. That’s why the case of the Palestinian refugees is frozen. There 
is no progress, and no one is talking about the humanitarian and social side, they only talk about the political 
problem.’582 
 
* 
 
I asked the Palestinian SALAH DABBAGH about the right of return, and he said: 
 
‘Yes, it is important, but the right of return does not mean that the refugees should be treated with 
substandard conditions.’583 
 
 
C) On the subject of the belief that the situation was temporary 
 
 
When I asked about the situation of the first period, KHALIL MAKKAWI said: 
 
‘There was no issue except that it was not treated properly from the beginning, on the humanitarian level. If 
we had treated it properly from the beginning, maybe it would not have been compounded unto this turn for 
the worse. The Palestinians were not looked upon as a threat, they were seen as poor refugees in the camps, 
waiting for a solution. And Lebanon was doing what it could to help, with its means. But basically our help 
was on the political level, through the UN etcetera.’584 
 
* 
 
I asked TARIQ MITRI what issues were the most important in the first period. He said: 
 
‘In the sixties, no one talked about this: It was a general assumption that they would go back to Palestine. And 
liberating Palestine, going back to Palestine, was kind of a general, undifferentiated perception. Things 
became more focused on when the peace process started, I think, and you knew that returning to 1948 Israel 
was not possible; that Palestinians are going to have a state on the West Bank and Gaza. And then, in 
conjunction with this turning point in the Palestinian history, then the issue of the future of the Palestinians in 
Lebanon became an issue. Before, I don’t think it was. Civil rights were an issue, but also less controversial 
and less acute than it is now, because I mean in the sixties, Palestinians had only been there for twelve or 
fifteen years, and they were in camps. There was a sense that all of this is provisional, that they will go back. 
So it’s only normal then, that they have a kind of precarious status. And they were first generation refugees. 
Now they’re second, third – in some cases fourth. There are people who were born here, who went to school 
here, who have no life elsewhere. So that is why it has become an issue, it was not in the sixties. (…) As far 
as I remember, before the war in the sixties [the six-day war], there was a kind of universal perception that 
this is altogether provisional. They’re going back, so why bother give them...? I think in the background there 
was always fear that they would disrupt the fragile communal balance.’585 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
582
 Interview with Simon Haddad 08.02.06. 
583
 Interview with Salah Dabbagh 15.03.06. 
584
 Interview with Khalil Makkawi 10.03.2006. 
585
 Interview with Tariq Mitri 07.03.2006. 
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D) On the subject of economic influences 
 
 
The Palestinian lawyer SALAH DABBAGH said, in response to my enquiring after the 
state of Lebanon’s economy: 
 
‘Lebanese emigrate. In general, this has been historical. We have no natural resources.’586 
 
* 
 
KHALIL MAKKAWI said, when I asked about the goals of the new committee: 
 
‘There is a list of so many demands. We have the very important issue of improving the lives of the 
Palestinians inside the camps. This means executing projects for the infrastructure, schooling, education, 
health facilities. All these projects need money. And Lebanon is already in an economic crisis. We strongly 
feel that this is the responsibility of the international community. UNRWA was created to help the 
Palestinians, and the burden should be shouldered by the UN. We are speaking with many donor countries to 
contribute more to UNRWA so that they can execute many vital projects in the camps.’587 
 
 
E) On the subject of the war legacy 
 
 
CHARIF FAYAD said, when I asked about his party’s history with the Palestinians: 
 
‘We were allied with the PLO, because we think that the Palestinians have right to let their case live, and 
they must take over their case in their hands. But we were against their behaviour inside Lebanon.’588 
 
He also said that the behaviour had grave consequences: 
 
‘This military stature deprived the Palestinians from being integrated in the Lebanese society, made them a 
military existence, not a civilian existence.’ 
 
* 
 
I asked SIMON HADDAD what the greatest obstacles to giving the refugees civil rights 
were, and he said: 
 
‘Some, or many of the Lebanese do not have a positive memory or positive ideas about Palestinians in 
general, they are inclined to segregate them from the other groups in society. You can say it’s discrimination, 
but it is somehow a justified discrimination for some groups, especially the Christians, and the Shi’a 
Muslims.’589 
 
He emphasized later that he did not mean that it was justified to keep civil rights from the 
Palestinians. 
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 Interview with Salah Dabbagh 15.03.2006. 
587
 Interview with Khalil Makkawi 10.03.2006. 
588
 Interview with Charif Fayad 27.02.2006. 
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 Interview with Simon Haddad 10.02.2006. 
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FARID EL KHAZEN stated the following: 
 
‘Once the PLO was established in Lebanon, Lebanon was involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. You had 
Israel, you had Syria, you had Jordan, you had Iraq – and the PLO attracted all these forces into Lebanon. Not 
because of Lebanon but because of the PLO in Lebanon.’590 
 
He emphasized the meaning of the weapons greatly, and stated that there was an 
inseparable link between the civil right or humanitarian situation of the refugees, and their 
weapons. He also linked the war legacy directly to the weapons and the humanitarian 
situation: 
 
‘The problem here is that the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and refugees elsewhere - if we go by the same 
standard - there are no refugees anywhere in the world that carry weapons. So if the Lebanese Government 
wants to deal with the refugees as ‘refugees’, no doubt the refugees have rights and we have to give them 
these rights. But we cannot, on the one hand, accept the Palestinian argument that they are refugees one day, 
and the next day they are controlling areas that are inaccessible to the Lebanese Government.’ 
 
He claimed that the government undeniably would protect them once they gave up their 
arms. Farid el Khazen was the only one among my interviews who did not mention the 
confessional balance as a reason, nor did he directly answer when I asked whether civil 
rights would lead to tawtin. His main focus was the military status of the refugees, and he 
said that in order to debate civil rights, Lebanese and Palestinians must first create a 
climate of trust, and in order to do this, the situation of the weapons in the camps must be 
solved. 
 
* 
 
TARIQ MITRI suggested quite the opposite from el Khazen, when I asked him about the 
issues of the weapons and the civil rights: 
 
‘There are those who say that these issues are not separable, but even though this is true, we want to separate 
the issues and deal with them independently. We don’t want to favour a logic of bargain – you give us this, 
we give you that. We want to be genuine, sincere, in wanting to address of the humanitarian situation – no 
matter what comes out of our dialogue about the arms. At least for some of us, that is the case.’591 
 
Mitri was part of an official delegation that visited the camps in 2006, and he also 
recounted his experience to me, related to the issue of weapons and the perception of their 
threats: 
 
‘Even I, who have a history with the Palestinians – people told me ‘what the hell are you going to do there?’ I 
saw the Prime Minister before going to Sabra and Shatila, and an official there told him: ‘But this is a good 
minister, why are you giving him a one-way ticket?’ I told him ‘Come on…’ and he said ‘I don’t know – I 
don’t want you to take risks.’ I said ‘I’m not taking risks, don’t worry about me.’ But that’s the perception.’ 
 
Mitri did not go to ‘Ayn al Hilweh, but his visits in Sabra, Shatila and the camps of Tyre 
were positive experiences of some importance, and the camp dwellers were ‘pleased to see 
them’. 
 
                                                 
590
 Interview with Farid el Khazen 14.03.2006. 
591
 Interview with Tariq Mitri 27.03.2006. 
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I asked the Palestinian SALAH SALAH about the state of the weapons, and he said: 
 
‘I think up to now, you cannot find weapons in the hands of everybody. You find it only in the hands of the 
Armed Struggle, which is the Palestinian police, and with some people who are guarding their offices, or 
offices to some Palestinian factions, not more. (…) Those who are speaking about Palestinian weapons 
outside the camps and inside the camps, they are exaggerating. It is not real! There are no weapons outside of 
the camps. And even inside the camps, it has been well organized since 1991. (…) Maybe there are some 
accidents here or there – it is normal, it happens anywhere. In the United States you can find weapons here 
and there, everywhere! So, I think this problem has been resolved since 1991.’592 
 
F) On the subject of the Syrian influence 
 
 
When I asked TARIQ MITRI what his views were that Syria controlled the government 
and the camps until 2005, he said: 
 
Tariq Mitri: ‘To a great extent it’s true. Syrians have always played one against the other in Lebanon, so that 
they would be looked upon as the supreme arbitrator. Different groups were encouraged to come to Damascus 
as a last resort – and in order to become a last resort, you need to create dispute. I think was a pattern of 
Syrian behaviour, and it’s true of Lebanese-Palestinian relations. But you also have to consider the Lebanese 
themselves. Especially the Christians and the Shi’ite Muslims, who have had unhappy experiences with the 
Palestinians, were not prepared to deal with them in a fair, just, reasonable, peaceful manner. (…)’ 
Maria Reme: ‘Perhaps the Syrians encouraged this treatment and the Government did not feel the need to 
argue?’ 
Tariq Mitri: ‘Very little.’593 
 
* 
 
We saw that KHALIL MAKKAWI explained that the demise of the 1991 committee was 
caused by Syrian influence, and he also said that the committee that he was heading was 
able to deal with such issues because Syria had left:  
 
‘It is only after the ousting of the Syrian military presence of Lebanon that Lebanon became free to look at 
this issue. And that’s why the committee exists and that’s what we are doing now.’594 
 
He later added that the Syrian withdrawal was not the only reason for the committee: 
 
‘Lebanon’s new government thought that the time has come to face this challenge that has been dragging on 
for so many years without a proper solution. Because of the withdrawal of Syria, our job will be easier 
because there will be no interference with what we want.’ 
 
* 
 
HAIFA JAMMAL was the human rights officer at the Norwegian People’s Aid, and when I 
asked about Syria controlling Lebanon and causing the problems, she said: 
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 Interview with Salah Salah 10.02.2006. 
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‘I agree a little bit from a different point of view. (…) The Syrian government was in control of the situation 
in Lebanon. And if they had made the decision to improve the situation of the Palestinians, they could have 
done so. They could. But they didn’t. (…) They didn’t encourage the Lebanese government to improve. 
Already the situation was not good, but they didn’t encourage them.’595 
 
* 
 
While discussing the relations and cooperation between the Palestinians and the Syrians, 
which FARID EL KHAZEN deemed extensive, he asked me to inquire about this from 
Palestinian officials, and insinuated that they never wished to speak about this. 
 
Former PLO official SALAH SALAH claimed that Lebanon focused on Syria and the 
Palestinians in order to have an excuse for the situation: 
 
‘They use it for political reasons. First, they want to say ‘okay, the Syrians have withdrawn’. But their 
representatives the Palestinians are still there and still working for the interest of the Syrians. Second, they 
want to say ‘okay, Palestinian weapons are a part of the weapons of Hizbollah. They want to make a link 
between the weapons of the Hizbollah and the Palestinian ones, to prove how dangerous the weapons of 
Hizbollah are.’596 
 
Palestinian lawyer SUHEIL AL-NATOUR put it this way: 
 
‘The negative manipulation of the human rights of the Palestinians began since our arrival, and Syria was not 
here. What the Government uses as reasons, let them. What we are living is a continuous deterioration, with 
or without the Syrian presence.’597 
 
 
G) On the subject of the distinctions of the Lebanese society 
 
 
KHALIL MAKKAWI claimed that the political system of Lebanon mattered to a great deal: 
 
‘In Syria and Jordan there were dictators. They were not allowed to behave there the way they did in Lebanon. 
The proof of this was Black September. So why the Palestinians were treated differently here is also because 
of the different system – in other Arab countries they are not allowed to behave in this manner. This is very 
important.’598 
 
Relating this to the war legacy, he believed that the negative image the Lebanese had of the 
Palestinians may have been avoided if they had not been allowed to behave in the manner 
they did during the war. 
 
* 
 
TARIQ MITRI confirmed that there were anti-Palestinian feelings, but also said that there 
were anti-Syrian feelings: 
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‘Lebanese have developed a sense of being the ‘best Arabs’. It was always the most Westernized, and 
therefore they looked down on other Arabs. They looked down on Africans because of the history of 
emigration there – they went, made money, and came back – took people’s fortunes. So there is a history of 
having a sense of superiority over other Arabs, which plays against the Palestinians. While in Syria or Jordan 
the Palestinians were the same as the Syrians.’599 
 
Mitri emphasized that this was not one-sided or complete. Lebanon’s people may feel 
superior, but it was mixed with an openness and hospitality towards others: 
 
‘We were better than Sweden when it came to welcoming Kurds, and Armenians, and Syrians. They have 
been integrated. We welcomed the Palestinians when they came in 1948. One the one hand we welcomed the 
influx of peoples. It’s a mix, it’s ambivalent, it could go either way.’ 
 
* 
 
Phalange party member Joseph abu Khalil said the following about the distinctions of 
modern Lebanon in the Middle East: 
 
‘L’objectic était de créer en Liban un état de droit. Ca veux dire un pays de liberté; a tous les niveaux; 
démocratique. (…) Surtout, la liberté de croyance. (…) C’est unique au Moyen-Orient. (…) Le Kata’ib s’ont 
faitent pour soutenir ce projet d’état.’600 
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